


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No 8, August 1990

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CONTENTS

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Distribution of Labor in USSR [L.M. Martseva; pp 3-12]	1
Collective and Individual: Civilization Perspective [V.G. Kremen; pp 13-21]	7
Culture and Alienation [V.N. Orlov, O.I. Karpukhin; pp 22-29]	12
Vox Populi—Voice of the "Elect"? [E.S. Gams, V.I. Petrov; pp 53-57]	17
When the Marriage Partner Is Bought [M.S. Berdyayev, F.N. Ilyasov; pp 58-65]	19
Real and Imaginary Dilemmas, or the Mass and Elite Culture [A.B. Gofman; pp 106-111]	24
Communist Views on Perestroyka in the Party [A.V. Lipskiy; pp 119-129]	28
Professional Growth of Young Specialists [G.N. Sokolova, V.G. Drakokhrust; pp 130-133]	36
Articles Not Translated	38
Publication Data [p 160]	38

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 8, August 1990

Distribution of Labor in USSR

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press 29 Jun 90) pp 3-12

[Article by Lidiya Mikhaylovna Martseva, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent in Department of Socialist Theory and Philosophy of the Omsk Railway Engineers Institute]

[Text] The perestroika of Soviet society was made necessary by the deformation of the fundamental principles of socialism in recent decades. The success of the initiated reforms will entail a thorough analysis of the deformed elements to learn which socialist principles were distorted or unrealized. The issues of concern here are fundamental—forms of property ownership, the democratization of the political system, the social class structure, and ethnic relations. Labor issues should occupy the most prominent place.

Above all, the distinctive features of socialist labor in the pure sense of the term, particularly universal compulsory labor as the basic premise of socialism, will require impartial analysis. This principle was formulated in the earliest socialist treatises and was common to utopian and scientific socialism. From the RSFSR Constitution of 1918 to the Fundamentals of Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics of March 1988, universal compulsory labor has been viewed as the basis of labor relations and as the legal source of the livelihood of citizens. In its more than 70 years as a constitutional premise, universal compulsory labor was never questioned by anyone from the standpoint of theory and practice.

Utopian socialism stipulated that "all people must work" (Saint-Simon) as an essential condition of social equality. The study of the causes of social inequality and class antagonism led pre-Marxist socialists to the conclusion that these phenomena were directly related to the unequal distribution of labor in the society, where parasitical classes and estates make their living by appropriating embodied and live labor. Thomas More was also referring to this privilege of the ruling classes when he spoke of the "colossal number of nobles...living in idleness, like drones, off the labor of others"[2]. When the utopian socialists divided society into parasitical and laboring classes on the basis of their participation in labor and suggested that the unequal distribution of labor was one source of private property, they proposed the principle of universal compulsory labor as a means of eliminating private ownership. This premise found its way into the "Communist Manifesto" in the form of a policy demand: "Equally compulsory labor for all, and the establishment of industrial armies, particularly for farming"[1]. The relatively equitable distribution of labor among all members of society without exception

would have reduced the labor participation of some by involving others in socially useful labor. This socialist principle was always regarded as the main condition for the elimination of social inequality in the sphere of production, appropriation, distribution, and consumption.

In an article entitled "Marx and the Western World," E.V. Ilyenkov says that the young Marx turned to communist ideas because even before he was a communist, Marx viewed their spread as a symptom or a theoretically naive expression of the completely real conflict which was coming to a head in the social organism of the leading countries of Europe[3]. When the utopians studied the distribution of labor in society, they concentrated on the following social problems: 1) the relationship between unequal distribution of labor and property relations; 2) the division of society into parasitical and laboring classes and social groups on the basis of participation in labor; 3) the division of labor itself into productive and non-productive, socially useful and "useless" forms. These aspects of labor within our social organism still require close scrutiny, although the reader might accuse us of theoretical naivete in the expression of a completely real situation. This naivete is compounded by the misleading figures at our disposal.

The number of able-bodied members of the country's population of 288.8 million in January 1990 numbered 164 million, 139 million of whom were employed in the national economy. If we subtract the 25 million able-bodied individuals who are not employed in the public labor network and the 12 million full-time students, we are left with 13 million able-bodied individuals who are not engaged in any kind of labor at all. The existence of this number of "available labor resources" was first admitted by USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] in January 1990[4]. According to its estimates, the non-working able-bodied population numbered 6 million in July 1989[5]. A 2.5-fold increase in the number of people who are not working in just half a year is an alarming symptom.

Our statistics are so misleading that it is difficult to believe them and even more difficult to work with them. In June 1989, for example, USSR Goskomstat listed the number of able-bodied individuals as 160 million, but in January 1990 the figure was 164 million, which would mean that the country's labor resources were augmented by 4 million people in just half a year. Goskomstat, however, reported that the increase for the whole year was 900,000. Goskomstat estimated the number of people employed in the public sector of the national economy at 128.6 million in 1988 and 139 million in 1989, but the increase of almost 10 million a year in the working population (we should recall that the level of unemployment in the United States has stayed at around 7-8 million for the last decade) is not corroborated by the insignificant growth of the cooperative sector (2.9 million people at the beginning of 1990) and the private sector (300,000) or personal subsidiary farming (4 million), which are augmented mainly by manpower from

the state sector of the economy[6]. For this reason, if we take the number of employed able-bodied individuals as 130 million[7, p 19], it turns out that around 34 million of the 164 million able-bodied individuals do not work, including 12 million students and more than 20 million (and maybe "around" 39 million) people representing "available labor resources" of working age. Our conclusion is that the number of able-bodied individuals not engaged in socially useful labor must be clarified.

As a rule, there are no "careless" estimates of this kind in foreign statistics. For example, 138.1 million of the 243.9 million people in the United States are able-bodied[7, p 19], and more than 119 million are employed in national production. The remaining 19 million members of the economically active population consist of 12 million students and 7.4 million unemployed individuals[8, pp 166, 395]. These statistics tie up all of the loose ends and present a completely distinct picture of the structure of employment in the United States without any reservations or contradictions.

It is an extremely difficult matter to clarify the exact number of able-bodied individuals in our country who do not work because the indicator of population distribution by sources of livelihood "disappeared" from reference works in recent years. Analyzing the unacceptable state of domestic statistics in general and the mistakes in the organization of the all-union population census in 1989, which predetermined the inaccuracy of its results, M.S. Tolts directs special attention to the presumed errors resulting from the inaccurate calculation of data or the complete absence of data on sources of livelihood[9].

The non-working able-bodied population has turned into an acute social problem. In 1989, people between the ages of 18 and 29 represented around 40 percent of the citizens who received official warnings from the militia on the need to find a job in the Central Asian republics, the Transcaucasus, the northern Caucasus, and the Kazakh SSR, and 50 percent in the Georgian SSR[5], and in Tajikistan 25 percent of the able-bodied population does not work. Only 4 percent of the able-bodied population of Khorezm Oblast works in industry. As a result, all of the necessary products have to be shipped into the oblast[10]. The reserve labor army in the Kirghiz SSR has been estimated at 60,000[11]. Statisticians estimate that around 2 million in the Central Asian republics, or 13 percent of the able-bodied population, were not employed in social production in 1988. More than two-thirds of the able-bodied population not involved in social labor lives in rural communities in the Central Asian republics; "a significant portion of the group is engaged in housework and private subsidiary farming." (But what about the remaining portion, and how large is it in comparison to the "significant" portion?) The author of these calculations believes that "the ideas about the labor surplus in Central Asia need revision," because he feels that people engaged in private farming should be categorized as people "engaged in

socially useful labor"[12]. Engels once criticized Duehring for saying that "playing a game of skittles or taking a walk" could be regarded as work because they demanded the expenditure of time and energy. Fourier described people engaged in housework as "household parasites." I think the issue is more complex and is connected with the degree to which labor is collectivized, the level of material and technical equipment, and the national and historical traditions of land use in Central Asia, for which the proper social forms of organization have not been discovered. Through the press and through announcements, the job placement bureau is constantly inviting people to apply for jobs in the worker professions in the public utilities, production, and construction, but cannot find a manpower supply. This is why we cannot accept the recommendations of Central Asian republics regarding the resolution of the employment problem by locating production facilities in the region. We have to wonder who will build the enterprises and then work there. Are these people not likely to represent a "restricted group," "migrants," and an "ethnic minority" in relation to the native population, as they already do in several republics? I think that this will require a thorough investigation of traditional national types and forms of economic management and the development of the kind of production that will feel natural to the people of the east and the Transcaucasus.

We must admit that the problem of people not engaged in social production (and numbering in the millions) is a problem of individual republics and of the country as a whole. This suggests the need to analyze the "idea" of the free labor market and of unemployment as a factor enhancing labor discipline and productivity. "We must be able to discuss, objectively and without fear," N. Shmelev suggests, "what benefits we might derive from a comparatively small reserve labor army, which the state certainly cannot leave completely to the mercy of fate.... The real danger of losing one's job and having to apply for temporary compensation or to be obligated to work wherever one is sent is not a bad medicine for laziness, drunkenness, and irresponsibility"[13]. The "real danger of losing one's job," however, does not threaten workers yet, especially in labor-intensive production, and it does not threaten people engaged directly in agricultural labor, teachers, or practicing physicians, who are still in short supply even in big cities, not to mention "the hinterlands." In fact, this "danger" will threaten mainly the bureaucrats, and if their fear "enhances labor productivity" and causes them to fill out two documents per capita instead of the present one document, this is not likely to solve the problem of "laziness, drunkenness, and irresponsibility."

The discussions of the free labor market and unemployment make us wonder: Do we really need them, or should we admit the fact that unemployment already exists in covert (idleness in the workplace) and overt forms, in view of the fact that several million able-bodied individuals are not engaged in socially useful labor?

The acknowledgement that unemployment is a fact of our life would require us to move from mere discussions to concrete offers of state assistance to the unemployed. We need genuine economic and socio-legal guarantees of the individual's constitutional right to work and the appropriate social measures to provide the individual with work or to pay him compensation as a legal source of income if the state is unable to provide him with a job. This raises the question of the social status of the unemployed and the state's obligations to the individuals it cannot provide with jobs. Legal criteria are needed to determine the differences between parasitism, or the refusal to work, and unemployment, or the inability to find employment.

In the case of parasitism, we should concern ourselves with society's *right* to urge the individual to work (through socioeconomic and legal mechanisms and to define labor-related sources of income. In the other case, we should be concerned about the state's *obligations* to the individual it cannot provide with a livelihood. In general, we have to admit that we are experiencing difficulties connected with the existence of the significant (numbering in the millions) portion of the able-bodied population with no legal—i.e., labor-related—sources of income and livelihood.

The utopian socialists associated non-involvement in labor with a rise in vagrancy, crime, and other social aberrations. Foreign scientists—and, in recent years, even domestic scientists—see this as the social origin of the legal offenses generating non-labor income. In 1989 the increase in these offenses acquired menacing proportions and constituted the following figures in relation to 1988 statistics: an increase of 26.8 percent in premeditated murder and attempted murder, of 47.3 percent in aggravated assault, of 73.4 percent in muggings, of 25.4 percent in the theft of guns and ammunition, and of 39.4 percent in other felonies[14]. Thefts of the personal property of citizens increased by a factor of 1.5, and thefts of state and public property increased by a factor of 1.7[4].

The rising crime rate is connected with the more pronounced property and economic differences in society. Studies in Latvia revealed a vivid example: More than half of all the planned savings in the republic were concentrated in 3 percent of the savings accounts (data of this kind were not reported for other regions). The average savings of these depositors amounted to 23,700 rubles. There was a 32-fold difference between them and the remaining 97 percent of depositors. In the USSR around 40 million people had an average monthly income of under 75 rubles in 1989[15]. Around 54.5 percent of the population was paid from 100 to 200 rubles, and only 17.2 percent had an average monthly income of 200-250 rubles or more[14, p 3]. The average income in the USSR can be compared to the official poverty level in the United States, which was 11,611 dollars for a family of four in 1989[16], or to the indicators of per capita gross product and personal consumption in different countries, among which the

USSR ranks 68th and 77th respectively[17]. Annual turnover in the shadow economy during the same period was estimated at 70-150 billion rubles[15, p 1]. Examples of this kind confirm the strong tendency toward more pronounced economic differences in our society. Whereas the results of social clashes are social vices (crime, prostitution, drug addiction, suicide, vagrancy, etc.), their causes are directly related to the distribution of labor in society. In other words, the gross social product, produced by only part of the working population, is confiscated from the immediate producers by legal and illegal means for distribution and redistribution in favor of non-producing social groups.

It is difficult to determine the actual state of employment in our society in this sea of misleading figures. The reference work "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let" [The USSR National Economy in the Last 70 Years] says that 73 percent and 27 percent of the population are engaged in physical production and the non-production sphere respectively[18, p 411]. These figures, however, include the recently revealed 18 million administrators making up 14 percent of all people working in the national economy. Around 5 million people, or 6.7 percent of the population, are employed in the civil service in the United States[8, p 191]. Ever since 1960, reference works on the USSR have invariably said that 2 percent of the population works in administration, credit, and state insurance[19, p 360]. This figure does not correspond in any way to the 18 million officially declared administrators or to the almost 40 million administrators S. Andreyev writes about[20]. This most likely refers to an administrative staff within the larger administrative category. It is probably impossible to judge the number of all administrators from the statistical tables which usually include them in the "employee" category.

"There is a whole stratum in society which cannot be called exploitative, because no one works for it officially, but can be called parasitical with complete justification. It lived (and still lives, to some extent) in an atmosphere which will be inconceivable to the future inhabitants of the communist society," G. Khvatkov writes[21]. This is an example of utopian terminology in our own day. We can understand why G. Khvatkov calls this a parasitical stratum, stipulating that it is not exploitative, but because parasites have to live off the labor of others, this raises questions about the exploitative essence of this division of society in terms of participation in socially useful labor. There is no other explanation for the 40 billion rubles paid out annually for the maintenance of only the administrative staff[22].

According to the reports of the USSR Ministry of Defense and according to the law "On the State Budget of the USSR for 1990," total expenditures on defense this year will amount to 70,975,800,000 rubles—8.2 million less than in 1989. The cost of maintaining the army and navy was estimated at 19,323,300,000 rubles. The stated personnel strength of the USSR Armed Forces as of 1 January 1990 was 3,993,000—or almost 4

million[23]. According to LIFE, the American magazine, 2.1 million people were on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces in 1989[24].

It is impossible to get any idea of the labor contribution of servicemen in the civilian economy, of their employment for the needs of society or, conversely, of the waste of the live labor of the healthiest and most able-bodied segment of the population. There are no data on the number of internal troops and personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or on expenditures in this sphere. It is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the labor contribution and maintenance costs of convicts. The labor of the members of society who have chosen to spend their lives in monasteries, spiritual institutions, and religious communities is also of interest to us, especially now that their contribution to social labor in the form of repaired and restored historical monuments is clearly apparent, and now that the labor of an entire social stratum is beginning to transcend its original confines and enter the spheres of, for example, public health and the offer of various types of assistance (charitable services, for example) to the Soviet population.

Other groups also occupy a specific place in the distribution of social labor but do not have a specific place in the existing social structure. "These are economic managers on different levels, people involved in the distribution and exchange of the products of the national economy, small socialist entrepreneurs, accounting and clerical personnel (or employees), dealers in the shadow economy, and others"[25]. Therefore, because of the absence or shortage of information, it is extremely difficult to single out several social groups and strata, define their place in the existing system for the distribution of social labor, and categorize them as parasitical (supported by the society) or laboring classes and strata.

According to statistics, 82 million people are engaged directly in physical production[19, p 363]. Around 61 percent of them are workers[19, p 351]. This figure, however, includes junior service personnel and security guards. Around 31.3 million workers are employed in industry, 10.9 million work in the lumber industry and agriculture, 9.1 million work in construction, and 95 million work in transportation and communications[19, p 365]. In January 1990 there were 977,000 job vacancies in industry, 119,000 in motor transport, 654,000 in construction, and 245,000 in trade and public catering. Personnel turnover in the labor-intensive branches of production rose to 14-17 percent in 1989. Labor overloads in branches with a manpower shortage are accompanied by the deterioration of labor discipline[4, p 2].

The number of people employed directly in agriculture, including official recruits, is 22 million[18, p 300]. (This is approximately equal to the number of administrators, but it could be only about half as high.) Our rural workers are engaged mainly in routine labor, which has changed slowly under the influence of mechanization. This is why there are significant qualitative differences behind the external similarity of our figures and foreign

statistics. The agroindustrial complex in the United States employs 21 million people, but the ratio of farm workers to the number of people employed in other branches of the complex is 1:9[8, p 181]. A more precise comparison of indicators of this kind requires the consideration of relative labor productivity, which represents, according to our official data, 55 percent of the U.S. level in industry and under 20 percent of the U.S. level in agriculture[18, p 632]. According to the calculations of B. Bolotin and A. Ulyukayev, labor productivity in the USSR was equivalent to 45 percent of the American level in industry and less than 10 percent of the U.S. level in agriculture in 1989[26]. Annual output per worker in industry was 59,000 dollars in the United States in 1986-1990 and will rise to 69,500 dollars in 1991-1995. In the USSR this indicator was equivalent to 28,000 dollars in 1986-1990 and will rise to 38,300 dollars in 1991-1995. This means that the U.S. indicator of annual productivity is more than twice as high as the USSR indicator in industry and almost 10 times as high in agriculture. In U.S. agriculture the annual output per worker was 58,700 dollars in 1986-1990 and is expected to rise to 64,600 dollars in 1991-1995. In the USSR the respective figures are 6,100 dollars and 7,500 dollars[26].

According to CIA calculations, the total cost of the goods produced by 243.8 million Americans in 1987 was 4.436 trillion dollars, but the more than 288 million Soviet citizens produced goods worth only 2.375 trillion dollars[27]. What is interesting here is not only the figures, but also the method the agency used to compare population size and production volume. It underscores the interdependence of these indicators, which is highly logical and applicable in our analysis. It reveals that the average American earned 18,200 dollars in 1988, while the income of the average citizen of the USSR was equivalent to 8,400 dollars[27]. The twofold gap is revealed in several indicators—the total production volume in the United States and USSR, the productivity of the labor of a single individual (particularly in industry), and average annual income. This does not seem to be a coincidence, and it is probably a case of a direct cause-and-effect relationship.

A significant portion of useless and absolutely harmful (according to Fourier's definition) labor is concealed in national production. This is attested to by economic indicators, the country's position in the world market, and the standard of living of its population. The estimated costs of unproductive and destructive labor are colossal. The above-norm volume of incomplete construction, for example, increased by 5 billion rubles in 1989. The cost of suspended projects reached 24.2 billion rubles in 1988, although new construction projects were begun that same year at a cost of 59.1 billion rubles. The total cost of the ongoing construction projects of the USSR Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry was 9.8 billion rubles, with actual construction lagging 5 years behind schedule, and the estimated cost of the projects of the USSR Ministry

of the Chemical Industry was 14.4 billion rubles, with a 6-year lag. In the country as a whole, construction projects take two or three times as long as plan schedules, and actual construction costs are usually two or three times as high as estimated costs (some examples are the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant, the Baykal-Amur trunkline, Neryungri, etc.). Designers estimated the cost of building the canal to reroute Siberian rivers into Central Asia at 13.8 billion rubles (excluding the cost of establishing a production and social infrastructure). The project could actually cost the society 90-100 billion rubles. The ecological consequences are unpredictable and cannot be assessed. Experts describe projects of this kind as economic adventurism[28]. "The agents of destructive production," in Fourier's terminology, collect a salary for their labor, but the burden of paying for and maintaining their projects is becoming too heavy for the society to bear.

The data used to categorize the population according to participation in total social labor can be collated in a single table for the sake of graphic demonstration and comparison (the sources of the figures were indicated as they were presented, and some are the result of our calculations).

Distribution of Population According to Criterion of Participation in Total Social Labor, millions of individuals

Categories	USSR	United States
Total population	287.8	243.8
Unemployable	127.7	105.7
Economically active (able-bodied)	160	138.1
Engaged in social production	132	119
Subcategory of servicemen	5.2	2.1
In administrative sphere	18	5
In physical and non-physical production	108.8	112
Able-bodied individuals not engaged in social labor	28	19.1
Full-time students	12.3	12
Unoccupied	15.7	7.4*

* Number of officially unemployed individuals.

First of all, although the population is much larger in the USSR (by almost 44 million), fewer people are engaged in productive labor than in the United States. If we consider the lion's share of useless or "destructive" labor and the twofold and tenfold (in different branches) lag

behind the United States in productivity, we have to wonder exactly how many people produce our total social wealth. In the industrially developed United States, half of the population works, but in our country, with its low level of labor productivity and highly wasteful use of live labor, just over one-third of the population works. Furthermore, we have almost four times as many administrators and more than twice as many people who do not work at all. In a brilliant critique of his own contemporary society, Fourier once wrote that two-thirds of the population was living parasitically off the remaining one-third, producing nothing and giving the society nothing. Fourier listed the following parasitical social groups: 1) *household parasites* (women, children, the elderly, and servants engaged directly in housework); 2) *social parasites* (the military, all types of officials, tradesmen, lawyers in the service of the ruling classes, merchants, and others); 3) *other parasites* (bums, idlers, criminals in prison, prostitutes, swindlers, and other antisocial groups)[29]. It is hard to admit, but it seems that we have not progressed too far from the society Fourier describes.

An analysis of the distribution of labor in the USSR at the turn of the decade suggests that universal compulsory labor does not exist. Total social wealth is produced by around a third of our population. Around 20 million able-bodied citizens do not work anywhere, do not have unemployed status, and are creating a dangerous situation conducive to crime in the society. All of the "useless" labor which cannot be appropriated by society is having a devastating effect. We can draw the following conclusions: The present quantity and quality of labor cannot guarantee the socioeconomic progress of the country or allow it to "break out" of its present situation; the social form of labor that took shape in the 1930s and existed until the 1970s has now been completely disrupted, causing a crisis in all societal structures; society's primary objective should be a labor reform to secure the involvement of most of the population in social labor with the aim of economic stability and social progress.

In the process of its historical development, labor acquires the specific forms of existence defined by the term "social form of labor," reflecting the dialectical unity of productive forces and production relations. The traditional definition of the socialist form of social labor in socialist science is the following: Labor is directly social, planned, and devoid of exploitation—i.e., free, universal, and creative. Today this is an unsatisfactory approach to labor in science and practice. We must admit that in the Soviet period of the history of the USSR, labor took an essentially coercive form, using extra-economic and economic means of coercion.

Under the effects of dialectical laws, labor is revealing a need for new forms of organization. The autonomous and spontaneous release of the individual from the coercive social form of labor attests to its destruction. Our society is living through a stage in its history in which the old form of labor has been "discarded" and steps have been taken to "revise the content" of labor

and find a new social form. The search for this constitutes the essential purpose of the processes occurring in our country and in the entire socialist and non-socialist world.

General trends in the development of contemporary productive forces and the division of labor and the interdependence of all of the links of a single world economy suggest the necessary guidelines of labor reform in the USSR:

The freeing of labor should not be accomplished through personnel cuts, but through the reduction of the compulsory workday. A whole group of measures will be required to institute a shorter workday, flexible schedules, work in the home, equal numbers of workdays and days off (at enterprises with continuous work cycles), a dynamic temporary employment system, etc. Short and non-debilitating periods of compulsory labor, supplemented with free time for creative pursuits, constitute the ideal social form of labor and are central to utopian and scientific socialism.

The biological characteristics of the human being are such that overloads of any kind lead to deviations from the norm in the health of the organism. A variety of pursuits, changes in activity, alternating periods of work and rest, the reduction of work time to provide more free time, and the display of individual natural traits, abilities, and talents (temperament, mood, habits, etc.) without hurting the production process—only collective forms of labor make the combination of all of these possible. This is why the process of freeing labor is connected with the development of collective forms inside and outside the sphere of compulsory labor.

There are other guidelines as well, but these underscore the main principles of the social form of free labor. They could be called classic because the roots of these ideas go back centuries into the past, and the effectiveness of their application has been confirmed by labor organization practices in developed countries, where these trends and guidelines are more and more prevalent.

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Collective and Individual: Civilization Perspective

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to
press 29 Jun 90) pp 13-21

[Article by Vasilii Grigoryevich Kremen, candidate of
philosophical sciences]

[Text] "The free development of each is essential to the
free development of all"—this imperative of humanistic
thinking, which was only of metaphysical significance (as
a projection of the communist ideal into the future) to
the founders of Marxism, is acquiring concrete empiri-
cal, and even worldwide historical, significance in our
day. In this article we would like to discuss some aspects
of this process.

Of course, the dialectical relationship of the human
being and society, the collective and the individual, and
so forth is one of the traditional subjects in the social
sciences, and one on which researchers have expressed
diverging views. It is significant that until recently the
prevailing practice has been the encouragement of the
"new people" to believe that "collectivism" is the
essence of real socialism and "individualism" is the basis
of the bourgeois order. The author of this article was
party to this[1]. The new social realities which have
taken shape during the course of perestroika, however,
have urged us to take a discerning look at many seem-
ingly indisputable premises of socialist construction. The
foundation for this in the social sciences has already
been laid in the extremely constructive article by Yu.A.
Zamoshkin[2].

"One for all..." "the primacy of group interests..." "the
socialist type of personality..." and other "figures" of
ideologically charged speech, which are familiar to the
Soviet people from their childhood, live in a specific
kind of "philological reality" which was created by
assigning absolute value to the social-class approach to
sociohistorical analysis[3]. Now we are finally realizing
that it can serve as a genuinely scientific method only in
combination with other "perspectives." An analysis of
current processes in the East and the West provides
empirically valid evidence of this.

Perestroika forced us to reconsider these matters, but
can we confine this to a mere analysis of the "deforma-
tion" in this area? It seems to me that this line of
reasoning—which is essentially normativistic and there-
fore unavoidably dogmatic—is clearly inadequate today.
The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for
the 28th party congress contained the statement, which
has still not been fully appreciated, that the idea of
humane, democratic socialism is not just another social
experiment, to be imposed on the social process by force,
but the means by which the country will embark on the
road of organic and natural historical development.

With a view to this, we will start by describing the
distortions the idea of collectivism and individualism
underwent in our past practices.

First of all, the collective principles of the authoritarian
system were inconsistent with the full appreciation of
individual interests and led to the invariable subjugation
and even the stifling of these interests. The clearest
indication of this is probably Stalin's description of the
human being as a "cog" in the social machine. The ideal
of this mode of social organization is a "human factor"
devoid of individual features and wholly subordinate to
the interests of the group.

It is completely obvious that this approach not only
conflicted with Lenin's view of socialist collectivism, but
was also inconsistent with the goal of socialism—the
thorough and balanced development of the individual. It
was inevitable that standardization would keep the
human being from expressing his individuality, prevent
the complete disclosure of his abilities and inclinations,
and impede their development. "The Stalinist distor-
tions," M.S. Gorbachev wrote, "led to the loss of the
main premise of the Marxist and Leninist idea of
socialism: the view of the individual as the end rather
than the means"[4].

To a considerable extent, this was due to the unjustified
practice of contrasting the collective to the individual
and to a misunderstanding of their dialectical relation-
ship. In the bureaucratic administrative structure of
society, the hard-won truth that there can be no genuine
collective interest outside the individual interest and
that the highest purpose of collective action is the
creation of all the necessary conditions and prerequisites
for the genuine flourishing of individual interests, which
would, in turn, enrich the spectrum of collective interests
and foster organic social integrity and community, was
ignored.

Second, although collectivism retained its basic charac-
teristics until recently, it is largely formal and lacks
strong internal connections because it is based not on the
actual interests of individuals, but on factors of a dif-
ferent kind—pseudo-revolutionary enthusiasm at best
and coercion or even outright brutality at worst.

Third, the emphasis on collective interests, in which the
individual was underestimated and kept in a subordinate
position, invariably also included the cult of a specific
individual. Furthermore, this occurred not only on the
level of the country and party, but also on the levels of
the region, oblast, city, or rural community.

It sounds illogical to suppress individuality on the one
hand and to extol specific individuals on the other. It is
only contradictory on the surface, however. The ten-
dency to ignore the individual and individual interests
robbed collectivism of its natural integrating mechanism
and gave the cult a chance to fill this gap and promote
unification, thereby preserving the collective entity.

It must be said that this made the collective structure rigid and conservative, because it rested largely on official bureaucratic foundations which did not reflect the actual needs of the society, and it was therefore even less able to change in the process of natural social development. Furthermore, this kind of collectivism, in which the role of a single individual was exaggerated, lost its resistance to the irrational conduct of this individual, his unreasonable behavior and his generally capricious and even criminal actions. This was the cause of many problems—from the inefficient administration of specific collectives, due to the assignment of absolute value to the role of a single administrator, to the possibility of using leadership status for the commission of terrorist acts against the leader's own people.

These features of the past displays of the "collectivist" essence of socialism were one of the main reasons for the "barracks" brand of social relations that became prevalent in the Stalin years. Pseudo-democracy became their integrating feature. It hampered the constructive potential of the people who were responsible for the socialist revolution, impeded the disclosure of the potential of the new order, distorted its values and ideals, and seriously deformed the Soviet people's way of life by preventing the maximum development of their individual abilities and the complete realization of these abilities in social practice.

The logical result of this organization of social life can only be a social impasse, referred to as "stagnation" in our history. The deadlock cannot be broken without the establishment of genuine socialist collective principles during the process of perestroika and the restoration of the proper dialectical relationship of collective and individual interests.

I want to stress that the present definition of collectivism is largely a result of the new global realities which are acquiring more and more common human features. This, in turn, signifies a new stage of civilization.

Several features of the present phase of human development are having a significant impact on the interpretation of the collective and individual dialectic in modern society. In general, they indicate two interrelated tendencies. On the one hand, collectivism is becoming an organic feature of mankind on the global scale. On the other, new and unprecedented opportunities for the thorough display of individuality are being created. Both processes are closely interrelated and are reflected in the single and integral flow of human progress.

Let us take a closer look at the first of these objective tendencies: the increasingly collective nature of world civilization. It is primarily due to the fact that the continued existence of the human race has been made impossible outside the collectivist framework by global problems.

The global implications must be viewed from two standpoints: from the standpoint of the potential impact of

these problems, and from the standpoint of the possible solutions, which will necessitate global action.

When mankind acquired the ability to destroy itself, it entered a crisis signifying the impossibility of development within the earlier parameters of the antagonistic world social systems and the existence of isolated and inimical states. The divided human race is coming to the end of its history. A new and integral world is being born. The total group of countries is turning into a world community, and mankind is acquiring more and more of the features of a single global collective.

In contrast to the original situation in which collectivism allowed man to oppose nature, now it is giving him a chance to counteract his own destructive influence. Whereas the primitive level of technical equipment in the primitive society resulted in small-scale activity, autarchic behavior, and a lack of unity, cooperative labor is acquiring global dimensions in today's civilization, and this will lead eventually to the creation of a worldwide community of nations and a unique planetary collective.

The establishment of this situation will eliminate the threat of self-destruction, and mankind will enter a post-civilized era in which the free development of each individual will actually become a condition of the free development of all.

Mankind in its present state contains the new elements which could become the basis for the resolution of the crisis and could change the face of civilization. As for the threat of nuclear self-annihilation, this assigns colossal importance to the steps to minimize military confrontation, especially the elimination of a whole category of weapons. Mankind, personified above all by the USSR and United States, has not only given the impending danger abstract acknowledgement, but has also been capable of qualitatively new actions which seem absurd and irrational from the traditional standpoint because they signify the destruction of the results of labor, but are absolutely reasonable and completely rational from today's standpoint because they pave the way for the progress of mankind.

As for man's destructive effects on the environment, this also points up a few elements which can be developed and endorsed everywhere in order to stop these processes and to restore much of what has already been lost. Above all, these include the modern technological processes developed and incorporated in the most highly developed countries, including waste-free and energy-saving processes, as well as processes with other conserving properties.

Before these elements and others can acquire global scales and confirm the new state of civilization, however, concerted action must be undertaken by all mankind on the basis of collectivist principles.

The objective bases for this exist. In the economic sphere they have taken the form of the progressive internationalization of productive forces and the intensification of worldwide economic exchange, constituting the material content of international economic life. Integration processes are undergoing unprecedented development, and this is reflected in the stricter international regulation of economic processes, the gradual formation of international economic complexes, the expanded international transfers of goods, manpower, and financial resources, and the equalization of internal economic conditions in different states, particularly those belonging to international associations. Division of labor is bringing different countries and peoples of the world closer together, encouraging their interaction, and making them interrelated and interdependent. The most visible processes are occurring in Western Europe, where an essentially new type of international community, with its own currency, labor market, and capital and with the free movement of citizens within the EEC framework, will take shape by 1992.

Considerable experience in collective coordinating activity has also been accumulated in the political sphere. The existence of the United Nations and many other international organizations for several decades and their increasingly active and productive functioning established the kind of practical experience in planetary political cooperation that is already permitting successful interaction in the resolution of the most complex regional and worldwide problems. The political basis of united action by mankind is also being reinforced by the tendency toward stricter adherence to democratic principles in the activities of states. The events of late 1989 in the European socialist countries can be regarded as some of the results of this tendency.

In the spiritual sphere there has been a constant augmentation of the intellectual community of mankind, reflected in part in the ever stronger and broader flow of information between countries.

The rapidly developing community of mankind is also apparent on many other levels. They include the more active, broader, and unimpeded movement of people throughout the world, the broader exchange of the results of their activity, both material and spiritual, the creation of a common field of world information, the establishment of the "common skies" idea, and others.

The second tendency I mentioned consists in the unprecedented expansion of opportunities for the display of individuality. Mankind seems to be entering a qualitatively new phase in attitudes toward individuality. It is distinguished by the creation of objective prerequisites for the implementation of a postulate declared many times in the past—the supreme value of human life.

This is reflected, first of all, in the fact that the level of development of productive forces in the industrial countries and the achievements of agricultural production and medicine are laying the material foundation for the

extension of the biological lifespan of the absolute majority of people. Mankind is reaching the stage at which it can put an end to hunger and provide for the continued existence of each person born into this world. Solutions to these problems have been found, but they cannot be employed within the confines of traditional social relations. This will require the establishment of a single world community basing its activities on collectivist principles. The creation of the necessary conditions for the biological existence of each individual is a material prerequisite for its genuine establishment as society's highest priority.

Second, there is the possibility and even the need for each individual and his development to become the central concern of the society. The new form of production developed during the process of the present scientific-technical revolution, based on intellectually charged technology, demands the disclosure and development of the individual's abilities, creating a social need for the more balanced and thorough development of the individual. It is completely obvious that as mankind progresses, it will depend more and more on the degree to which each individual can realize his own potential.

Third, mankind's potential for self-destruction objectively increases the value of the life of each individual. The establishment of an atmosphere of concern for each specific individual everywhere in the world and the concentration of society's efforts to preserve the life and secure the thorough development of each individual will strengthen mankind's chances of survival. The tendency to ignore individuality and individual interests and disregard the very existence of these interests will pave the way for the mutual annihilation of individuals and nations.

Fourth, the increasing unity and heightened integrity of mankind will lead objectively to the humanization of interpersonal relations and assign higher priority in the system of world social relations to the development of each specific individual. The transformation of mankind into a unified worldwide collective will enhance the individual status of each person as one of its elementary components and will reduce or neutralize the importance of mediating structures, including states, by bringing the individual "closer" to all mankind.

These are objective tendencies, but the increasing value of each individual can only be manifested fully in an atmosphere of genuine collectivism, where the true dialectical unity of the collective and the individual will be affirmed as the two sides of the single life force.

How have global tendencies affected the changes that have taken place in our country during the process of perestroika?

Above all, the new political thinking which was formulated and proposed by M.S. Gorbachev during the period of perestroika is the fullest expression of the realities and prospects of today's world, including those mentioned above.

Reflecting the distinctive features of contemporary international development, especially the integrity of the world and the priority of human survival, it contributed to the move from the earlier primacy of class interests to the primacy of common human interests. It confirmed that the objective unity of the human race, which always had common interests, regardless of class and other differences, had acquired the level of integrity at which the realization of particular (class or national) interests would be impossible without consideration for general human interests. Otherwise, there would be the real danger of not only the destruction of the integrity of mankind, but also the termination of its very existence.

To an increasing extent, the new thinking is becoming the methodological basis of perestroika. On the one hand, this has allowed us to overcome Stalin's view of socialist construction, resulting from the assignment of absolute value to the class approach and from the eventual distortion of this approach and accompanied by nihilistic attitudes toward common human values, and on the other it has urged us to take all of the processes occurring in today's world fully into account. It is precisely on this basis that the theoretical model of contemporary socialism should be founded and its realization should begin.

Global tendencies, including those determining the essence and relationship of collective and individual principles, are reflected in the reforms in literally all spheres of social life in our country. We can take the tendency toward the development of collectivism in the economic sphere as an example. The present transformation of the total group of countries into a world community, based on collective principles, has the formation of a single world market as its economic basis. The participants in this market will be states as well as individual production collectives. The USSR cannot participate in this market without getting rid of the authoritarian methods of economic management, establishing its own domestic market, and granting participants in this market the right of free and direct participation in the world market. This is one of the motives and goals of the economic reform in our country. We have to establish a market economy "field" for the stimulation and regulation of national economic development and the organic inclusion of our country in the new world market.

Let us take a look at the political sphere. The processes in this sphere, including those influenced by the positive experience in foreign democratic practices, are contributing to the organic inclusion of our country in the political fabric of today's world. The augmentation of the people's legal knowledge will lead to the establishment of strong bases for socialist self-government, not only for the effective regulation of domestic political relations, but also for the maintenance of stable inter-governmental ties and the promotion of stronger interaction in the world. This purpose will be served by the optimal decentralization of public administration and the endowment of local Soviet government agencies with

the real powers and opportunities they will need for the successful performance of their governing functions. When these agencies become the subjects of administration instead of representing primarily its objects, horizontal ties can be pursued more actively within the country and with regional governing bodies in other countries.

Extraordinary processes are occurring in the sphere of ethnic relations. It might seem that the tendency toward a stronger human community should weaken these aspects of social life. This is not happening. In some cases we have witnessed the complete opposite. What can we say about this?

The dialectical nature of the changes occurring here consists in the fact that the stronger integration processes in the world are based to a considerable extent on national elements and have been accompanied by the more distinct crystallization of the ethnic aspect. It is possible that the creation of the world community and its regional subsystems, such as the European home, will be accompanied by intra-governmental changes resulting in the emergence of states representing just one or a few nationalities and entering directly into the world or regional community.

Recent ethnic processes in the country testify that union and autonomous republics and other national entities want stronger autonomy and feel that the only functions to be delegated to union authorities should be those which would be inexpedient or impossible to perform on the republic level.

The broader sphere of influence of national-state entities will have a favorable effect on their opportunities for direct participation in the new world community of nations and will aid in strengthening the positive influence of common human progress on the development of each nationality and ethnic group.

Forces in some union republics are known to be striving for the complete severance of ties with the union government. Even their formal secession from the union probably will not sever the numerous strands, some visible and some invisible, connecting these republics to the union government today. The possibility that these ties could be put on the intergovernmental level and could thereby be complicated substantially is a different matter.

Strict centralization and the authoritarian methods of its accomplishment, including inter-republic exchange, kept republics and regions from realizing their common economic interests and distorted the connection between the standard of living of the republic population and the effectiveness of its production activity. Perestroika, by establishing economic methods of national economic management and regional cost accounting, is expected to replace the authoritarian method with economic methods of expressing the republic's interest in the existence of the union, which will reflect its real strength quite effectively. This is certain to mean substantial

changes in the union administrative structures, necessitating their consideration of the economic interests of republics and regions and assigning many of them only mediating functions in place of their earlier governing status.

There is another interesting aspect of the dialectical relationship of general human and national interests. The acknowledgement of the priority of common human values objectively increases the importance of nationwide interests as indications of common human interests on the national level. The entire course of world social development has proved that the national communities with a future are those with a strong sense of internationalism, presupposing openness and interest in equitable cooperation with other nations. Otherwise, they are doomed to isolation and a place on the sidelines of world history.

Common human values are being incorporated actively in the perestroika process in the spiritual sphere of life as well. The most vivid example is the affirmation of the pluralism of opinions and creative freedom. This is making the spiritual life of society multidimensional, including competition by various currents reflecting the interests of various groups of people and highlighting the greatest achievements in each specific sphere of the spiritual process.

The elimination of dogmatic ideology is contributing to the establishment of common human values in the spiritual life of the Soviet society. Ritualistic ideological clichés were used too often in our country in the past, when attempts were made to employ them as a common denominator for all new developments. This deformed the spiritual culture, stopped its natural development, and had a destructive effect on genuine collective principles in this culture. We must realize, however, that the complete de-ideologization of this sphere of social life would be impossible, because it objectively contains some kind of ideological import, and this does not even depend on the wishes of the creator or artist.

Perestroika is turning into an increasingly complete reflection of the worldwide tendency toward a stronger individual identity by putting the individual at the center of social development and guaranteeing him the living and working conditions he deserves. Furthermore, this is not being done in the form of charity, but by means of active participation by each individual in his own secure maintenance. This is why one of the characteristic features of the present reform is the establishment of economic, social, and political conditions for the self-assertion and self-affirmation of the individual and for more autonomous and independent action by the individual.

It is significant that these reforms are not simply intended to create the necessary conditions for the display of individual abilities; they require each person to realize his own potential to the maximum.

There is another side to the matter. While we are encouraging maximum individuality, we must not allow it to turn into individualism. Otherwise, man's present alienation from economic and political structures will be supplemented by the mutual alienation of people, and this could cause all of our social structures to collapse.

One of the merits of the new view of socialism, in our opinion, is its ability to overcome the central flaw in the earlier model—society's inability to secure dynamic and stable self-development. This can be accomplished by mobilizing all individual and collective incentives through a variety of forms of ownership and competition by autonomous producers.

The main way of achieving a balance of collective and individual interests in human civilization as a whole and in the Soviet society consists in democratization. An analysis of social development in the world suggests that the democratization of the human community is a natural process common to all civilization, and a process not only accompanied by social progress, but also a process generating this progress and representing an essential condition for it.

The move from authoritarianism and false democracy to real democracy, however, cannot be compared to an abrupt move from black to white. Just as there are many shades and hues in the color spectrum, the process of democratization must include the whole essential spectrum of progressive steps and reforms. Otherwise, social upheavals and cataclysms will lead to failure, standstill, and regression. All processes have their limits. The criterion of social democracy is social participation by each specific individual.

By establishing a truly balanced combination of collective and individual interests, perestroika is making the development of our society a genuine product of mass effort, which is only made possible by the free activity of each individual, representing an essential condition for the free activity of the collective, and vice versa.

Socialism must be what only it can be—not a social project designed with more or less emphasis on realistic or utopian ideas and serving as a goal in itself, but a society distinguished by natural, continuous, and dynamic development, based on the set of standards, principles, and values which we call socialistic and which should guarantee that all social life is as humane as possible and guarantee the inclusion of each specific individual in it.

Perestroika, the embodiment of worldwide tendencies, is contributing to the more organic inclusion of our country in the common flow of civilization and encouraging the same trend in the development of countries belonging to the other socioeconomic system.

Perestroika has been directly responsible for the elimination of unwarranted confrontation in the world and the reinforcement of collectivist principles in relations between countries, whole populations, and individuals.

All of this is intensifying the process by which mankind, once torn apart by conflicts, is turning into an integral world community with a collectivist structure, in which human activity on the planetary scale will become genuinely sound and intelligent.

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Culture and Alienation

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[Article by Vladimir Nikolayevich Orlov, professor and head of the Department of the Theory and History of Culture at the Higher Trade-Union School of Culture, and by Oleg Ivanovich Karpukhin, candidate of philosophical sciences and deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet Cultural Foundation]

[Text] At the end of 1989 SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA organized a roundtable in Leningrad to discuss "Alienation in the Socialist Society." The economic, social, political, and psychological aspects of the problem were discussed. Special attention was directed to signs of alienation among youth.

It seems to us that the debate was creative and not trivial and that it was interesting and productive, even though it followed the traditional pattern—from "alienation in the labor sphere" to "alienation in the leisure sphere" and from the analysis of "mass" forms of alienation to their "individual" dimension.

We regard this discussion of the topic as an invitation to take part in the debate, particularly in view of the fact that the cultural aspect, one of the most important aspects of the problem, was overlooked by the participants. In this article we propose our own approach to the problem—not from the alienation of labor to alienation in the culture, but the reverse: from the "alienated" culture to "alienated" labor. In this way, we will strive, on the one hand, to fill the gap in the discussion of

alienation and, on the other, to propose a non-traditional approach to its investigation, presupposing an analysis based primarily on cultural facts.

Culture and perestroyka—there is probably no topic that is more relevant and less researched today. Scholars usually contemplate and write about the politico-economic aspects of perestroyka and say virtually nothing about its cultural, moral, and aesthetic aspects. This topic, however, is literally pervading the atmosphere. Culture is being addressed at rallies, in debates, and in lecture halls and dormitories. People ask what "perestroyka in the culture" might mean. Can this process take place in culture, and how should it begin? How will the political and economic reforms influence the perestroyka in culture? How, in turn, will culture influence the process of perestroyka as a whole?

Many questions have been asked. Inquiring minds in our country ask these questions, demanding answers, waiting for and often hoping for the "final verdict" on the matter and "recipes" for the proper and "correct" course of action. Many wonder whether we started the process correctly, whether we are pursuing the right goals, and whether we will achieve the right goals. Where should perestroyka "begin"—in the economy or the culture? Which takes precedence? The MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and NOVYY MIR controversy is indicative. It is unlikely that any simple answers can be found for these relevant questions, but it is possible to set the general guidelines for the resolution of these problems, and it is essential to define the methodology of their investigation. An objective social-scientific understanding of the "culture and perestroyka" relationship will first necessitate, in our opinion, an analysis of the problem of "culture and alienation" in the socialist society. The proper guidelines of perestroyka processes in the culture and the cultural aspects of perestroyka can only be defined from this standpoint.

Cultural alienation is one of our society's most "vicious" problems today. Traditionally, we spoke and wrote about alienation in reference to the capitalist culture for decades. Meanwhile, the process of alienation in the socialist culture was picking up speed and growing more intense. What forms did it take? First of all, the alienation of culture from labor: Culture began to exist as an entity in itself and for itself, and workers in physical production gradually acquired an attitude of indifference toward culture, as something alien and largely inaccessible to them. A special branch of spiritual production was established for them—cultural-enlightenment work, which was more concerned with agitation and propaganda in general than with culture. This work imitated cultural activity but was closer to "social pedagogy" and was intended to fill the leisure time of the laboring public with a group of quasi-cultural pursuits.

The workers were supposed to be content with the mass, commercial-entertainment "culture," and the intelligentsia was content with the highly professional, classical,

"elite" culture. In the second place, the process was reflected in the appearance and rapid development of the "alternative" culture, existing outside and apart from state and trade-union establishments. The development of makeshift recording studios, rock groups, and so forth is an example of this. In the third place, the development of the authoritarian bureaucratic system led to the considerable stagnation of culture, a slump, and the promotion of so-called socialist realism (or perhaps "surrealism"), intended to reproduce the mechanisms of totalitarian statism. In the public mind and in articles by journalists and some scholars, alienation is defined as the presence of something alien or hostile in the society. According to this line of reasoning, as soon as this "anomaly" has been eliminated, everything will immediately return to its normal, natural, and "proper" state. In our opinion, confrontational militarized terminology is not applicable in this sphere. In what sense are forms of cultural alienation in the socialist society "anomalous"?

The capitalist alienation of labor does give rise to a corresponding form of cultural alienation, but long before capitalism, as history tells us, there were other, successive social forms of alienation caused by specific economic and spiritual factors.

Cultural alienation is a natural historical process consisting in the disunity and rupture of the once single and integral syncretist culture of the primitive and barbarian era. "The syncretist cultures of the primitive and barbarian societies were unified. They were not divided into professional (or artistic) and unprofessional (or folk-natural), into 'high' and 'low,' or into learned and profane art.... The emergence of the class society (in pre-antiquity and antiquity) led to the first stratification (which became pronounced in time) of the previously integral folk culture into 'high' (professional, learned, and artistically individualized) culture and 'low' culture, or folklore. It was folklore that became the custodian of primitive syncretism and collectivism, a living memory of those times, 'rooted' in some kind of pre-cultural era" [1].

The stratification of culture was the result of the development and intensification of the social form of alienation, the appearance of the private form of ownership, and the growth of class antagonism.

Each specific stage in human history has its own form of socioeconomic and spiritual alienation. Socialism is also distinguished by its own form of cultural alienation.

We believe that alienation is just as natural in the socialist society as in the capitalist society and, incidentally, in the primitive communal order. This is not an anomaly, but a normal and natural process, characteristic of the development of each society and extending to the spiritual and cultural sphere as well as the economic sphere.

Under the conditions of genuine socialism, the alienation of labor still exists because the laboring masses are

alienated from the means of production here. They are neither the legal nor the actual owners. The final result of their labor is alienated from them when it is appropriated for the benefit of the different ministries and departments responsible for labor conditions and acting as the monopolist owners of virtually all natural resources and production equipment. Man is also alienated from nature, and the ties within the unified system of productive forces have been severed: the ties between the workers and the means of production on the one hand, and between man and nature on the other.

Alienation extends to production and consumption processes. Consumption virtually loses its independence and autonomy and becomes an appendage of production because the consumer has no choice and turns into a suppliant or hostage of production. Official morality, politics, and propaganda convince public opinion of the dependent functions of the consumer, who has to be content with what he can get from the shortage-ridden economy.

At the same time, workers are alienated from their labor collectives and from the people employed in other spheres of production, on whom their uninterrupted and balanced production activity depends. For this reason, they transfer "part" of their "dissatisfaction" and "hostility" to the transportation, communications, and supply workers on whom their labor and living conditions depend. In this way, some labor collectives are put in the position of the suppliant-consumers of others and this turns the entire production process into a "supra-economic" cycle, where everything is based not on commercial and technological relations, but on requests, entreaties, and pleas. In this way, personal and utilitarian relations, invested with the suitable "business" ethics, are substituted for economic relations.

A sensible idea was stressed repeatedly in the reports and speeches presented at the first and second congresses of people's deputies of the USSR. In essence, this was the idea that the alienation of the laboring public would have to be surmounted before the revolutionary reforms in our society could be intensified: the alienation of the peasant from the land and of the worker from the means of production. This will entail radical socioeconomic reform to turn the laboring public into the true masters and collective owners of industrial and agricultural enterprises.

The history of our country reveals the opposite pattern: The alienation of peasants from the land and workers from the means of production actually began in the 1920s and was particularly intensive in the 1930s. Of course, there were sociocultural, spiritual, and ideological grounds as well as socioeconomic and material-technical ones for this process. The underdeveloped productive forces we inherited and the working conditions approaching serfdom in agriculture and some branches of industry helped to perpetuate this alienation.

In essence, the revolution was supposed to eliminate the old forms of alienation of labor that were so burdensome to the majority of the population in tsarist Russia. The notorious and regrettable surplus-appropriation system of the first post-revolutionary years, however, was a new and equally burdensome form of alienation. It extended to agriculture and to industry, where it had a particularly strong impact in the 1930s. This, however, was not the main thing. Alienation not only continued in the socialist society, but was also developed, and primarily in connection with the spiritual and sociocultural grounds for it. The low spiritual level of most of the masses, combined with the blaring, regimented, and precisely targeted political campaigns, intended to fuel class hatred for everything "alien," "bourgeois," and "intellectual," led to a situation in which the workers did not even notice (and could not have noticed) when they became alienated from "their own" industrial and agricultural enterprises and "their own" "public" property and "popular" government or when all spheres of life in the society, including the spiritual sphere, were completely and irrevocably nationalized.

The alienation of labor does exist in the socialist society. It is a result of cultural impoverishment as well as the economic alienation inherited from capitalism. In our opinion, it was precisely the low level of culture that led to the situation in which the worker did not even notice his alienation and did not understand what had happened to him or how and when it had happened. He became a victim of the form of ideological pressure V.I. Lenin noticed toward the end of his life, when he warned the party and the people of its dangerous consequences. This was the ideology of "proletarian culture," which was intended to separate the broad popular masses from the intelligentsia—in our country and the rest of the world. The class struggle the ideologists of proletarian culture stirred up in our society was aimed against culture and against the proletariat itself, because it stupefied the proletarian mind with blind hatred for everything that was "not our own," "not proletarian" in origin, and planted the enemy image of the non-existent ideological saboteur in the proletarian mind.

A barrier, known as cultural-enlightenment establishments, was erected in the 1920s and 1930s and turned creative activity into "cultural-enlightenment work," which was supposed to raise the level of spiritual "services" for the population—i.e., fill leisure time with pseudo-cultural diversions defined as the results of "popular art." This was followed by a process of differentiation or, more precisely, "elitization": Theaters and concerts were still accessible to some, but for many years the club was the only "cultural center" for others, providing "cultural" services primarily to those residing permanently in communal dwellings—i.e., in an antisocial and anticultural environment.

The constantly growing and virtually unregulated and unrestricted migration by millions of people from rural areas and small communities to the big cities had a tragic effect on the economy, and especially on culture. It led

unavoidably to the loss of the old traditional culture, the disruption of the customary lifestyle and family structure, and the voluntaristic propagation of a new urban, "industrial" culture. People from rural areas, uprooted from their familiar social and cultural surroundings and centuries-old relationships, ties, and traditions, lost their old culture without gaining a new one. Their acclimation to the cities was a matter of formal and superficial adjustment, because they moved to the cities in search of jobs and bread, and not in search of culture. The urban environment, which was already educationally and culturally underdeveloped, was constantly augmented by numerous migrants from rural areas who quickly lost the traditional mentality and ideology of the rural way of life and just as quickly assimilated new ones—pseudo-urban ones.

As a result of cultural alienation, professional art was influenced on an unprecedented scale by primitive forms, giving rise to a variety of "legitimized" forms of art. Primitive art conquered the leisure sphere on a broad scale and a seemingly solid basis, including even the intelligentsia in its orbit.

Cultural alienation can be seen quite clearly in the fate of folklore. It ceased to be the natural state of peasant culture and became an artificial, professionally recreated genre. Why? Because the forcible industrialization of rural areas and their destructive collectivization resulted in the alienation of labor. The elimination of patriarchal forms of life and art in the rural community led to the elimination of folklore, despite all of the attempts to revive it: the attempts to keep "folk crafts" alive and revitalize folk dance troupes and folk choirs.

The alienation of modern culture due to the intensification of its stratification and its division into "high"—elite—and "low"—mass or "folklore"—was historically, socioeconomically, and psychologically programmed in advance.

The common mass culture, with a largely primitive basis, presents the views of people with a keen sense of their own social insignificance and "unacceptability," their cultural "inferiority," and their psychological and economic insecurity. As a rule, these are people who have been uprooted from their "soil," their "native community," and who have moved to big cities in search of financial security, for the sake of which they are willing to give up everything, including their past, to their present cultural surroundings, which they fear, and sometimes even hate, because they view them as an alien (in the social and psychological sense) "intellectual" culture, to which they cannot feel any "connection" and which constantly "repels" them. These socially and economically insecure people with weak psychological defenses—and, consequently, aggressive and intolerant people—usually become avid disciples of "kitsch," "mass culture," and "primitive art."

The facts indicate that the assimilation of culture by the individual has always been a fragmented and situational

process in our country, has been marked by ineptitude and incompetence in the past and the present, and eventually led to a shortage of spirituality and gave rise to a passive consumer attitude toward culture and life. Most people do not have the proper background to appreciate works of art, and this is why they are easily carried away by primitive "spiritual" values and "cultural" fads.

The low level of cultural requirements, the inclination of some adults and young people to seek out cultural "diversions"—or, more precisely, primitive culture—and the move away from genuine culture to the "consumer" culture are indications of cultural alienation.

This also leads to the "separation" of culture and education: For many decades culture was systematically banished from secondary and higher academic institutions and from virtually all pre-school establishments and elementary schools. Education devoid of culture ceases to be education, as the experience of human civilization reveals, and becomes something alien to the individual and society. It turns into a "trade," a medieval training system, in which the teacher is the "master of the trade" and the student is an "apprentice." One "rams in" the knowledge, and the other memorizes it mechanically. As a result, the individual and the society cease to experience a genuine spiritual need for education.

The expulsion of culture from the educational sphere and the elimination of art classes in secondary schools are nothing other than signs of the ideology of proletarian culture, which was officially (or verbally) disavowed in the 1930s, but actually still exists even today, taking command of art instruction in the educational sphere, turning club activities into pedagogical exercises, and inventing various "theories" of cultural-enlightenment work and leisure "pedagogy."

The development and realization of the individual's cultural potential are influenced directly by the educational process, its content and organization, and the level and quality of instruction in the humanities. What kind of "level" and "quality" of instruction in the humanities can we expect when instruction in the fundamentals of aesthetic knowledge (the course in "Aesthetic Education" in vocational and technical institutes and classes in literature and history) occupies no more than 6-7 percent of the academic process even in the schools and vocational and technical institutes in the city and oblast of Leningrad and under 5.5 percent in the Uzbek SSR?[2] As a result, only 5 percent of all students participate in various amateur art groups (in Pioneer centers, clubs, schools, and vocational and technical institutes). The formal-aesthetic nature of instruction—i.e., its effective absence—has an extremely negative effect on 91 percent of all teenagers and young adults: The majority of young people are not engaged in any type of aesthetic activity and have no interest in it. Today, for example, it is quite easy to chart the paradoxical attitudes of youth toward the fine arts. On the one hand, statistical records indicate

that visitors to art museums and exhibits are getting younger. Combined with the general increase in museum and exhibit attendance, this is viewed as a sign of cultural growth. On the other hand, surveys of young people suggest that the fine arts play an extremely small part in their aesthetic and artistic interests.

When a thousand upperclassmen living in big cities were surveyed, only 4 percent admitted to an interest in the fine arts. "The average student spends around 8 hours during his school years visiting art museums and exhibits and more than 10,000 hours watching television"[3].

The present fine arts curriculum drawn up by the Scientific Research Institute of Schools of the RSFSR Ministry of Education has not undergone any fundamental changes in more than 50 years. Experience has shown that most of the students covered by this curriculum have no interest in joining artistic groups. The fine arts are not taught at all in the upper classes of secondary schools, but upperclassmen in the developed capitalist countries spend 3 hours a week in music and art classes.

What is the explanation for the paradox mentioned above? There are apparent differences in the perception of works of art by young people and the older generation. "Around 60 percent of the young respondents could name their favorite artist, but only 40 percent of their parents could do this. Furthermore, the preferences of upperclassmen are of higher quality (but extremely low in themselves) than the preferences of their parents and teachers. This probably does not mean that the generation of the 1980s has a keener aesthetic sense. It is more likely that people lose their interest in the fine arts as they grow older.

"Among the objective reasons for this phenomenon, a particularly negative role is played by the breaking of certain traditions in the art culture. The trade fairs where decorative folk art objects were sold disappeared, personal orders for works of art gave way to departmental orders and then almost disappeared, and the temporary exhibits lost their permanent audience when they lost their relevance. An analysis of the suggestions of patrons of art museums in the Russian Federation indicated that 29 percent were disturbed by the stagnation of exhibits and the lack of new displays, 22 percent complained about the late issuance of prospectuses and catalogues, 13 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of lectures, and 13 percent were disturbed by the shortcomings of mobile exhibits"[4].

The most negative of the subjective causes are the shortage of amateur art groups in the urban leisure culture and the absence of training for the appreciation of cultural treasures, including works of fine art. This situation is rooted in the flawed mechanisms of the organization of spiritual life.

These flaws include the procedural weakness of art classes and the near inaccessibility of publications with color reproductions for non-specialists. Such rarely published albums as "The Tretyakov State Gallery,"

"The Pushkin State Museum of the Fine Arts," "The Russian State Museum," "The Fine Arts," and "The State Hermitage" are issued in editions of no more than 50,000-100,000 copies. Copies of books of the works of individual artists are even fewer in number.

What kind of impression can a book with black-and-white reproductions of poor quality have on a person, especially when the commentary frequently has little to do with real art criticism? How can tours of museums and exhibits inspire viewers when tour guides provide them only with the "bare facts" and do not bother to arouse their aesthetic inclinations, imagination, or sense of adventure?

Researchers have reported that 4 percent of the upper-classmen of secondary schools and students of vocational and technical institutes in Uzbekistan and 5.8 percent of the college students in Leningrad are united in a variety of spontaneous, informal associations. This is frequently the result of their desire to make music together. Without the proper artistic education, however, these groups cannot perform an aesthetic function, and to some extent they can be categorized as anti-cultural phenomena. Almost every school and vocational and technical institute in Uzbekistan has groups of young people who have learned to play folk instruments and perform at weddings and other gatherings for money, displaying a purely commercial-consumer attitude toward life instead of aesthetic sensibilities[2].

The alienation of culture from man is most clearly reflected in the fact that it has virtually ceased to influence the spiritual and moral development of the individual, and the individual has ceased to feel a need for culture and a need to appreciate it.

According to the data of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture's sectorial sociological service, one-tenth of the adult population of kray and oblast centers is completely or almost completely outside the sphere of activity and influence of art and cultural establishments and has to do without them.

Sociologists asked the following question: "Who can be called a cultured person, and what do you feel are his salient features?" Respondents were asked to choose the answer from a list of 16 characteristics, including "active participation in cultural affairs (the regular attendance of concerts, exhibits, plays, etc.)." It is interesting that this characteristic was not among the top three or even the top five salient features of the cultured person, but ranked next to last, in the 15th place on the list. Only 17 percent of the respondents felt that the regular attendance of concerts, exhibits, and plays was a prominent feature of the cultured person[4].

Above all, these data suggest that the overwhelming majority of respondents felt no need for culture. The problem is not merely the inferior quality of many concerts, plays, and exhibits or their moral and aesthetic

squalor. The low level of cultural and spiritual development of most of the population is also part of the problem.

Recent articles by scholars and writers have focused attention on the problem of the so-called "shortage" of spirituality in our life. They write about moral decline, the wave of uncultured behavior, and the corrupting influence of the "mass" culture on the population, especially youth. The discussions of this topic are generally conducted on an "emotional" level and usually bear little resemblance to impartial analysis. The shortage of spirituality, however, is directly related to, and caused by, the process of cultural alienation and deformation and by the fact that culture suffered for several years from arbitrary administration, the remainder principle of planning, protectionism, and other, far from coincidental symptoms of alienation. In this respect, the investigation of the problem of cultural alienation would seem to be an essential part of the determination of guidelines for the perestroika of the cultural process in the country.

What is the purpose of these comments? The name of the journal answers the question of whom they address quite clearly, but the answer to the question of why they were written consists of two interrelated aspects: first, to direct attention to the problem and prove that the resolution of all other problems, including economic and social ones, will depend on its resolution. Second, to recommend a modern and genuinely socialist method of solving the problem—turning culture over to the people, taking it out of the hands of the authoritarian system, and turning it over to the people's care in perpetuity. Only this can make it accessible and democratic and only this can lead to real—actual rather than verbal—cultural equality.

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Vox Populi—Voice of the "Elect"?

91SD0001C Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to
press 29 Jun 90) pp 53-57

[Article by Eduard Sergeyevich Gams, people's deputy of the USSR, and by Vladimir Ivanovich Petrov, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at the Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; both are new contributors to the journal]

[Text] We must begin with a few words about the pre-history of our survey.¹ It was undertaken because of the events that took place at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After laws on land and property and problems in the democratization of politics and the government in the USSR aroused heated debates, the session decided not to schedule these topics for discussion by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The arguments which were cited in support of this decision were the following: "The people are not ready," "the people will not agree," and "the people will not understand." These "arguments" were used to obstruct deputies' proposals regarding a referendum on private property, the transfer of land to peasants as their property, and the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. They were also used to stifle attempts to direct the Supreme Soviet's attention to the need for the quickest possible revision of the union treaty. In this way, the fate of the people's fundamental rights, and that of what might be the most important laws governing our life, was decided "on behalf of the people."

We will be discussing the validity of the references to "public opinion," which actually turned out to be the personal opinion of a few deputies. Consequently, we will also be discussing the responsibility of the deputy who passes off his own personal vote as the vox populi. It appears that attempts by deputies to pass off their personal opinion as the opinion of their electors and the people as a whole are becoming the norm in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Doubts about the validity of these attempts were the reason for our survey. The authors conducted it because they wanted to learn the attitudes of voters (in Saratov Oblast) toward the country's main problems.

More than 1,500 people were surveyed, 62 percent of them men and 38 percent women. Around 40 percent of the respondents were from 21 to 40 years of age, and 44 percent were from 41 to 60. The educational level of respondents was fairly high: More than 36 percent said they had a higher education, 39 percent had a secondary specialized education, and almost one-fourth had a complete or partial secondary education.

The more active participation by men in the survey was probably the result of several factors, such as their traditional interest in economic and political issues. Besides this, they had more free time than the women.

These are the sociodemographic features of our respondents. Now we will take a look at the results of the survey.

Our analysis of the results allowed us to draw two main conclusions. The first was that the rapid politicizing of public thinking could lead to the dramatic destabilization of the political situation in the survey zone in the near future.

As far as political, economic, and other changes were concerned, the overwhelming majority of respondents were in favor of them. Almost 90 percent intended to vote in local soviet elections. It is a well-known fact that the most active segment of society usually takes part in surveys, and the real number of people wishing to cast a vote is therefore lower. Even this adjustment, however, is unlikely to change the overall situation substantially.

Therefore, there was an expressed desire to vote and to support people with the potential to lead us into a better future. On the other hand, the majority had only the slightest expectations of genuine and concrete changes in their life. Around 41 percent said that everything would still be the same after the elections, and one out of every five refused to answer the question, which certainly does not attest to optimistic views of the future. Only one-third of the respondents felt that the elections would lead to changes for the better. Three out of every four, however, hoped that their opinions would be taken into consideration in decisions on the society's most pressing problems.

What does this mean? First of all, there is a distinct awareness of the need for changes and a desire to participate in their accomplishment. Second, there is a lack of hope that these changes will be accomplished. Public thinking is in a precarious state: On the one hand, people want to believe in the possibility of change, but on the other, reality itself is convincing them that this possibility does not exist. The further exacerbation of this contradiction could mobilize forces beyond the control of official institutions.

There is another way this contradiction might be resolved and another possible course of action. Public thinking could "collapse," like the high-density celestial bodies known as "black holes." The result will be an inert mass, incapable of normal self-development and the exchange of information with the outside world. This kind of mass consciousness would need a constant source of energy for its existence and reproduction, and this energy is more likely to be generated outside the mass consciousness than within it. This course of events is attested to by the rapid disappearance of the belief in the possibility of a more or less tolerable existence and by the increase in apathy and indifference. Its important features are the absence of public criticism of the news reported by the mass media, especially the central press, and the inability, and even the reluctance, to delve into the essence of reports from the center or even to simply compare these reports to surrounding reality.

The analysis of these symptoms led to our second conclusion: The politicizing of public thinking in the region is not progressing in the direction of democracy and, what is more, cannot be directed into the channel of democratic standards today.

Here are the arguments supporting this conclusion. One is the indicator of people's attitudes toward the existence of different forms of ownership in our country. We can take the issue of land as private property as an example. Should the law guarantee property owners—we repeat, the actual owners, and not the managers—the right to hire outside labor? In our survey, 44 percent said that it should, but 46 percent disagreed. As we can see, the "forces" were approximately equal. The distribution of opinions regarding the ability of the owner of a plot of land to build an enterprise on the lot, for the processing of the products derived from the land, was completely different. Disagreement was expressed by 16 percent of the respondents, while around 74 percent were in favor, and the rest declined to answer.

If the hiring of labor and the construction of one's own enterprise are both indications of the existence of private property, why did construction win extensive support while hiring aroused so much opposition? Because the private hiring of labor is still condemned in the USSR even today, in the sixth year of perestroika, on all levels, beginning with legislation. Of course, small-scale private ownership (for example, the ownership of a small processing enterprise) was also condemned for a long time, but the cooperatives managed to break through the solid wall of mass opposition in this case. Now small businesses have been legitimized in our country.

Only the practice of private initiative can test the accuracy of legal prohibitions and authorizations in this sphere. Because it was stifled 60 years ago, before it had a chance to mature, people had no choice but to follow the directions of official ideologists. This resulted in the same kind of "destruction" of the mass consciousness that we observed in our survey.

As for the respondents' attitudes toward private enterprises and the legitimization of cooperative and private ownership in the USSR, positive opinions were expressed by 53 percent and 47 percent of the respondents respectively. As we can see, there is not much of a difference here either.

We went on to study respondents' views on the possibility of living on their present salary. To put it more precisely, we discerned their views on minimum and optimum subsistence. Around 60 percent of the respondents, for example, said that the "minimum" was 150-200 rubles, and around a third said it was 100 rubles. As for the optimum wage, 25 percent said it began at 200 rubles, 30 percent said it was at least 300 rubles, and around a third said it began at 500 rubles.

What does this mean? When they had to define the minimum subsistence level, most of the respondents said it was between 100 and 150 rubles, which corresponds to

today's legal minimum wage. The respondents' estimates of minimum subsistence did not exceed the boundaries of average monthly earnings in the country: over 260 rubles for workers, 200 for kolkhoz members, and 500-600 for cooperative members. In other words, the demand certainly does not exceed the supply.

The personal income evaluations "handed down from above" are so firmly ensconced in the public mind that there is no attempt to transcend these boundaries. People are simply incapable of freeing themselves of the pervasive idea that their demands should be limited, an idea which was imposed on them for decades. Even the cooperatives' attempts to break this vicious circle have not changed the situation much. On the contrary, they have earned the public's indignation by the very fact of their existence. Public opinion has not even tried to determine which of the cooperatives are good and which are bad! All of this is confirmed by the intention of two-thirds of our respondents to work not in a cooperative and not on their own land or in their own enterprise, but in a job with a guaranteed salary—however modest!—from the state. Of course, this is partly a result of the people's lack of faith in the irreversibility of changes, but dreams of a better life have to be preceded by a taste of this life. How can people indulge in dreams when they were not even allowed to doubt that we were living "in the most humane, most just state" until recently...?

Another argument in support of our conclusion is the attitude toward political pluralism in the country. In our survey, 42 percent of the respondents were in favor of a multi-party system, 9 percent were opposed, and 61 percent favored the repeal of the sixth article of the Constitution. Here is the most interesting fact, however: According to 44 percent of the respondents, the democratization of national politics does not depend on the number of parties.

Similar views were expressed in attitudes toward alternative state structures for the USSR. A union of sovereign republics within the boundaries of a single state was supported by 75 percent of the respondents, but a union of sovereign states was supported by only 17 percent. Three out of every four respondents wanted all of the union republics to belong to the USSR. Furthermore, they acted as though the opinions of the inhabitants of each of these republics were of no consequence. After all, if the respondents had had any doubts on this score, they could have declined to answer, but only 8 percent did this! We wonder where the inhabitants of Saratov Oblast got this desire to see other republics belonging to the USSR, irrespective of the wishes of the inhabitants of these republics. Where did the population of Saratov Oblast and other oblasts in the central Volga zone get this wish to stifle the political self-determination of the Volga Germans and interfere with the establishment of not even a German union republic, but merely an autonomous German republic? The answer is obvious. This wish is the result of the tenacity of the imperious ideology in the public mind, the result of the activities of

the state propaganda industry, which declared the "inevitability of the disappearance of ethnic differences between citizens of the USSR."

The respondents' views on the most important problems of their region were interesting. The highest-ranking item on the list was the state of the environment (60 percent), with housing and social security in second place (50 percent), followed by the democratization of public affairs and the protection of human rights (20 percent) and then by economic and cultural issues, the national-state structure of the country, etc. The issue of inter-ethnic relations ranked only seventh among these concerns. This opinion would seem to deprive it of the status of an extremely urgent problem, and this is not surprising: The inhabitants of this region are more likely to encounter this issue in the central press and television and radio programs than in their daily life.

Do our main conclusions confirm or deny the above-mentioned statements by some USSR Supreme Soviet deputies that "the people will not understand," "the people will not agree," and so forth?

The situation is not as simple as it might seem on the surface. On the one hand, there is clear mass support for the quickest possible democratic changes in the economic and political affairs of the country. The majority favored the legalization of private ownership in the country and favored the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. Meanwhile, there were also signs that public thinking is deformed, has little "power-generating potential," and lacks direction and force. People would like to believe in change, but they do not have the feeling that it will be irreversible. This is reflected in the following phrases: "the irresponsibility of leaders," "the despotism of the CPSU," "the elimination of cooperatives," "the lack of legal protection," "insecurity," "the impossibility of exercising legal rights," and "the exploitation of labor."

We can say quite definitely, however, that the statements made at meetings of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress "on behalf of" and "in the name of" the people frequently turn into irresponsible demagoguery and attempts to manipulate public opinion—in the traditions of the totalitarian ideology. These attempts have been nipped in the bud repeatedly by other people's deputies: We can recall the episodes at the second congress, when the generalizations about the "indignation of the people," who supposedly did not want to have anything to do with private ownership, revealed their groundlessness when they conflicted with the sociological research findings cited from the congress podium.

We hope the results of our study will serve the same good purpose.

Footnotes

1. A questionnaire drawn up by associates of the Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with USSR people's deputies representing the voters

of Saratov Oblast was printed in rayon newspapers in Saratov Oblast in December 1989. The questions dealt with our most acute current problems, both local problems and problems concerning the whole country. After analyzing the data, we decided to inform readers of the most interesting results of our study.

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When the Marriage Partner Is Bought

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[Article by Mukhamedgeldy Sardzhayevich Berdyayev, junior scientific associate at History Institute, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and a first-time contributor to our journal, and by Farkhad Nazipovich Ilyasov, candidate of philosophical sciences and scientific associate in Philosophy and Law Department of Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and one of our journal's permanent contributing authors]

[Text] A Turkmen proverb says that "A man without a goal is clay, and a man without love is an ass." But if the man's goal is a loveless marriage, what is he?! The bride-price and love—are they compatible? "Incompatible," according to 46.8 percent of our respondents;¹ the opposite point of view was expressed by 8.5 percent; 28.3 percent said that it all depended on the circumstances. In short, although the arranged marriage has been "humanized" to some extent (with more consideration for the opinions of "the young couple"), the contradictory nature of this kind of transaction is still quite pronounced today.

Survey results indicated that the bride-price is paid in over 68 percent of the marriages in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan at the present time. Of course, the problem does not consist only in the spread of this custom and the amount of the bride-price (it is far from symbolic, averaging 8,476 rubles in the region). It is also important that this kind of marriage reflects complex social processes.

What are the origins and social implications of the bride-price? It is still too early for a complete answer. "The road the development of the marital bond took," C. Darwin remarked, "was a mysterious one" [1, p 631]. We must admit that this is still a valid judgment today, more than a century later. We will try to determine the main factors impeding the investigation of matters of interest to us in connection with our current topic.

Of all the great researchers of the last century—I. Bachofen, J. McLennan, and L. Morgan—F. Engels is known to have given preference to the latter, essentially accepting his entire theory of the evolution of marriage. This is why it began to be known in Soviet literature as Engels' theory (in spite of all of Engels' references to Morgan) and why it was consequently revered as the only correct

theory, and therefore the definitive one. Is this why the historical-theoretical aspects of marital and family relations have been approached so timidly in our country and still have not been given a satisfactory scientific interpretation? In particular, there is no clear understanding of the phenomenon of purchased mates. The most basic work is still the monograph by K. Kautskiy[2].

Therefore, the evolution of marriage was never researched because it was considered to be a restricted topic. In this connection, it is significant that Morgan's theory, supported by Engels, was unilinear—i.e., it proceeded from the postulate that marriage had one and only one line of development, in spite of all of the changes in its forms over many centuries. Kautskiy's publication of a theory substantiating a bilinear evolution was enough in itself to be viewed as criticism of Marxism. Because of this, Soviet researchers tried to be more restrained in their inventiveness.

There was also a ban on a field closely related to the sociology of marriage—sexual sociology. A.S. Makarenko made the unequivocal statement that "sexual topics simply do not come up in a completely healthy family and a completely healthy society"[3, p 246]. This sounded particularly convincing in 1937 (the year the work was published). For this reason, there could be no investigations of the phenomenon Kautskiy called the "sexual purpose of marriage" (using marriage as a way of satisfying sexual needs).

Incidentally, there was another reason the bride-price was overlooked by researchers. There was the assumption that this custom did not exist in the country. "We know," Makarenko asserted, "that women are actually bought and sold in some countries.... The October Socialist Revolution put an end to all of these outrageous remnants of the class society"[4, p 102]. Contrary to this wish, which was so impatiently portrayed as a reality, the revolution did not "put an end" to the bride-price, although the situation connected with it was indisputably transformed.

What are the driving forces stimulating the evolutionary development of marital ties? Useful insights can be derived, in our opinion, from the theoretical legacy of the same Kautskiy and A.M. Kollontay, which is almost never employed in contemporary family sociology. The approaches they suggest provide a slight different view of the matter. Defining one of the pairs of these conflicting forces, for example, Kautskiy wrote that "the communist instinct, demanding that women be common property, has to struggle against the individualistic instinct, which wants to monopolize the object of love"[2, p 47]. These are psychological determinants. The main social source of the process in question, according to Kautskiy, is the division of power between the sexes. For the sake of clarity, we have outlined Kautskiy's theory in the form of a diagram of the phases and sequence of the evolution of marital relations. It has been updated with a view to the possible development of some of its logical premises.

During the first phase of evolutionary progression, according to Kautskiy (see diagram), there was sexual equality, resulting in corresponding forms of marriage: free monogamy and free group marriages (including voluntary polygamy and polyandry and the club marriage). Actually, we are inclined to agree with Darwin, who believed that the first evolutionary phase was the "status marriage," in which the individual's position in the primitive community completely predetermined his marital status, similar to the situation in primate communities.

During the second phase, when one sex was dominant, compulsory monogamy and polygamy came into being. The evolution of marriage split into two lines, and so did the development of human civilization.


The third phase was distinguished by a situation in which the dominant position of one sex turned into supremacy as the social community developed. Female supremacy (one of the lines of evolution) engendered the matriarchy and led to compulsory polyandry and monogamy. The main forms (or elements) of betrothal became the abduction (or kidnapping) of a bridegroom or the purchase of one. The other evolutionary line was male supremacy. It gave birth to the patriarchy, where the main ways the partners were joined together were kidnapping (or abduction) and purchase. Compulsory polygyny and monogamy are characteristic of these social conditions.

During the fourth phase, in the democratic society, the equality of the sexes was restored and different forms of marriage existed simultaneously: free monogamy and free group marital unions.

This view of the evolution of marriage is completely logical as a whole, but it does have one significant flaw: There is no convincing explanation of the causes of the dominant position and subsequent supremacy of one sex. Following the reasoning of some other researchers, for example, Kautskiy believed that the matriarchy was established because ancestry could only be established (during a specific phase of social development) on the maternal side. In all probability, the cause and effect are transposed in this opinion.

Besides this, there are arguments which sound more valid. Let us look at Kollontay's work[5], where the initial premise is the thesis that the first division of labor in human society was based to a certain extent on the biologically determined, psychological and physiological differences between the sexes. Let us trace this author's line of reasoning. In the primitive tribe the women usually gathered edible fruit and plants while the men hunted. Depending on the habitat, one or the other ensured a stable existence. In line with this, the gender specializing in the more effective type of labor began to occupy a dominant position in the social community. Women were dominant in regions with an abundance of flora, and men were dominant in those with an abundance of fauna. Later, the gathering of fruit evolved into

Diagram of Evolution of Marriage Depending on Division of Power Between Sexes in Social Community (Updated)



Key:

- | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Club marriage | 9. Female supremacy | 17. Purchased bride |
| 2. Equality of sexes | 10. Patriarchy | 18. Purchased groom |
| 3. Group marriage | 11. Polygamy | 19. Marriage with dowry |
| 4. Free monogamy | 12. Matriarchy | 20. Equality of sexes |
| 5. One sex dominant | 13. Compulsory polygyny | 21. Club marriage |
| 6. Compulsory monogamy | 14. Compulsory polyandry | 22. Free monogamy |
| 7. Male supremacy | 15. Abduction | 23. Group marriage |
| 8. Supremacy of one sex | 16. Abducted groom | |

agriculture, and hunting evolved into livestock breeding. The assignment of priority to specific types of labor was the initial process of specialization in primitive tribes. Two types of economic systems took shape: the "farming-hunting" system and the "livestock breeding-gathering" system. The first system was a matriarchy and the second was a patriarchy.

According to this point of view, we can assume that as the tools of agricultural labor were improved and the effectiveness of hunting declined, tribes with the "farming-hunting" system became almost completely agricultural (with isolated elements of livestock breeding). The men began working the land, forcing the women to do "auxiliary" work. The change of labor roles turned the matriarchal community into a patriarchal one (which we would call the neo-patriarchy), and whereas the forms of marriage (abduction and the bride-price) remained the same in the traditional patriarchy, the purchase of mates turned into the bride's dowry during the transition from the matriarchy to the neo-patriarchy. The abduction of the future husband gradually became something found only in folklore.

Let us sum up the results of our theoretical digression. According to Kautskiy's point of view, the division of power between the sexes is the main determinant of the evolution of marriage. According to Kollontay, this then predetermined the role of each sex in the economic system.

Therefore, the economic supremacy of one sex leads to political, moral, and all other kinds of supremacy. Some of the rituals recorded by anthropologists² can be interpreted as remnants of the sexual supremacy of women. This means there is reason to assume that women were the active partners and initiators of sexual relations in the matriarchal cultures. The "courting" process would have been quite different from the process in the patriarchy, if not the complete opposite. Incidentally, studies of male and female sexuality also support this assumption.

Now we will return to the origins of the purchased mate. When the sexes were equal, there was naturally no payment involved. The betrothal ceremony took the form of the equal exchange of gifts. We can illustrate this with an anthropological description of a primitive Indian tribe. "If, for example, a young man sees a girl he likes, he presents her with a small wicker bowl or basket. If she accepts the gift, she is accepting his proposal. In this case, she gives him a painted headdress made with her own hands in exchange. Then they begin living together without any further ceremony"[2, p 26]. There are also tribes where the young girl can initiate the courtship.³

We might wonder why the couple could not simply decide to live together without the preliminary exchange of gifts. Evidently, this is a matter of man's predilection (especially in the distant past) for custom and ritual. After all, they are "tangible" regulators of behavior, and

they also give the events a certain air of solemnity and profound meaning. An agreement concluded in the form of a familiar ritual, with the observance of a certain code of etiquette, always seems (and frequently also is) stronger than an oral agreement, although even in this case people want to "seal it with a handshake."

When one of the sexes begins to occupy a superior position in the economic system and in the community as a whole, the marriage ceremony takes the form of an unequal exchange of gifts. The dominant sex, as the "richer" one, gives more—in accordance with its economic status. In essence, the partners engage in an equivalent exchange from the standpoint of their financial status, but in the absolute sense the gifts are unequal to the same degree that the positions of the partners are unequal. Besides this, the subordinate sex is coerced into marriage. This coercion is reinforced by a set of unique manipulating circumstances—ritualized and compulsory symbolic actions. In fact, this is how the marriage ritual ends—with a procedure uniting the futures of the partners.

Later, when one of the sexes is superior, the magical force of the marriage ritual is enhanced by the standards of common law, the ritual itself becomes increasingly conventional, and it is finally regulated by secular law. As we said before, however, "sexual" supremacy is the result of the development of productive forces, which also gives rise to commercial relations. When the economic market comes into being, the coercion of the subordinate sex takes the form of a purchase and sale transaction, because economic supremacy presupposes property relations. "In marriage to a purchased mate," Kautskiy stressed, "the whole point is the acquisition of property, and this is why the husband's rights to the possession of his wife frequently depend on the price he paid for her. Among the Gassani Arabs of Nubia, the number of days in the week a wife is obligated to be faithful to her husband depends on the number of livestock he paid for her"[2, p 15].

The superior sex acquires an opportunity to possess the inferior sex with the rights of a property owner. This is why the woman in a matriarchal society buys a husband (or husbands), and the man in a patriarchal society buys a wife (or wives), in accordance with their possibilities, desires, and also considerations of morality and prestige. This is how the paid marriage is arranged, but its content is not confined to the regulation of economic ties between the sexes.

The patriarchal society is a society in which all individual behavior is regulated and must conform to standards. Here patriarchal structures (the leader, the clan, the father) perform all of the actions making up the marriage procedure: a) making the decision that a marriage is necessary (or desirable); b) choosing the marriage partner; c) concluding the appropriate agreement; d) performing the ceremony itself, including symbolic and formal actions and arranging for the ritual feast.

Consequently, the arrangement of a paid marriage goes beyond the interests of the wedding couple. This process also regulates family and tribal relations, with their complex history and distinctive features. The bride-price is a result of two social phenomena—division of power between the sexes (economic and so forth) and the activities of patriarchal structures—and the paid marriage has evolved as these have changed.

The inclusion of women in social production in the 20th century was accompanied by the gradual transition (or return?) to the equality of the sexes. Kollontay remarked that "women have absolutely no rights among the Kirghiz, Bashkirs, and Kalmyks, these modern nomads, in societies where earlier, almost primitive economic forms have been preserved, but as soon as a Bashkir or Kirghiz family settles down in a city and the Kirghiz woman gets a job, the power of His Excellency the Husband dwindles before your very eyes" [5, p 12]. This is a universal pattern: "If the economic opportunities...of married women improve, this also affects their status in the family, and this is attested to by the rapid disappearance of patriarchal authority in the families of some important groups of immigrants in the United States" [8, p 172].

As for the regulation of the interaction of patriarchal structures, this functional feature of the bride-price is preserved as long as they continue to exist. The totalitarian order which was established in the USSR around the middle of the 1920s "meshed" well with the patriarchal structure which had existed in the Muslim region prior to the October Revolution. Totalitarianism merged organically with the patriarchy. This is why there was no need to change the general public's attitudes toward power structures. From the standpoint of the average man's perception of political institutions, no revolutionary changes had taken place. The patriarchs—khans, religious leaders, and rich landowners—were replaced by representatives of the totalitarian system: kolkhoz chairmen and raykom and obkom secretaries. Administration became more detailed, and the hierarchy became more precise. The sacred symbols and dogmas were replaced, but this did not change things much. The new ideological formulas were just as far removed from reality as before.

The main thing was that the patriarchal order continued to exist and displayed little evolution. The bride-price, as one of its consequences, also continued to exist. It is true that ideological functionaries on all levels launched repeated campaigns against the bride-price and had to admit that "this remnant still exists in some places." Few people noticed how paradoxical this was. The totalitarian-patriarchal system itself had engendered the bride-price, and the system itself was now trying to put an end to it with admonitions and criminal prosecution. When a cat spins around in circles, trying to catch its own tail, it has a serious and even worried expression on its little face. This is how the republic patriarchies were trying to catch the result (the tail) of their own functioning. Abolishing the bride-price was tantamount to a fight

with themselves. This was impossible because the totalitarian power structure does not have the ability to eliminate itself.

The Turkmens say: "When there is a shortage of brides, expect the end of the world." In recent years there has been a "shortage" of brides in the marriage market of the region, and the bride-price has risen dramatically. The reason, however, is not the "shortage" of marriageable young women. At any rate, this is not the only reason, but, of course, as a product of endogamous ethnic and tribal barriers, it played a definite role in the rise of the bride-price. In some sense the saying turned out to be true: The "end of the world" (meaning the signs of crisis in the society) was drawing near.

Patriarchal authority as a personality trait and a system has much deeper and stronger roots in the region than it might seem to a reader living elsewhere. The concept of the "bribe" did not have time to reach full maturity here before the revolution. The payment of tribute and the presentation of gifts to the powers that be seemed natural. The totalitarian structure, which was implanted "from above," absorbed the "nectar of power"—bribes—rising spontaneously "from below."

The ratio of bribes to stolen (in the broadest sense of the word) goods has not been determined yet, but it is already clear that there is a connection (functional or statistical?) between the two. The "bribes-robbery" cycle is a self-perpetuating mechanism. An increase in stolen sums increases the amount of the bribe, and this, in turn, increases the amount stolen. The functioning of this mechanism is one of the reasons for the rising bride-price. It is convenient for dealers in the shadow economy because it is a matter of prestige.

The high level of conformity in the patriarchal community forces the "common people" to make an earnest effort to rise to the upper level. Families frequently concentrate all of their efforts on the accumulation of the necessary sum. In some cases they economize on everything else—from food and clothing to durable goods, and this gives rise to several social problems.

Some situations are extremely awkward. If a young girl commands a high bride-price and the parents of the groom do not have the necessary sum, they borrow the money (according to our survey, this occurs in six out of every ten cases; it takes around 6 years to repay the debt). After the wedding the young couple moves and then has to endure deprivations for a long time in order to pay off the creditors.

We are not against the bride-price as a custom. We must admit that many rituals add color and even inspiration to our lives. The solution is to remove the negative "social implications" of the bride-price, eliminate its categorically imperative nature, and make the amount symbolic. Administrative intervention in this sphere was attempted before the revolution and in the first years following it. "In 1923," Ya.S. Smirnova writes, "the congress of soviets of the Ingush district authorized a

reduced 'conventional bride-price' in the amount of 200 rubles and two sets of clothing for the bride." In 1925 it was reduced to 25 kopecks, but provisions were also made for the cost of the wedding and reception (25 rubles), presents for the bride (75 rubles), and another 25 rubles to pacify the parents in cases of elopement[9, p 124]. Obviously, these measures did not solve the problem.

Now this has been made possible by the move from the patriarchal arranged marriage to the democratic marriage, in which all of the elements are decided by the young couple.

There was an interesting custom in Babylon. Something that we might describe today as marriage auctions were common. Three respected men were chosen to conduct the auction in each district. They assembled all of the single girls of marriage age. The first girl to be "exhibited" was the most beautiful, and her hand in marriage was given to the bachelor making the highest bid. Then the less pretty girls were auctioned off, until there were no beauties left. The money earned from their sale was put aside as a dowry for the girls not blessed with beauty, and the least attractive was awarded the largest sum. The men who offered to marry these girls acquired wives with dowries[10, p 76]. This example shows how easily the purchase of a bride can turn into payment for a groom (in this case, in the form of a dowry).

The nature of betrothal customs always reflects the basic parameters of the social system, including ideas about social justice and welfare. When one of the partners is bought, neither is free. Giving them freedom entails giving them a new society. Consequently, the resolution of the bride-price problem is far from a regional objective.

Footnotes

1. The survey was conducted in the 1988/89 academic year by the young "Demos" group in the Philosophy and Law Department of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences. The information was gathered by interviewing students of the native nationality in universities in the capitals of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan (2,516 in all). A four-stage selection process was used to form the sample group.

2. Here is an example: "In the south of Kirivin Island and Vokuta Island the women who went out weeding in groups had the right to assault any man who did not live in their village. The women exercised this right...with enthusiasm and vigor. We cannot describe these assaults in detail. We can only say that when a woman noticed a man, she stripped naked, threw him to the ground, and committed indecent acts on his body"[6, pp 133, 136-137].

3. Morgan describes the following custom: "A young woman who feels attracted to a young man might send

him a secret message: Do you want to gather food for me? This is a marriage proposal"[7, p 338].

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Real and Imaginary Dilemmas, or the Mass and Elite Culture

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[Article by Aleksandr Bentsionovich Gofman, candidate of philosophical sciences, lead scientific associate at Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and contributor of two articles to our journal, including "Values in the Structure of Fashion" (1980, No 4)]

[Text] The adjective "mass" is quite common in the vocabulary of the social sciences today. We speak of mass production and consumption, mass movements, mass organizations, mass media, and the mass consciousness. Mass appeal has become an integral feature

of many social processes and can be discerned in the most diverse spheres of socioeconomic and cultural life.

Whereas the existence of these phenomena is apparent, however, some of the unavoidable historical consequences are frequently viewed as a deviation from the "normal" course of events. This is exactly what has happened in evaluations of certain cultural processes. The bugbear of the "mass culture" first came into being in the West and then moved to our part of the world.

As soon as the discussion turns to the mass culture, even the most impartial researchers sometimes lose their objectivity. In some cases, even cultural figures who are certain of their own commitment to democratic values feel obligated to condemn it. They employ a variety of subtle tricks, particularly terminological devices. The "mass culture" is definitively contrasted to the "culture of the masses," the folk culture, the original culture, and so forth. This is usually preceded by a procedure reducing the former to a trite and inferior product, manufactured by clever craftsmen and swindlers for consumption by the emotionally immature masses.

It is exceptionally important to discern the real motives behind this line of reasoning. Two critical positions are dominant today—cultural elitism and traditionalism (the latter is often passed off as respect for national traditions). There is the clear or hidden implication that there was a golden age of culture in the past, when "real" artists created exceptionally "genuine" cultural masterpieces, and "true" connoisseurs had a "genuine" appreciation of them.

The non-differentiated critical attitude toward the mass culture and its "dismissal" by many Western researchers—and then by several domestic theorists and practitioners—essentially conceal snobbish criticism of the masses. Obviously, we cannot object to the rejection of the inferior products of the culture "market," but "inferiority" and "mass appeal" are not synonymous.

When an inferior work of art wins mass recognition and "comes into vogue" in our day, it is its widespread dissemination that makes inferior taste seem widespread as well, but how many second-rate products do not win universal recognition even for a short time and are never in "vogue"? How many of these works, even when they are circulated widely, find only a handful of fans or die of natural causes soon after their birth? We have every reason to assume that there are many more of these works, but it is precisely because of their mass rejection that they escape notice.

Their authors are tempted to criticize the mass culture and current trends, and not all of them can resist the temptation. On the one hand, this gives them a convenient excuse to criticize those of their colleagues who do not impress them for some reason but have won mass recognition. They can accuse these colleagues of being "slaves to fashion," of striving for "cheap popularity," and of pandering to the infantile tastes of the masses, they can predict that their success will be short-lived.

they can speak of the distance separating these works from the "high" culture, "authentic art," and so forth. At the same time, while taking a stance against the mass culture, these "artists" are inclined to assign some kind of virtue to their own unpopularity and attribute their lack of recognition to their contempt for current fads and their lack of success with the public to its inferior tastes. Consequently, their declared goal is not the improvement of their own works, but the re-education of the ignorant masses who have been corrupted by the "mass culture." It is convenient for them to conceal and compensate for the poor quality of their own works by condemning mass tastes and fashions and by making constant references to classic, traditional, national, and eternal values (as if the mass nature of the mass culture per se is radically inconsistent with these values and is capable of undermining their greatness). These authors are inclined to call themselves the defenders and custodians of these values. There is even a whole stratum of cultural figures whose main functions consist in, on the one hand, exuberant praise (and not research!) of the classics and, on the other, the inclusion of certain works among the classics and excommunication of others from this category. Both functions are essentially intended to compensate for their own artistic infirmities.

In my opinion, it is time to move from the regular composition of hymns and odes to the classics (popular genres in domestic art criticism) to serious sociological and cultural-historical studies of this phenomenon, its causes, and its methods of functioning in the culture. It is quite possible (if you will pardon the play on words) that if the classics themselves had always followed classical guidelines, we would have no classics at all today.

It was precisely from the standpoint of "high," "classic," and "anti-mass" culture that some colleagues slighted the works of B. Okudzhava and V. Vysotskiy, "Time Machines" and "Aquarium," "unofficial" paintings, and other works after they had already won widespread recognition. Furthermore, the mass media either ignored the works of these artists or also slighted them: They were resolutely separated from the "high and genuine" values of life and were declared part of the base mass culture. In spite of, and sometimes because of, this silence or vehement criticism, a tape recording, a concert, or an exhibition in an inappropriate facility without any kind of advertising served as an effective means of communication with the mass listener and viewer, who found serious answers to the most important existential questions in these works and are still finding them today.

Obviously, mass recognition for a specific period of time is certainly not always an indication of high merit, and the criticism of weak works of art which have become successful is extremely necessary. The establishment of high criteria of public taste is important and always relevant, but it is accomplished primarily by the cultural works themselves, and not by condemnation in the name of "high" culture. We know that many crimes were committed against humanity and culture in the 20th century in the name of the "people." Outstanding works

were destroyed or banned on the pretext that the masses "would not understand" them and "did not need" them. The conscious or unconscious wish to please the masses or those acting on their behalf usually has a ruinous effect on art. In general, the artist is not obligated to address the broad masses or to be understood immediately and by everyone. It is even quite natural for an artist to address his works to only a small group of people close to him. In time, even these works can gain mass appeal and win universal recognition.

The present situation is peculiar, in my opinion, because some of the people who reject the mass culture are "artists" whose cultural level is lower than the average level of the masses for whom they intend their works of art. Furthermore, they are many in number, which is precisely the reason for the mass nature of cultural processes. This kind of "criticism from below," which is often based on ordinary jealousy, is not that rare, but the main thing is that it is not that harmless either. With their loud criticism of the mass culture, these authors bring it down to their own level and diminish the cultural potential of the society.

In the final analysis, the cultural elite does not depend on the number of consumers addressed. The important thing is not mass appeal per se, but the kind of works that gain mass appeal. The "creators" have a great responsibility to the society, but before they can carry out their mission, the society must provide them with the necessary conditions for the free competition of minds and talents—i.e., for the natural formation of a cultural elite. It is this elite, which is formed on the basis of merit, and not by means of bureaucratically distributed jobs, titles, and awards, that is capable of establishing the authentic values of culture and life in the society.

Let us consider the example of a clearly inferior work of art which is not disseminated in the mass media and which is "consumed" by a small group. Would we call it part of the mass culture? Obviously, we would not. On the other hand, the masterpieces of world culture can simultaneously or successively belong to both categories, mass and elite. The works of Bach certainly did not come into being as part of the mass culture, but now that they are on phonograph records and tape and are used as the musical accompaniment in figure skating competitions, they are certainly part of the mass culture. Meanwhile, and this is particularly important, they have not ceased to belong to their brilliant composer and cannot compromise him in any way whatsoever. The same is true of the frequently mentioned "profaned" Mona Lisa on the soap wrapper and of other such cases.

One of the common themes of the criticism of mass culture concerns the standardization invariably accompanying its "products." This criticism is always a conscious or unconscious result of the idealization of traditional culture, which supposedly never suffered from standardization, or of the tendency to think of all past cultural works only as unique classic models (overlooking the fact that the "middle" and "lower" levels simply

sank into oblivion). This puts the critic in the same position as a person who would compare, for example, modern row housing, built by the mass industrial method, to a 15th century Florentine palazzo and then proceed to list all of the obvious aesthetic flaws of the former in comparison to the latter, implying that there were no shacks in Florence in those days.

The circulation of copies does not necessarily mean the "vulgarization" of unique and superior works (although losses are possible and unavoidable here). According to art historians, an acquaintance with copies of art works frequently leads to a deeper understanding of the unique essence of the originals.

Standardization, which is closely connected with mass consumption, is a universal social process, and the important thing is not to "expose" standardization per se. There is no question that we should cultivate an appreciation for the unique and inimitable and support it in every way possible, especially in art (because without this, it simply would not exist), but we must also remember that it can (and sometimes should) become the standard, although not necessarily a standard for all time and all places.

The creation of original and diverse cultural standards is extremely important in the functioning of culture, however paradoxical this might seem at first. In time, the standard can become (and has become) unique. Finally, there is a need to raise the level of existing standards of mass consumption.

Some lowering of the quality of outstanding cultural achievements is certainly possible and even inevitable in the process of mass dissemination, but the historical process is dialectical by its very nature, all gains are accompanied by losses, and it is impossible to exchange something for nothing. The important thing is to minimize the negative consequences of the generally positive processes of the mass dissemination of cultural achievements.

The distinctions drawn between "mass" and "folk," between "mass" and "classical," and others are highly artificial and have no logical or historical basis. It is more valid and more realistic to compare the mass culture with the elite, traditional, and specialized cultures. Even here, however, it is important to remember that these distinctions are conditional and variable. In modern societies, the elite, traditional, and mass spheres are overlapping and interpenetrating elements of culture and often cannot exist without one another. It is also important to consider the complexity of such seemingly comprehensible terms as "elite" and "traditional." The concept of the cultural elite is extremely vague: First of all, it does not coincide with the concept of the social elite; second, it does not coincide with the concept of the "creators" of culture. For this reason, even serious researchers have had to introduce value judgments into their interpretations of the "elite—mass" dichotomy. The categorization of anything as part of the mass

culture is often simultaneously a covert allusion to the existence of an elite culture (designated as "high," "authentic," and so forth). When critics, art critics or literary critics, include a work in the category of "high" ("non-mass") culture, they are naturally guided by their own, quite diverse tastes and values. As a result, the elite culture (just as, incidentally, the folk culture) could include a dull and colorless (and therefore unread by anyone) novel as well as a masterpiece.

As far as the traditional culture is concerned, here we are dealing with another pseudo-verity. Not only does the mass culture frequently rely on the traditions of folklore and on professional traditions, particularly the classics, but tradition itself does not influence the subsequent development of cultural forms directly or automatically. The cultural heritage is multifaceted and constitutes an object of constant choice for each generation. In this sense, we are always choosing not only our future, but also our past. The traditional culture, which is no more homogeneous than the elite and mass cultures, not only influences the last two, but is also constantly reproduced, investigated, and interpreted in them. Without this, tradition cannot exist.

The comparison of the mass culture with various specialized cultures seems more valid. The latter are the cultures whose forms are not widely disseminated but operate permanently in more or less isolated social groups and categories (sociodemographic, socioprofessional, amateur, etc.) with a special set of values, standards, and rituals, are reproduced only within these groups for some reason or another, and do not transcend their boundaries. Even here, however, various types of reciprocal influences exist. On the one hand, patterns of mass culture are differentiated in accordance with the traditions of the social group or other traditions and, on the other, the cultural models of specific social groups gain mass appeal and become accessible to everyone.

While theorists insist on exposing the mass culture and only occasionally, and quite reluctantly, acknowledging the right of such "vulgar" genres as variety theater, the circus, or the operetta to exist, experience tells us that the most diverse forms of creative activity and their results will eventually become part of the sphere of mass culture. Some are partially or occasionally "included" in it, while others are part of it from the very beginning. The latter include industrial design, the planning of physical surroundings in accordance with human requirements and specific social ideals. In contrast, for instance, to easel painting, which can only be "included" in the mass culture by the circulation of copies of initially unique works, design belongs to this sphere immediately. Designs are meant for the mass consumer. The use—or consumption—of the products of this activity is also of a mass nature. Many designs are based on mass production and could not exist without it. Others, such as the urban neighborhood, might be unique but are also meant for the mass consumer. Obviously, the consuming "mass" must be differentiated in this case.

It is completely obvious that design ideas, or the purpose of projects, are the products of individual "creators" or small groups of professionals who think alike. The project, however, is not a commodity yet. This is how design differs from other forms of plastic art or, for instance, from literature. The easel painter creates a unique work, and the circulation of copies of it is only an supplement to his work. For the designer, the mass production of the item is an integral part of the creation of his own work. If the designer's idea remains unique, it dies. It must be reproduced and must become a standard, although not necessarily an eternal standard everywhere. Furthermore, the interval between the scale model or experimental model and the mass-produced and mass-consumed item must be minimal.

Whereas uniqueness and inimitability are always necessary attributes of paintings, in design this is more likely to be a drawback, although it is not necessarily a flaw in the design. (It could have to do with the capabilities of technology, etc.) A unique design is often tantamount to an unrealized project. The uniqueness of the work is not the same thing as the uniqueness of the creative idea it embodies. As a rule, paintings are also unique because there is only one copy, or a few in some cases. At the same time, the painting could be weak and unoriginal. A mass-produced design, on the other hand, could be outstanding and original because of the ideas it embodies. (Copies are not the same as imitations: Copies of masterpieces are quite different from derivative and unoriginal works.) Consequently, originality is just as important a creative element in design, in spite of its mass and standardized production, as in the forms of artistic creativity producing "unique" works.

I do not intend to defend the artistic, moral, and other qualities of works lacking in merit or to defend bad taste. It does seem to me, however, that the mass culture—and cultural trends, for that matter—are much more complex phenomena, with much deeper roots in sociohistorical reality, than they seem to their numerous critics in our country and in the West.

If we can move from the subjective evaluations of these phenomena to their objective cultural-historical and sociological analysis, and if we can stop portraying part (the intentionally or unintentionally negative part) as the whole, we will see that the mass culture is not a separate and static entity with a specific set of features, but a particular state, determined by the current phase of historical development. The main distinction of the mass culture is not its "inferior" content, but—however trivial this might sound—its mass appeal. This means that different and even conflicting forms, including classic, folklore, elite, and others, can be its models at different times and with differing degrees of probability.

It is this last fact that encourages us to ensure that works of genuine value, both those created in the past and those being created before our very eyes, are not confined to the almost inaccessible and rarely frequented upper levels of culture or to the lower levels, but that they live

a full life together everywhere. Then perhaps the "top" will not sound so impossibly high in the discussions of the theorists of culture, and the "bottom" will not look as obscenely low as it often looks today.

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Communist Views on Perestroika in the Party

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[Article by Aleksandr Viktorovich Lipskiy, scientific associate at Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and one of our journal's consultants and permanent contributing authors (this article was written at the end of 1989)]

[Text] Five years of perestroika, years which have been more tempestuous than productive, have gone by. Citizens standing in front of empty store counters are arguing about the speed and results of social renewal. Optimists assert that we are restructuring, taking the best of all possible roads. Pessimists are afraid that this is all there is. Sociologists are surreptitiously using up our scarce paper to print questionnaires to study something that is not social reality, but only a projection of it, based on the ratio of optimistic to pessimistic views in the society.

Arguments about perestroika are a waste of time: Judgments have to be based on criteria which do not depend on the feelings of the arguing parties. Any method is good if it is objective. In the final analysis, the situation can also be judged by the number of the "dismissed," no longer relevant anecdotes about the period of stagnation, complete sets of which are kept in official agencies and in private collections. The folklore has lost its edge and its meaning: All the pluses are on the side of perestroika.

According to the calculations of well-known "experts," no more than 10-15 percent of the cases referred to in these anecdotes have been "closed" in the last 5 years. This means that we still have to cover approximately nine-tenths of the distance between points "A" and "B." If we state this in the form of an arithmetic problem, we can ask how quickly the pedestrian must walk if we know that the reforms stipulated in the new edition of the CPSU Program are scheduled to be essentially completed by 2000. From the standpoint of arithmetic, the answer is clear: He must walk two and a half or three times as quickly as before. We derive the same result from a comparison of the rate of labor productivity growth in the last 5 years and the projected rate. If it is to be augmented by 2.3-2.5 times by 2000[!]¹—i.e., to reach the present U.S. level—it would have to rise more than 6 percent each year for 15 years beginning in 1986. The losses of the last 5 years can only be covered by speeding up the present rate two and a half or three times.

Who (or what) is keeping us from setting sail at the proper speed? Is it an incompetent crew, rotten rigging, the notorious "force majeure," or the absence of agreement on the direction of travel, both on the bridge and on the deck? World experience in handling a ship in a stormy sea suggests that the only hindering factor is the last of these. We know that Stalinism was unable to exterminate all of the competent people, the rigging can be replaced, and the "force majeure," as a term more applicable in bookkeeping than in the natural sciences, is not that frightening when there is unanimity in the struggle against difficulties. The example of such countries as the FRG or Japan, where the people were united after the war by a passion for "bourgeois" democracy and economic prosperity, a passion alien to us for class reasons, speaks for itself.

It appears that the key to the success of perestroika is the achievement of a consensus on the main problems in the society's socioeconomic and political affairs, but we have a different interpretation of this than they do. Over there, "on the other side of the ridge," compromise, based on the real balance of power, is a synonym for unity, but in our country consensus is usually accompanied by the barracks brand of conformity—"Eyes center!" (the center, as we know, is the location of the party, the core of the Soviet sociopolitical system).

The artifact of official party ideology, the messianic idea about the CPSU's leading and directing role in social life, rests on a few sacrosanct propaganda postulates, and perhaps the most important is the imperative of unity, which is given a primitive interpretation as adherence to the single course chosen by the leadership and the unanimity of the CPSU rank and file with regard to this. The monopoly on the truth, appropriated by virtue of dogmas often far removed from living Marxism, demands two things for its self-justification—first, the absence of doubts and conflicts within the monopolist party and, second, the support and enthusiastic unification of the people whose "highest interests" it represents.

Dialectic conflicts with harmony, however, and the two demands cannot be fulfilled simultaneously in a single party system. If the political party turns into something like an order of sword-bearers and achieves monolithic thinking among its followers, unity with the people has to be forgotten, because the variety of interests of all social groups cannot ever fit into the Procrustean bed of the class approach and the general line. If the party decides to actually unite all social forces in the country without resorting to a witch hunt, however, the renunciation of unanimity is inevitable, and the pluralism of opinions and intra-party debate will develop naturally. In other words, the new "thinking" is beginning to make some headway in our domestic affairs as well as in the world arena.

As a structure of political power, the multi-party system "became part of history" in the first post-revolutionary years, and this was followed by the elimination of the intra-party factional struggle, which had some purpose at

least in the sense that it encouraged the conflict of opinions and the debates which are known to reveal the truth. In complete accordance with the theories of physiologist Pavlov, the threat of being accused of opposition activity, reinforced by mass repression, aroused a fear of personal opinion in whole generations, and this eventually evolved into horror at the very thought of expressing dissent. Just recently the press reported the first abstention from a vote by a Supreme Soviet deputy with great emotion and anticipation, as if overcoming the herd instinct in oneself were tantamount to a public auto-da-fe.

The total suppression of dissenting views in the party, which continued even after Stalin, objectively undermined the party's contacts with the masses. To rectify the situation, official "agitation and propaganda" began the intense, and essentially forcible, inculcation of the idea of the indissoluble union of Communists and non-members in the public mind in the early 1970s. The more this statement was repeated, the more skepticism it aroused. This is why the slogan "The people and the party are the same" is already openly doubted, to put it mildly. Meanwhile, the party is being blamed for the collapse of the economy, its alienation from the people, the opportunism of the party staff, etc. Our opponents are cleverly taking advantage of the fact that the ruling party was essentially unable to provide the majority of citizens with the living conditions they deserved—conditions corresponding to the present level of civilization, and not the 1913 level.

If the CPSU claims to play the leading role, they spitefully say, let all of the Communists go and live in one oblast, from which all of the non-members have been evacuated, and let the party members build a glorious future in a couple of five-year plans, and we will see what they come up with. These schismatic arguments would not deserve repetition if they did not imply a genuine wish to portray the party as an institution alien to the society and isolated from it—a wish which, in the final analysis, can only weaken our unity during the course of perestroika.

These attitudes reached their height in the election campaigns of the last 2 years, in which the candidates supported by the party staff were running against candidates who had not won this support. In Moscow, for example, the struggle was launched under this characteristic slogan: "Ivan Ivanovich is the party candidate, but Ivan Nikiforovich is the people's candidate." In principle, the CPSU membership of the candidates and the voters was of no consequence. For most people the election was a chance to vote against the candidates behind whom, as the public saw it, the leaders of rayon, city, and oblast party organizations were looming. As a result, not one of the raykom secretaries in the capital was elected to serve as a deputy of the first Congress of Soviets on 26 March 1989, the chairman of the Moscow gorispolkom did not win either, and most of those who ran uncontested did not win the necessary number of

votes because the absence of rivals was also interpreted as the result of party staff intrigues against undesirable candidates.

Drawing a distinction between the party and the party staff in their minds, the people preferred to support mainly the CPSU members who had no known ties to the staff, and the party's prestige did not suffer: Almost 9 out of every 10 of the newly elected deputies were Communists.

The election results provided clear evidence that party unity simply did not exist, apart from the united staff, because the CPSU rank and file are not lunatics or infiltrating parachutists, but people just like us, part of our diverse multimillion-strong population. I will mention just a single incident, which is extremely interesting and is worth a whole sociological research project. Child psychologist M. Idlinskaya told me that when she asked a 4-year-old boy what kind of games children play in kindergarten, he said they played "Politburo." The children arrive carrying briefcases, and after deciding who should play which roles, hold a meeting in the playhouse and pass decrees. At one meeting they "expelled" their "Yeltsin" from the Politburo. The boy explained the procedure to the inquisitive lady: The accused was simply pushed out of the window....

No, whatever anyone might say, the people and the party are the same! They are the same flesh and blood. They are the same in the sense that the CPSU today is a scale model of the society at large, a copy of its conflicts and problems. We now see that the party ranks include radicals as well as conservatives. The processes taking place in the party are identical to those taking place in the society: The lower levels are taking more initiative, glasnost is becoming more widespread, bureaucrats are objecting to changes, and professional activists are jabbering on and on about perestroika. Therefore, we can assume that the party rank and file are not united by any kind of single ideology differing in any way from the ideology of the non-party masses, because their living conditions and average level of consciousness (not to be confused with conscientiousness) are approximately the same. Nevertheless, although unanimity no longer exists in the party, we still have only a vague idea of the actual state of affairs and do not the precise range of Communist views on domestic politics and intra-organizational matters.

We were given a unique opportunity to satisfy our curiosity to some extent at the very beginning of 1989 when the leadership of one of Moscow's central rayons asked us to learn what Communists thought about the work of the raykom and primary party organizations just before the rayon report and election conference. A preliminary study of the total group—the CPSU members in good standing in Moscow's Sverdlovskiy Rayon—suggested that it could be viewed as a model of the party organization of the "whole capital." A four-stage selection strategy, designed to preserve the parameters of this

model in the sample group, secured the group's acceptable correspondence to the total group and sufficiently representative data. The main method of collecting information was an anonymous questionnaire, which was filled out by almost 3,000 party members from 42 party organizations in the rayon. The sample group included Communists working in industry, construction, transportation, science, education, trade, medicine, the administrative network, public utilities, culture, the press and the mass media, as well as retired individuals and students.

The documents we received from the CPSU raykom indicated that the following areas of work were assigned priority during the report period:

"1. The restructuring of the activities of party committees and bureaus of the CPSU raykom as organs of political leadership;

"2. The promotion of the democratization of affairs in primary party organizations by means of political, personnel, and organizational work, the creation of an atmosphere of free discussion and debate, criticism, and self-criticism, the enhancement of the initiative, personal responsibility, and vanguard role of Communists, and the reinforcement of concerted action based on collective decisions;

"3. The promotion of economic methods of administration through party organizations by establishing the principles of cost accounting and self-funding in economic practices and developing socialist production self-management;

"4. The stepped-up resolution of urgent socioeconomic problems."

These areas became the structural basis of our study, focusing on four separate groups of questions. For understandable reasons, it would be impossible to discuss all of the survey results in this article, and we will therefore mention just a few concerning the first two areas of work. The determination of the degree of Communist unanimity—the main purpose of this article—will be taken up again later.

"When comrades cannot agree, things never go right..."—I.A. Krylov

Let us begin with the now ritualistic question: "How quickly is perestroika progressing in your work collective?" Most of the Communists (52.9 percent) believe that perestroika is progressing too slowly, and another 16 percent said that it has not even begun in earnest. Table 1 (part "A") illustrates that workers and engineering and technical personnel expressed the most negative opinions. For example, members of the sample group representing different levels of management were three times as likely to choose the response "Quick."

Table 1. A.

Estimates of Speed of Perestroika in Collectives, December 1988-January 1989, %

Categories	Quick	Average	Slow	Perestroika has essentially not begun	No definite opinion, or No opinion
Workers	1.4	21.2	53.1	18.8	5.6
Engineering and technical personnel	1.4	17.6	52.1	22.4	6.4
Managers	3.8	28.7	55.4	9.0	3.1
Average	2.2	23.8	52.9	16.0	5.0
		76.7			

When we analyzed the distribution of these responses in connection with length of CPSU membership, we found that members become less critical as the years go by. The highest number of dissatisfied responses were given by candidates for membership and members who had belonged to the party for less than 15 years. The assumption that this was a natural result of the higher

percentage of managers among respondents who had belonged to the CPSU for more than 15 years was not corroborated, because most of the managers who responded to the questionnaire had belonged to the party for only 6-15 years. Apparently, other factors, generational ones, are at work here.

Table 1. B.

"How Is Perestroika Progressing at Your Enterprise?" (%)

Surveys	Quite vigorously	No significant results yet	Perestroika essentially has not begun	No definite opinion
"Perestroika-1987"	5.1	57.6	34.8	2.6
"Perestroika-1988"	4.1	60.0	33.6	2.3
"Perestroika-1989"	3.8	58.0	38.2	—

The subjective attitudes of Communists toward the current changes were quite similar to the opinions of perestroyka revealed in other studies, such as the all-union monitoring surveys called "Perestroyka—1987, 1988, 1989," with more than 10,000 respondents in each group, irrespective of party membership (see Table 1, part "B"). The slight shift in the distribution of Communist opinions in 1988 from the response "Not begun" in the direction of "Begun, but no significant results yet" is an accurate reflection of the state of affairs in the country, and especially in the economic sphere. In 1989 the opposite occurred, when it became clear that the new radical economic reform was still quite distant[2, p 11].

Returning to our study, we must say that estimates of the speed of perestroyka differed substantially in individual organizations—up to 20 percent in either direction. Most of the Communists at enterprises of physical production and in organizations from the "remainder financing" sphere—i.e., schools, medical establishments,

etc.—had a low opinion of the progress of perestroyka. Communists in the rayon internal affairs administration were also extremely critical, and the people most satisfied with the speed of reforms were those working in the "administration and distribution" sphere: in ministries and in the trade network.

Communists had the same opinions of the overall progress of perestroyka in the rayon as a whole. More than half of the respondents (60.1 percent) declined to answer, choosing the response "No definite opinion." Of those who did express an opinion, only 0.7 percent of the respondents said it was progressing quickly, 16.3 percent said it was not very fast or very slow, 62.4 percent said it was progressing slowly, and 20.6 percent chose the response "Perestroyka has not begun."

Has the work of party organizations improved as a result of the decisions made at the 19th party conference? Let us take a look at Table 2, illustrating the distribution of responses to this question.

Table 2.

Opinions of Changes in Party Committee Performance After 19th Party Conference, %				
Categories	Considerable improvement	Negligible improvement	No improvement	No definite opinion
Only workers	10.3	46.0	32.0	11.7
Only engineering and technical personnel	5.6	45.7	36.0	12.6
Only managers	18.0	58.6	16.9	6.5
Average	10.4	50.1	28.7	10.8

As we can see, the opinions of "overseers" (as F. Iskander aptly termed them) differed from the opinions of the rank and file executors of managers' instructions this time as well. Depending of length of party membership, young Communists (under 6 years in the party) and, what is most interesting, veterans (over 25 years in the party) expressed the most critical opinions. In response to a question about raykom performance (worded in the same way), only 4.9 percent of all respondents said it had improved, 20.6 said there had been negligible improvement, and 17.6 percent said there had been no improvement. More than half (56.8 percent) said they had difficulty evaluating the degree of change in the work of the CPSU raykom.

Let us take a look at the evaluations of the performance of party committees in relation to different criteria. Around 51.1 percent of the respondents mentioned improvement in the consideration of Communists' opinions and suggestions (34.9 percent said the situation had not changed, 0.9 percent said it had changed for the worse, and 13 percent had no opinion whatsoever). And

what about glasnost? Are there still areas of party committee work which are not open to discussion? One out of every four Communists (one-fifth of the workers and one-third of the managers) said that glasnost had taken over completely and that there were no forbidden zones at all. Two out of every five workers and managers, however, made the guarded comment that these zones still exist, but they are few in number.

When the work of the CPSU raykom was evaluated from this standpoint, 52.2 percent of the respondents prudently said they had no definite opinion. Among the imprudent, the distribution of responses was the following: 67.5 percent said there were many forbidden topics, 26.5 percent said there were a few, and 6 percent said glasnost was unlimited.

The responses to the next indispensable question, about the existence of conditions for the development of criticism and self-criticism at enterprises and in organizations, completed the evaluation of the perestroyka of party organization performance (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Opinions of Conditions for Development of Criticism and Self-Criticism, %

Responses	Average evaluation	Workers	Engineering and technical personnel	Managers
Favorable conditions have been established	32.1	25.2	22.7	41.1
Criticism is discouraged and disregarded	46.7	53.8	53.7	38.9
Criticism is followed by outright harassment	13.9	14.8	16.2	11.5
No definite opinion	7.3	6.2	7.4	8.5

*"There are few real fighters, and there are no leaders..."—
V. Vysotskiy*

Only one out of every five respondents said that his party organization was a united entity and was capable of attaining great long-range objectives (20.6 percent), while 60.8 percent said that their party organizations were not distinguished by much solidarity, 8.8 percent said their party organizations were disunited, with each

person out for himself, 2.5 percent said the party organization was split into opponents and defenders of perestroika, and 7.2 percent declined to answer. Once again, engineering and technical personnel and workers were most critical, and managers were least critical.

Most Communists feel no proprietary sense and do not believe they can influence the state of affairs in the collective (see Table 4).

Table 4.

Responses to Question: "Do You Feel That You Are the Master of Your Collective and Can Influence the State of Affairs in It?" (%)

Categories	No proprietary sense	Almost no proprietary sense	No opinion	Somewhat strong proprietary sense	Definite proprietary sense
Average	21.2	30.2	12.5	22.6	13.5
Only workers	29.0	28.7	17.4	12.3	12.6
Only managers	12.6	21.0	9.8	30.1	26.6

Do party members have a clear idea of their own role in perestroika, and did our respondents acknowledge their personal responsibility? Around 53.8 percent answered yes, 30.6 percent had no clear idea, and 15.5 percent had difficulty answering the question. The opinions of workers and engineering and technical personnel differed dramatically from those of managers. Whereas

only around 45 percent of the former acknowledged their role in perestroika, the figure for the latter is already around 70 percent (!).

Communists also had low opinions of real opportunities to influence the progress of perestroika in the party and to improve the work of their party organizations (see Table 5)

Table 5.

Assessment of Real Opportunities To Influence Course of Perestroika and Improve Work of Party Organization, %

Categories	Many opportunities	Few opportunities	No opportunities
Average	22.3	62.8	14.9
Only workers	16.8	66.0	17.2
Only engineering and technical personnel	15.9	64.7	19.4
Only managers	34.4	58.1	7.5

All categories of respondents were almost unanimous in the evaluation of their opportunities to influence perestroika in the rayon and the work of the CPSU raykom: 6.6 percent said there was more opportunity, 26.5 percent said there was less, and 66.9 percent said there was no opportunity.

An analysis revealed a close connection between the opinions cited above and the assessments of the role of

primary party organizations in perestroika at enterprises and in organizations. The more party members were aware of their own personal role in perestroika, the more authority their party organization had among the laboring masses. In general, only one out of every four Communists said that his party organization played a leading role in perestroika (see Table 6).

Table 6.

Evaluation of Actual Role of Primary Party Organization in Perestroyka at Enterprises and in Organizations, %

Categories	Leading role	No special role	No authority
Average	25.2	60.4	14.4
Only workers	25.1	54.0	19.9
Only engineering and technical personnel	18.3	62.4	19.3
Only managers	31.6	60.4	8.0

Evaluations of the party rayon committee were even lower. Some 7.8 percent of the respondents said the raykom had considerable authority, 23.5 percent said it had little authority, 23.2 percent said that virtually no one respected the CPSU raykom, and 45.5 percent had no definite opinion.

The leading role presupposes the existence of a leader in the collective, capable of heading the perestroyka process, but most of the respondents saw no such person in their group (see Table 7).

Table 7.

Opinions Regarding Presence of Genuine Leader in Collective, %

Categories	Yes	No	I do not know
Average	31.0	41.6	27.2
Only workers	20.9	42.6	36.5
Only engineering and technical personnel	25.0	48.2	26.8
Only managers	40.7	33.3	25.9

Whom did Communists see as the leader? It was usually the economic manager of the enterprise (67.4 percent), and only 14.1 percent named members of the party committee as leaders. The workers were less likely to see economic managers as leaders—only 47.6 percent of the workers said this. The managers were more likely—83.2 percent, and the figure for engineering and technical personnel was 70.5 percent. The most surprising result, however, was that virtually no economic managers saw party committee members as leaders (only 7.3 percent), and the situation was the same among engineering and technical personnel—9.1 percent. Workers and employees were more likely to name party committee members as leaders (20.4 percent and 21.2 percent respectively). Why? There are probably two reasons: First, the tenacious technocratic attitudes of economic and production managers; second, the new party organization members who have joined the staff of party committees in place of people who established their routine during the years of stagnation—i.e., the selfsame economic managers. In general, it is clear that party committees are not ready to direct the course of perestroyka at enterprises in the rayon yet.

Finally, let us look at the Communists' personal evaluations of the performance of primary party organizations (see Table 8).

Table 8.

Responses to Question: "Were Communists Satisfied with the Performance of Your Party Committee (Or Bureau) During the Report and Election Campaign, and What Is Your Personal Evaluation of Its Performance?" (%)

Categories	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	No definite opinion
Average	74.0	16.0	10.0
Workers	68.4	19.6	12.0
Engineering and technical personnel	68.0	21.0	11.0
Managers	79.4	11.7	8.9

These are the average evaluations for each category. They were much lower at some enterprises. In seven primary party organizations the performance of the previous party committee was given a satisfactory evaluation by 50-59 percent of the Communists. In 12 others, however, from 80 to 100 percent of the Communists were satisfied with the performance of party committees. It is significant that throughout industry, transportation, science, and construction, the party committees of only the enterprises and organizations which had made the move to economic accountability were given a high evaluation.

In our opinion, one of the most interesting questions was the one which revealed the measures the respondents were willing to support for the reinforcement and rectification of party ranks. Almost one out of every two (45.7 percent) chose "the resolute expulsion of opportunists, self-seeking individuals, and morally defective people from the party ranks." Around one out of every eight (12.9 percent) proposed the radical reduction of party membership, and one out of every ten (10.8 percent) suggested a longer probation period for candidates for CPSU membership. Three out of every ten favored the renunciation of the representative principle (quotas) of party membership.

This suggests that Communists themselves feel that clearing the deadwood out of the CPSU is the most important current objective. It is interesting that only half of the party members mentioned this indisputably natural requirement for the real Communist. It might be possible that some people really believe there is not a single scoundrel in the party, but I think there are almost no Communists who are isolated enough from society to be taken for Old Believers from the taiga. In any case, they did not constitute a significant percentage of our respondents. This means that around half of the Communists did not choose this response because, even if they are not "self-seeking," it is at least quite possible that they joined the CPSU for opportunistic reasons or acted on other, far from ideological motives.

Comparisons of the distribution of responses to several sociodemographic characteristics did not reveal any significant differences (deviations from the average values of linear distributions) based on gender, education, age, or length of CPSU membership. Differences were only discovered during the analysis of the connection between responses and the social status of the respondent. Only one out of every five workers (around 20 percent) supported the renunciation of the representative principle of new membership. This was a much lower figure than in the other categories (employees, engineering and technical personnel, managerial personnel, retired individuals, students, and others). Almost half of the artistic and scientific personnel, for example, wanted the quotas to be cancelled. This difference warrants analysis: It appears that workers and the intelligentsia have diametrically opposed views on the quotas. Why?

First of all, this could be a reaction to the humiliating restrictions on CPSU membership for the intelligentsia and the continued discrimination against non-party members in promotions to managerial positions. Second, this is a comparative indicator of aspirations to join the party (irrespective of inner, individual motives), natural at the end of the fifth year of perestroika. It is no secret that workers themselves are in no hurry to apply for membership today, just as 10 years ago, and that "the right kind of work," as they say in party committees, has to be conducted among them. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, never had to be asked before: There was always a waiting list.

Whereas opportunistic considerations—why hide the fact?—were once the main reason many people joined the party, this is a much weaker motive today. In an atmosphere of increasing criticism of the party, high demands on its members, and intense struggle over perestroika, "life in Russia" has become much less happy and carefree for wheeler-dealers with party membership cards. Now people of that type are in no hurry to join the party because they are waiting to see which side wins.

We can conclude from this that when we kept the quotas in force, we were, in a certain sense, sawing off the branch on which we were sitting—i.e., we were keeping some active fighters for perestroika out of the party and, furthermore, in view of the progressive intelligentsia's inherent qualities, these were people who were objectively more active than most of the laboring public. Suspicion of the intelligentsia—of all things!—is permanently engraved in the genetic code of the bureaucratic state, or, as it is commonly called today, the authoritarian system. Examples of this can be seen not only in the way the intelligentsia was viewed and treated by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, but also throughout the history of the Russian State. It appears that many of today's administrators would immediately agree with Count Kurlov, the chief of police who compared the intelligentsia to rust, because it destroyed everything and created nothing. Was this the origin of the pejorative

term "corroded intelligentsia," which came into being during the years of repression?

The workers voted for the retention of class privileges in admittance to the CPSU and for limited access to the party for anyone "not from the lathe or the plow." What does this tell us? First of all, suspicions of intellectuals are characteristic of the working class as well as the powers that be. They began to be cultivated in earnest in the USSR at the end of the 1920s, beginning with the persecution of "bourgeois specialists" and farces like the Industrial Party trial. Second, the laboring public, especially the working class, is suffering from a severe crisis of faith in all managers, "executives," the administrative staff, and employees in general. According to Suslov, however, we were living in a completely democratic state and an almost classless society, which had supposedly been achieved when all strata and social groups had agreed with the ideological position of the working class!

After hearing the responses to just about one-tenth of the questionnaire, the reader is justified in wondering exactly what all of this means. The situation is paradoxical because the party still regards public opinion as a single entity. This creates the impression that the average statistical member of the CPSU, judging by these responses, does not know exactly what he wants: "Maybe democracy, or maybe sturgeon with horseradish." As soon as we realize that each opinion represents a separate individual with his own personal grievances, we can clearly see that a crisis is brewing in the party.

At the beginning of the article we agreed to view the CPSU as a scale model of the society, and this means that the same processes are occurring in the social community. In other words, a crisis is brewing, and this is more or less apparent to any discerning citizen with a red card in his pocket.

"But what does all of this mean? It means we should live..."

Is there a solution to the present state of affairs within the party? Strictly speaking, if we do not count the appeals to "live in harmony," there are probably only two possible scenarios. First, everything could be left as it is. The ban on dissenting views in the CPSU ranks will completely and finally discredit the thesis that "the people and the party are the same" in the near future. The party will cease to represent the population in miniature, and most of the population will move from passive disapproval of the party to active anticommunism, which will result either in the intensification of totalitarianism (to the point of a dictatorship more extreme than Stalin's) or outbursts of mob indignation as in Romania (to the point of the physical removal of the Communist Party from the political stage). The desire for unanimity within the party, reinforced by repressive regulations, will force some CPSU members to choose between keeping their membership cards and remaining silent or giving up their cards and venting their dissatisfaction.

The second alternative is the complete elimination of bans on the free expression of opinions and the democratization of intra-party affairs. This will lead unavoidably to the revision of the Stalinist canons of conformity and party discipline, and this, in turn, will put an end to the tenacious idea of the party's leading role. Subsequent events can also move in two directions: either a multi-party system "de jure," with the retention of the "ruling party" principle, or the same system "de facto," with power transferred to the soviets, officially apolitical bodies of social self-government, but made up of deputies from politicized social organizations expressing the interests of various strata and groups (and even calling themselves parties).

Of course, events in the CPSU could also adhere to both patterns: for example, slight democratization, followed by the exchange of party membership cards (activity for the sake of activity), and then a new tightening of the screws for dessert.

In any situation, they say, the number of possible outcomes is equivalent to $n+1$ (reserve). This sounds particularly appropriate to me today. The reserve plan—or, more precisely, the emergency plan—suggests that...

"Without waiting for praise, we will clean our white feathers"—B. Okudzhava

Left and right wings, factions, and blocs in the CPSU are fictitious in a situation distinguished by a single-party monopoly. Pretending that the pluralism of opinions and different ideological platforms are possible in this kind of party is incorrect at the very least. The idea determines the structure of the organization, its goals, and the means of their attainment. The RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks) (1912-1918)] was conceived and established as a means of achieving political supremacy. The moral justification for the claims to power was the arousal of progressive thinking in the backward masses and the exercise of authority (for a certain amount of time) in the interests of the majority, even if the majority was still unaware of these interests. Using "progressive" ideas to penetrate the essentially hostile territory of human minds unprepared to seek the realization of the communist ideal, the party took power into its own hands and then continued to do this every day and everywhere for the next 70 years. But from whom can power be taken in the absence of other authorities? Only from one's own people. This is abnormal. The CPSU can and must be divided into several parts, because only rapid "vegetative" self-propagation can help to normalize the processes of the struggle for power, without waiting until weeds like "Pamyat" start sprouting.

First of all, the CPSU should actually, and not just verbally, assume full responsibility for the fact that our country is lagging behind the developed civilized states in terms of economic and social criteria. There is no other alternative, because a single-party system means that a single party is responsible. Second, it is important

for all of us to realize that the CPSU can exist, can act as the people's vanguard, and can accomplish the effective political leadership of the society only in the presence of real opponents. It is no coincidence that the English word "party" is derived from the word "part," which naturally presupposes the existence of at least one other part of the whole. Whatever other people may have accomplished, the English were the pioneers in this area.

The existence of two or three (or more?) parties with Marxist or general democratic aims in the country will not be inconsistent at all with our common goal of building a just and flourishing society. It is not goals that should compete, but the means of their attainment. A new Marxist, workers', democratic, socialist, or whatever other party will not hurt the cause of socialism, because we are not even sure whether we have already built it or not, and if we have, we are not sure it is the right socialism.

The consequences of the arbitrary division of the CPSU could be debated, but this is essentially unimportant. It is much more important to decide what the Soviet people and the Soviet social order will gain from this. First of all, a multi-party system will unavoidably put each part of the political structure under the complete control of the society, which will force all of the people exercising power to act in accordance with the laws and interests of this society, and not against them, as they did in the past and as they are still doing today. Second, this will establish the necessary conditions to stop the process of universal de-professionalization and finally begin the enhancement of the comparative (in relation to other nations) effectiveness of our order, promised (or bequeathed) to us by V.I. Lenin. Competition for power will objectively promote the "removal of the cheap assortment" from the party staff. Without this, functionaries will simply "drift" gradually over to the soviets or any other new power structures and will once again do the only thing they are good for—controlling the distribution of resources—i.e., "holding on and not letting go."

The third and final advantage is that the filling of the political vacuum will diminish the threat of the undesirable politicizing of the informal organizations which are now trying their best to infiltrate the vacant niches in the power pyramid. They will tend to their own affairs, and the Central Committee will no longer have to issue helpful hints on ways of counteracting the informal groups "making political demands." The future will show whether any of this will happen. We can only wait hopefully for the 28th CPSU Congress.

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Professional Growth of Young Specialists

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press 29 Jun 90) pp 130-133

[Article by G.N. Sokolova and V.G. Drakokhrust]

[Text] Negative tendencies in the professional employment of specialists in the modern corporations (scientific-production associations) of Belorussia began to grow stronger in the 1980s. This was a period of transition from their traditional structure (scientific and engineering centers, design and technological bureaus, an experimental production unit, and a plant) to the "flexible" structure (separate scientific-technical complexes working on specific problems). It led to the development of several of the specific characteristics of scientific and engineering labor.

First of all, a system is being established for the continuous improvement of skills and augmentation of knowledge, guaranteeing the increased professional training of personnel. The traditional forms that are compulsory for each specialist have been supplemented with active personal involvement in groups and seminars dealing with specific problems. The need to constantly supplement knowledge stems from the emphasis on fundamentally new technical designs for the use of scientific ideas in production. Second, the concentration of experts with different areas of specialization and styles of thinking in the corporations is accompanied by professional mobility, defined as the broadening of outlook and the acquisition of the skills of interdisciplinary research and a comprehensive approach to the resolution of scientific and technical problems. Third, there is a new functional mobility, representing a broader range of professional activity. It occurs when the scientist or engineer participates in all stages of the cycle—from the scientific idea to its materialization—and promotes the expansion of professional knowledge and skills, the elevation of professional standards, and the assignment of priority to high-quality results. The workplace of the specialist grows broader, taking in the experimental production unit, design bureau, and plant along with the laboratory. Besides this, the length of the "research-production" process is shortened, and this intensifies all of the work involved in it.

The new type of professional activity conflicted with the earlier stereotypes of the extensive use of young specialists. Unexpected problems arose. On the one hand, the mastery of new levels of scientific and engineering labor is contributing to more flexible scientific and technical thinking, but, on the other, the possibilities for the realization of creative potential are still limited.

Creative Potential of the Specialist

When the creative potential of the specialist is described in literature, the following components are generally singled out for discussion:

- 1) Cognitive—the ability to assimilate new knowledge and professional experience independently;
- 2) Valuative—the willingness to participate personally in the accomplishment of socially important scientific and production tasks on the basis of personal values;
- 3) Communicative—the ability and skills of communication and the development of professional and personal contacts with colleagues;
- 4) Practical-transformational—the professional knowledge reflecting the specialist's ability to participate effectively in professional activity.

All of the components of the specialist's creative potential are closely interrelated. Judging by the results of comparative republic studies the authors conducted in 1983 and 1989,¹ however, the unequal development of individual components precludes a balanced relationship.

Specialists acquire their cognitive potential in higher academic institutions, but education can only be deemed successful when it provides specialists with knowledge and with the methodology of its acquisition. The VUZ training of specialists is flawed because of the absence of this methodology, and this is why the graduate has to spend a long time accumulating practical experience instead of working on production problems. The materials of the survey indicate that only 17 percent of the specialists regarded themselves as professionals immediately after graduation, 37 percent felt that they were professionals after 1-3 years, and another 46 percent did not feel this way until 4 or 5 years after graduation. It usually takes 3 years for a young person to adapt to production, and this is not a matter of growing accustomed to new production conditions or a new sociopsychological situation, but of continued professional training to the point at which it meets the requirements of scientific and technical progress.

Adaptation and professionalization are two separate processes, but they do depend on one another. The mastery of a specialty is impossible without the accumulation of experience in professional communication along with work skills. Becoming part of a new group entails fewer difficulties and takes about half as much time as the mastery of production skills. Up to 80 percent of all young associates "get used to" the collective in the first 6 months of work, and only 46.5 percent overcome production problems during this period. The difference could be due to the fact that the enterprise is usually working in fundamentally new fields of science which are still not part of the specialist's professional training in the higher academic institution.

When young specialists begin their professional activity in a scientific-production association, they participate in each stage of the "research-production" cycle and, consequently, in scientific work as well. Which type of activity do they prefer? The results of our survey indicated that 24 percent of the respondents had chosen

auxiliary jobs not requiring any scientific knowledge, 20 percent were performing complex production functions for which the VUZ did not give them adequate preparation, and 6 percent were managing a collective although they lacked the vocational and special knowledge needed for this. This means that the VUZ is responsible for half of the cases in which the content of labor does not correspond to the educational background. The other half of our respondents said there were shortcomings in the organization of their production activity.

The motivational nucleus of the specialist's professional self-assertion includes such values as work on engrossing projects, the improvement of skills, the existence of congenial colleagues and co-workers, work supervised by a highly qualified administrator (with an emphasis on professional communication) in an atmosphere of precisely organized labor and, finally, high wages.

The motivational nucleus determines the young specialist's degree of activity in production. If the conditions of the professional employment of specialists do not meet their interests and expectations, however, the opposite effect is apparent in the very first years: The specialist takes a passive professional stance.

A comparative analysis of the 1983 and 1989 results revealed the dynamics of the motivational nucleus and the degree to which the real opportunities provided by the work corresponded to the interests of young scientists and engineers. The relative importance of two factors—the opportunity to work on interesting projects and to improve skills—depends on the degree to which the individual is involved in the creative process of developing and incorporating scientific and technical innovations and fundamentally new scientific design and development projects. The young specialist's choice of specific professional interests is accompanied by an awareness of the productivity of communication with competent colleagues. Whereas in 1983 the young specialists valued colleagues who were simply good people with whom it was pleasant to maintain a good relationship, 6 years later the situation had changed dramatically. Highly professional and competent colleagues ranked highest. Businesslike cooperation with congenial professionals is preferable to friendships with co-workers.

It is true that the gap between the ideal and reality was much broader in 1989 than in 1983. The possibilities of working in an atmosphere of precisely organized labor, in comfortable conditions, and under the supervision of a competent administrator remained the same, but the projected value of these possibilities rose considerably. The continued extensive use of young specialists during the initial stage of their career, however, is still diminishing their creative potential. The "beginner's project" for the new researcher is usually not a complex (and therefore creative) project requiring him to use all of his intellectual and spiritual strength, but a partially completed fragment of an older colleague's project. The organization of labor on this level has a negative effect

on the immature professional character of the young researcher and gives rise to professional apathy and indifference.

The young researcher must be entrusted immediately with a project with a high level of risk if he is to become a researcher with a strong character. Organizations are not inclined, however, to take this risk. Given the present structure of management, the head of the subdivision is responsible for the final results. Whatever the distribution of functions, the personal responsibility of other associates is always negligible. This is why there has been an increasingly acute shortage of research qualifications and skills, and even of strength of character and the ability to make ingenious decisions and to lead the collective. If the tendency toward the extensive use of specialists continues, the problem of professional adaptation will be accompanied by a shortage of scientific leaders in general.

The traditional system for the professional employment of young specialists de-emphasizes creativity and excludes some of them (11 percent) from the integral functions of creative inquiry and decisionmaking. Around one-third of the respondents described their work in their specialty as conscientious performance requiring no independent initiative.

The passivity of young scientists is engendered by egalitarian tendencies in the payment of wages, inadequate material and moral incentives, and delays in professional advancement: 70 percent of the specialists had not risen above the level of third-class engineers in the first 10 years after graduation from the VUZ. The professional advancement connected with salary increases is complicated by the overall stability of personnel and is not always appealing because it presupposes more active involvement in administrative activity. Professional independence, on the other hand, does not earn the necessary compensation and social recognition.

In line with the informal system of division of labor in scientific-production collectives, each researcher masters one or several functions: scientific leadership, the generation of ideas, erudition, and criticism. Almost half of the young scientists mentioned a preference for criticism (not always constructive, incidentally). The second most popular function was erudition—37.1 percent. Fewer scientists wanted to generate ideas and lead the scientific team: 34 percent and 13.9 percent respectively. The change in the priorities of young scientists as a result of constant tutelage by older colleagues and the absence of the need to make independent decisions is certainly disturbing. The qualities of scientific leadership are in shortest supply at this time. Some 86-89 percent of the specialists surveyed associated the achievement of valuable creative results with the need for the constant elevation of professional standards. This must be regarded as a positive tendency. The improvement of the skills of associates between 1983 and 1989 is reflected in the higher number of young candidates of sciences, graduate students, and doctoral candidates (an increase

of 50-100 percent), in the higher skill categories of one-third of the young engineers, and in professional advancement. During that period the real opportunities to work without any substantial overloads doubled (according to the specialists' estimates), and opportunities to improve skills tripled. Young scientists have two or three times as many opportunities to work on their own ideas and on interesting projects. Opportunities to realize transformational potential, however, are still below average, and this certainly cannot increase job satisfaction. Whereas 42 percent of the specialists were dissatisfied or indifferent on this score in 1983, the figure was 31 percent in 1989.

A comparative analysis of the 1983 and 1989 surveys suggests that the effectiveness of the professional establishment of specialists depends on the degree to which negative tendencies can be surmounted in the use of their creative potential and on the reduction of their level of social and professional passivity. This could be achieved by developing the cognitive, valuative, communicative, and transformational components as interrelated elements of creative potential.

Footnotes

1. There was almost no change in distribution by gender during the survey period: In 1983, 48 percent of the respondents were men and 52 percent were women, and the respective figures in 1989 were 49 percent and 51 percent; the average age of the young specialists rose slightly, from 26 in 1983 to 28 in 1989; in 1983, 83 percent of the respondents were engineers and 17 percent were scientific associates, and the respective figures for 1989 were 80 percent and 20 percent.

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Articles Not Translated

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Half a Century of Silence (All-Union Population Census
of 1937) (Yu.A. Polyakov, V.B. Zhiromskaya, and I.I.
Kiselev) pp 30-52

Which Road Led to Ham (S.N. Savelyev) pp 66-78

Technological Aspects of Social Engineering (V.V.
Shcherbina) pp 79-86

Social Forecast and Social Innovation (I.V. Bestuzhev-
Lada) pp 87-93

I Took Trotsky's Side... (I.Ya. Vrachey) pp 94-105

Alternative Service: Domestic and Foreign Experience
(V.S. Novikov and M.A. Timofeyev) pp 111-118

Names (P.A. Florenskiy) pp 134-141

Letters to Editor pp 142-148

New Sociological Research Center pp 149-150

"Eros" as a Social Phenomenon... (L.V. Polyakov) . pp
151-156

Sociologist's Bookshelf pp 57, 78, 133, 150

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
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
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CONTENTS

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[Selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

Distribution of Labor in USSR [L.M. Martseva; pp 3-12]	1
Collective and Individual: Civilization Perspective [V.G. Kremen; pp 13-21]	7
Culture and Alienation [V.N. Orlov, O.I. Karpukhin; pp 22-29]	12
Vox Populi—Voice of the "Elect"? [E.S. Gams, V.I. Petrov; pp 53-57]	17
When the Marriage Partner Is Bought [M.S. Berdyayev, F.N. Ilyasov; pp 58-65]	19
Real and Imaginary Dilemmas, or the Mass and Elite Culture [A.B. Gofman; pp 106-111]	24
Communist Views on Perestroyka in the Party [A.V. Lipskiy; pp 119-129]	28
Professional Growth of Young Specialists [G.N. Sokolova, V.G. Drakokhrust; pp 130-133]	36
Articles Not Translated	38
Publication Data [p 160]	38

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 8, August 1990

Distribution of Labor in USSR

915D0002A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
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press 29 Jun 90) pp 3-12

[Article by Lidiya Mikhaylovna Martseva, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent in Department of Socialist Theory and Philosophy of the Omsk Railway Engineers Institute]

[Text] The perestroika of Soviet society was made necessary by the deformation of the fundamental principles of socialism in recent decades. The success of the initiated reforms will entail a thorough analysis of the deformed elements to learn which socialist principles were distorted or unrealized. The issues of concern here are fundamental—forms of property ownership, the democratization of the political system, the social class structure, and ethnic relations. Labor issues should occupy the most prominent place.

Above all, the distinctive features of socialist labor in the pure sense of the term, particularly universal compulsory labor as the basic premise of socialism, will require impartial analysis. This principle was formulated in the earliest socialist treatises and was common to utopian and scientific socialism. From the RSFSR Constitution of 1918 to the Fundamentals of Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics of March 1988, universal compulsory labor has been viewed as the basis of labor relations and as the legal source of the livelihood of citizens. In its more than 70 years as a constitutional premise, universal compulsory labor was never questioned by anyone from the standpoint of theory and practice.

Utopian socialism stipulated that "all people must work" (Saint-Simon) as an essential condition of social equality. The study of the causes of social inequality and class antagonism led pre-Marxist socialists to the conclusion that these phenomena were directly related to the unequal distribution of labor in the society, where parasitical classes and estates make their living by appropriating embodied and live labor. Thomas More was also referring to this privilege of the ruling classes when he spoke of the "colossal number of nobles...living in idleness, like drones, off the labor of others"[2]. When the utopian socialists divided society into parasitical and laboring classes on the basis of their participation in labor and suggested that the unequal distribution of labor was one source of private property, they proposed the principle of universal compulsory labor as a means of eliminating private ownership. This premise found its way into the "Communist Manifesto" in the form of a policy demand: "Equally compulsory labor for all, and the establishment of industrial armies, particularly for farming"[1]. The relatively equitable distribution of labor among all members of society without exception

would have reduced the labor participation of some by involving others in socially useful labor. This socialist principle was always regarded as the main condition for the elimination of social inequality in the sphere of production, appropriation, distribution, and consumption.

In an article entitled "Marx and the Western World," E.V. Ilyenkov says that the young Marx turned to communist ideas because even before he was a communist, Marx viewed their spread as a symptom or a theoretically naive expression of the completely real conflict which was coming to a head in the social organism of the leading countries of Europe[3]. When the utopians studied the distribution of labor in society, they concentrated on the following social problems: 1) the relationship between unequal distribution of labor and property relations; 2) the division of society into parasitical and laboring classes and social groups on the basis of participation in labor; 3) the division of labor itself into productive and non-productive, socially useful and "useless" forms. These aspects of labor within our social organism still require close scrutiny, although the reader might accuse us of theoretical naivete in the expression of a completely real situation. This naivete is compounded by the misleading figures at our disposal.

The number of able-bodied members of the country's population of 288.8 million in January 1990 numbered 164 million, 139 million of whom were employed in the national economy. If we subtract the 25 million able-bodied individuals who are not employed in the public labor network and the 12 million full-time students, we are left with 13 million able-bodied individuals who are not engaged in any kind of labor at all. The existence of this number of "available labor resources" was first admitted by USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] in January 1990[4]. According to its estimates, the non-working able-bodied population numbered 6 million in July 1989[5]. A 2.5-fold increase in the number of people who are not working in just half a year is an alarming symptom.

Our statistics are so misleading that it is difficult to believe them and even more difficult to work with them. In June 1989, for example, USSR Goskomstat listed the number of able-bodied individuals as 160 million, but in January 1990 the figure was 164 million, which would mean that the country's labor resources were augmented by 4 million people in just half a year. Goskomstat, however, reported that the increase for the whole year was 900,000. Goskomstat estimated the number of people employed in the public sector of the national economy at 128.6 million in 1988 and 139 million in 1989, but the increase of almost 10 million a year in the working population (we should recall that the level of unemployment in the United States has stayed at around 7-8 million for the last decade) is not corroborated by the insignificant growth of the cooperative sector (2.9 million people at the beginning of 1990) and the private sector (300,000) or personal subsidiary farming (4 million), which are augmented mainly by manpower from

the state sector of the economy[6]. For this reason, if we take the number of employed able-bodied individuals as 130 million[7, p 19], it turns out that around 34 million of the 164 million able-bodied individuals do not work, including 12 million students and more than 20 million (and maybe "around" 39 million) people representing "available labor resources" of working age. Our conclusion is that the number of able-bodied individuals not engaged in socially useful labor must be clarified.

As a rule, there are no "careless" estimates of this kind in foreign statistics. For example, 138.1 million of the 243.9 million people in the United States are able-bodied[7, p 19], and more than 119 million are employed in national production. The remaining 19 million members of the economically active population consist of 12 million students and 7.4 million unemployed individuals[8, pp 166, 395]. These statistics tie up all of the loose ends and present a completely distinct picture of the structure of employment in the United States without any reservations or contradictions.

It is an extremely difficult matter to clarify the exact number of able-bodied individuals in our country who do not work because the indicator of population distribution by sources of livelihood "disappeared" from reference works in recent years. Analyzing the unacceptable state of domestic statistics in general and the mistakes in the organization of the all-union population census in 1989, which predetermined the inaccuracy of its results, M.S. Tolts directs special attention to the presumed errors resulting from the inaccurate calculation of data or the complete absence of data on sources of livelihood[9].

The non-working able-bodied population has turned into an acute social problem. In 1989, people between the ages of 18 and 29 represented around 40 percent of the citizens who received official warnings from the militia on the need to find a job in the Central Asian republics: the Transcaucasus, the northern Caucasus, and the Kazakh SSR, and 50 percent in the Georgian SSR[5], and in Tajikistan 25 percent of the able-bodied population does not work. Only 4 percent of the able-bodied population of Khorezm Oblast works in industry. As a result, all of the necessary products have to be shipped into the oblast[10]. The reserve labor army in the Kirghiz SSR has been estimated at 60,000[11]. Statisticians estimate that around 2 million in the Central Asian republics, or 13 percent of the able-bodied population, were not employed in social production in 1988. More than two-thirds of the able-bodied population not involved in social labor lives in rural communities in the Central Asian republics; "a significant portion of the group is engaged in housework and private subsidiary farming." (But what about the remaining portion, and how large is it in comparison to the "significant" portion?) The author of these calculations believes that "the ideas about the labor surplus in Central Asia need revision," because he feels that people engaged in private farming should be categorized as people "engaged in

socially useful labor"[12]. Engels once criticized Dühring for saying that "playing a game of skittles or taking a walk" could be regarded as work because they demanded the expenditure of time and energy. Fourier described people engaged in housework as "household parasites." I think the issue is more complex and is connected with the degree to which labor is collectivized, the level of material and technical equipment, and the national and historical traditions of land use in Central Asia, for which the proper social forms of organization have not been discovered. Through the press and through announcements, the job placement bureau is constantly inviting people to apply for jobs in the worker professions in the public utilities, production, and construction, but cannot find a manpower supply. This is why we cannot accept the recommendations of Central Asian republics regarding the resolution of the employment problem by locating production facilities in the region. We have to wonder who will build the enterprises and then work there. Are these people not likely to represent a "restricted group," "migrants," and an "ethnic minority" in relation to the native population, as they already do in several republics? I think that this will require a thorough investigation of traditional national types and forms of economic management and the development of the kind of production that will feel natural to the people of the east and the Transcaucasus.

We must admit that the problem of people not engaged in social production (and numbering in the millions) is a problem of individual republics and of the country as a whole. This suggests the need to analyze the "idea" of the free labor market and of unemployment as a factor enhancing labor discipline and productivity. "We must be able to discuss, objectively and without fear," N. Shmelev suggests, "what benefits we might derive from a comparatively small reserve labor army, which the state certainly cannot leave completely to the mercy of fate.... The real danger of losing one's job and having to apply for temporary compensation or to be obligated to work wherever one is sent is not a bad medicine for laziness, drunkenness, and irresponsibility"[13]. The "real danger of losing one's job," however, does not threaten workers yet, especially in labor-intensive production, and it does not threaten people engaged directly in agricultural labor, teachers, or practicing physicians, who are still in short supply even in big cities, not to mention "the hinterlands." In fact, this "danger" will threaten mainly the bureaucrats, and if their fear "enhances labor productivity" and causes them to fill out two documents per capita instead of the present one document, this is not likely to solve the problem of "laziness, drunkenness, and irresponsibility."

The discussions of the free labor market and unemployment make us wonder: Do we really need them, or should we admit the fact that unemployment already exists in covert (idleness in the workplace) and overt forms, in view of the fact that several million able-bodied individuals are not engaged in socially useful labor?

The acknowledgement that unemployment is a fact of our life would require us to move from mere discussions to concrete offers of state assistance to the unemployed. We need genuine economic and socio-legal guarantees of the individual's constitutional right to work and the appropriate social measures to provide the individual with work or to pay him compensation as a legal source of income if the state is unable to provide him with a job. This raises the question of the social status of the unemployed and the state's obligations to the individuals it cannot provide with jobs. Legal criteria are needed to determine the differences between parasitism, or the refusal to work, and unemployment, or the inability to find employment.

In the case of parasitism, we should concern ourselves with society's *right* to urge the individual to work (through socioeconomic and legal mechanisms and to define labor-related sources of income. In the other case, we should be concerned about the state's *obligations* to the individual it cannot provide with a livelihood. In general, we have to admit that we are experiencing difficulties connected with the existence of the significant (numbering in the millions) portion of the able-bodied population with no legal—i.e., labor-related—sources of income and livelihood.

The utopian socialists associated non-involvement in labor with a rise in vagrancy, crime, and other social aberrations. Foreign scientists—and, in recent years, even domestic scientists—see this as the social origin of the legal offenses generating non-labor income. In 1989 the increase in these offenses acquired menacing proportions and constituted the following figures in relation to 1988 statistics: an increase of 26.8 percent in premeditated murder and attempted murder, of 47.3 percent in aggravated assault, of 73.4 percent in muggings, of 25.4 percent in the theft of guns and ammunition, and of 39.4 percent in other felonies[14]. Thefts of the personal property of citizens increased by a factor of 1.5, and thefts of state and public property increased by a factor of 1.7[4].

The rising crime rate is connected with the more pronounced property and economic differences in society. Studies in Latvia revealed a vivid example: More than half of all the planned savings in the republic were concentrated in 3 percent of the savings accounts (data of this kind were not reported for other regions). The average savings of these depositors amounted to 23,700 rubles. There was a 32-fold difference between them and the remaining 97 percent of depositors. In the USSR around 40 million people had an average monthly income of under 75 rubles in 1989[15]. Around 54.5 percent of the population was paid from 100 to 200 rubles, and only 17.2 percent had an average monthly income of 200-250 rubles or more[14, p 3]. The average income in the USSR can be compared to the official poverty level in the United States, which was 11,611 dollars for a family of four in 1989[16], or to the indicators of per capita gross product and personal consumption in different countries, among which the

USSR ranks 68th and 77th respectively[17]. Annual turnover in the shadow economy during the same period was estimated at 70-150 billion rubles[15, p 1]. Examples of this kind confirm the strong tendency toward more pronounced economic differences in our society. Whereas the results of social clashes are social vices (crime, prostitution, drug addiction, suicide, vagrancy, etc.), their causes are directly related to the distribution of labor in society. In other words, the gross social product, produced by only part of the working population, is confiscated from the immediate producers by legal and illegal means for distribution and redistribution in favor of non-producing social groups.

It is difficult to determine the actual state of employment in our society in this sea of misleading figures. The reference work "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let" [The USSR National Economy in the Last 70 Years] says that 73 percent and 27 percent of the population are engaged in physical production and the non-production sphere respectively[18, p 411]. These figures, however, include the recently revealed 18 million administrators making up 14 percent of all people working in the national economy. Around 5 million people, or 6.7 percent of the population, are employed in the civil service in the United States[8, p 191]. Ever since 1960, reference works on the USSR have invariably said that 2 percent of the population works in administration, credit, and state insurance[19, p 360]. This figure does not correspond in any way to the 18 million officially declared administrators or to the almost 40 million administrators S. Andreyev writes about[20]. This most likely refers to an administrative staff within the larger administrative category. It is probably impossible to judge the number of all administrators from the statistical tables which usually include them in the "employee" category.

"There is a whole stratum in society which cannot be called exploitative, because no one works for it officially, but can be called parasitical with complete justification. It lived (and still lives, to some extent) in an atmosphere which will be inconceivable to the future inhabitants of the communist society," G. Khvatkov writes[21]. This is an example of utopian terminology in our own day. We can understand why G. Khvatkov calls this a parasitical stratum, stipulating that it is not exploitative, but because parasites have to live off the labor of others, this raises questions about the exploitative essence of this division of society in terms of participation in socially useful labor. There is no other explanation for the 40 billion rubles paid out annually for the maintenance of only the administrative staff[22].

According to the reports of the USSR Ministry of Defense and according to the law "On the State Budget of the USSR for 1990," total expenditures on defense this year will amount to 70,975,800,000 rubles—8.2 million less than in 1989. The cost of maintaining the army and navy was estimated at 19,323,300,000 rubles. The stated personnel strength of the USSR Armed Forces as of 1 January 1990 was 3,993,000—or almost 4

million[23]. According to LIFE, the American magazine, 2.1 million people were on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces in 1989[24].

It is impossible to get any idea of the labor contribution of servicemen in the civilian economy, of their employment for the needs of society or, conversely, of the waste of the live labor of the healthiest and most able-bodied segment of the population. There are no data on the number of internal troops and personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or on expenditures in this sphere. It is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the labor contribution and maintenance costs of convicts. The labor of the members of society who have chosen to spend their lives in monasteries, spiritual institutions, and religious communities is also of interest to us, especially now that their contribution to social labor in the form of repaired and restored historical monuments is clearly apparent, and now that the labor of an entire social stratum is beginning to transcend its original confines and enter the spheres of, for example, public health and the offer of various types of assistance (charitable services, for example) to the Soviet population.

Other groups also occupy a specific place in the distribution of social labor but do not have a specific place in the existing social structure. "These are economic managers on different levels, people involved in the distribution and exchange of the products of the national economy, small socialist entrepreneurs, accounting and clerical personnel (or employees), dealers in the shadow economy, and others"[25]. Therefore, because of the absence or shortage of information, it is extremely difficult to single out several social groups and strata, define their place in the existing system for the distribution of social labor, and categorize them as parasitical (supported by the society) or laboring classes and strata.

According to statistics, 82 million people are engaged directly in physical production[19, p 363]. Around 61 percent of them are workers[19, p 351]. This figure, however, includes junior service personnel and security guards. Around 31.3 million workers are employed in industry, 10.9 million work in the lumber industry and agriculture, 91.1 million work in construction, and 95 million work in transportation and communications[19, p 365]. In January 1990 there were 977,000 job vacancies in industry, 119,000 in motor transport, 654,000 in construction, and 245,000 in trade and public catering. Personnel turnover in the labor-intensive branches of production rose to 14-17 percent in 1989. Labor overloads in branches with a manpower shortage are accompanied by the deterioration of labor discipline[4, p 2].

The number of people employed directly in agriculture, including official recruits, is 22 million[18, p 300]. (This is approximately equal to the number of administrators, but it could be only about half as high.) Our rural workers are engaged mainly in routine labor, which has changed slowly under the influence of mechanization. This is why there are significant qualitative differences behind the external similarity of our figures and foreign

statistics. The agroindustrial complex in the United States employs 21 million people, but the ratio of farm workers to the number of people employed in other branches of the complex is 1:9[8, p 181]. A more precise comparison of indicators of this kind requires the consideration of relative labor productivity, which represents, according to our official data, 55 percent of the U.S. level in industry and under 20 percent of the U.S. level in agriculture[18, p 632]. According to the calculations of B. Bolotin and A. Ulyukayev, labor productivity in the USSR was equivalent to 45 percent of the American level in industry and less than 10 percent of the U.S. level in agriculture in 1989[26]. Annual output per worker in industry was 59,000 dollars in the United States in 1986-1990 and will rise to 69,500 dollars in 1991-1995. In the USSR this indicator was equivalent to 28,000 dollars in 1986-1990 and will rise to 38,300 dollars in 1991-1995. This means that the U.S. indicator of annual productivity is more than twice as high as the USSR indicator in industry and almost 10 times as high in agriculture. In U.S. agriculture the annual output per worker was 58,700 dollars in 1986-1990 and is expected to rise to 64,600 dollars in 1991-1995. In the USSR the respective figures are 6,100 dollars and 7,500 dollars[26].

According to CIA calculations, the total cost of the goods produced by 243.8 million Americans in 1987 was 4.436 trillion dollars, but the more than 288 million Soviet citizens produced goods worth only 2.375 trillion dollars[27]. What is interesting here is not only the figures, but also the method the agency used to compare population size and production volume. It underscores the interdependence of these indicators, which is highly logical and applicable in our analysis. It reveals that the average American earned 18,200 dollars in 1988, while the income of the average citizen of the USSR was equivalent to 8,400 dollars[27]. The twofold gap is revealed in several indicators—the total production volume in the United States and USSR, the productivity of the labor of a single individual (particularly in industry), and average annual income. This does not seem to be a coincidence, and it is probably a case of a direct cause-and-effect relationship.

A significant portion of useless and absolutely harmful (according to Fourier's definition) labor is concealed in national production. This is attested to by economic indicators, the country's position in the world market, and the standard of living of its population. The estimated costs of unproductive and destructive labor are colossal. The above-norm volume of incomplete construction, for example, increased by 5 billion rubles in 1989. The cost of suspended projects reached 24.2 billion rubles in 1988, although new construction projects were begun that same year at a cost of 59.1 billion rubles. The total cost of the ongoing construction projects of the USSR Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry was 9.8 billion rubles, with actual construction lagging 5 years behind schedule, and the estimated cost of the projects of the USSR Ministry

of the Chemical Industry was 14.4 billion rubles, with a 6-year lag. In the country as a whole, construction projects take two or three times as long as plan schedules, and actual construction costs are usually two or three times as high as estimated costs (some examples are the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant, the Baykal-Amur trunkline, Neryungri, etc.). Designers estimated the cost of building the canal to reroute Siberian rivers into Central Asia at 13.8 billion rubles (excluding the cost of establishing a production and social infrastructure). The project could actually cost the society 90-100 billion rubles. The ecological consequences are unpredictable and cannot be assessed. Experts describe projects of this kind as economic adventurism[28]. "The agents of destructive production," in Fourier's terminology, collect a salary for their labor, but the burden of paying for and maintaining their projects is becoming too heavy for the society to bear.

The data used to categorize the population according to participation in total social labor can be collated in a single table for the sake of graphic demonstration and comparison (the sources of the figures were indicated as they were presented, and some are the result of our calculations).

Distribution of Population According to Criterion of Participation in Total Social Labor, millions of individuals

Categories	USSR	United States
Total population	287.8	243.8
Unemployable	127.7	105.7
Economically active (able-bodied)	160	138.1
Engaged in social production	132	119
Subcategory of servicemen	5.2	2.1
In administrative sphere	18	5
In physical and non-physical production	108.8	112
Able-bodied individuals not engaged in social labor	28	19.1
Full-time students	12.3	12
Unoccupied	15.7	7.4*

* Number of officially unemployed individuals.

First of all, although the population is much larger in the USSR (by almost 44 million), fewer people are engaged in productive labor than in the United States. If we consider the lion's share of useless or "destructive" labor and the twofold and tenfold (in different branches) lag

behind the United States in productivity, we have to wonder exactly how many people produce our total social wealth. In the industrially developed United States, half of the population works, but in our country, with its low level of labor productivity and highly wasteful use of live labor, just over one-third of the population works. Furthermore, we have almost four times as many administrators and more than twice as many people who do not work at all. In a brilliant critique of his own contemporary society, Fourier once wrote that two-thirds of the population was living parasitically off the remaining one-third, producing nothing and giving the society nothing. Fourier listed the following parasitical social groups: 1) *household parasites* (women, children, the elderly, and servants engaged directly in housework); 2) *social parasites* (the military, all types of officials, tradesmen, lawyers in the service of the ruling classes, merchants, and others); 3) *other parasites* (bums, idlers, criminals in prison, prostitutes, swindlers, and other antisocial groups)[29]. It is hard to admit, but it seems that we have not progressed too far from the society Fourier describes.

An analysis of the distribution of labor in the USSR at the turn of the decade suggests that universal compulsory labor does not exist. Total social wealth is produced by around a third of our population. Around 20 million able-bodied citizens do not work anywhere, do not have unemployed status, and are creating a dangerous situation conducive to crime in the society. All of the "useless" labor which cannot be appropriated by society is having a devastating effect. We can draw the following conclusions: The present quantity and quality of labor cannot guarantee the socioeconomic progress of the country or allow it to "break out" of its present situation; the social form of labor that took shape in the 1930s and existed until the 1970s has now been completely disrupted, causing a crisis in all societal structures; society's primary objective should be a labor reform to secure the involvement of most of the population in social labor with the aim of economic stability and social progress.

In the process of its historical development, labor acquires the specific forms of existence defined by the term "social form of labor," reflecting the dialectical unity of productive forces and production relations. The traditional definition of the socialist form of social labor in socialist science is the following: Labor is directly social, planned, and devoid of exploitation—i.e., free, universal, and creative. Today this is an unsatisfactory approach to labor in science and practice. We must admit that in the Soviet period of the history of the USSR, labor took an essentially coercive form, using extra-economic and economic means of coercion.

Under the effects of dialectical laws, labor is revealing a need for new forms of organization. The autonomous and spontaneous release of the individual from the coercive social form of labor attests to its destruction. Our society is living through a stage in its history in which the old form of labor has been "discarded" and steps have been taken to "revise the content" of labor

and find a new social form. The search for this constitutes the essential purpose of the processes occurring in our country and in the entire socialist and non-socialist world.

General trends in the development of contemporary productive forces and the division of labor and the interdependence of all of the links of a single world economy suggest the necessary guidelines of labor reform in the USSR:

The freeing of labor should not be accomplished through personnel cuts, but through the reduction of the compulsory workday. A whole group of measures will be required to institute a shorter workday, flexible schedules, work in the home, equal numbers of workdays and days off (at enterprises with continuous work cycles), a dynamic temporary employment system, etc. Short and non-debilitating periods of compulsory labor, supplemented with free time for creative pursuits, constitute the ideal social form of labor and are central to utopian and scientific socialism.

The biological characteristics of the human being are such that overloads of any kind lead to deviations from the norm in the health of the organism. A variety of pursuits, changes in activity, alternating periods of work and rest, the reduction of work time to provide more free time, and the display of individual natural traits, abilities, and talents (temperament, mood, habits, etc.) without hurting the production process—only collective forms of labor make the combination of all of these possible. This is why the process of freeing labor is connected with the development of collective forms inside and outside the sphere of compulsory labor.

There are other guidelines as well, but these underscore the main principles of the social form of free labor. They could be called classic because the roots of these ideas go back centuries into the past, and the effectiveness of their application has been confirmed by labor organization practices in developed countries, where these trends and guidelines are more and more prevalent.

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Collective and Individual: Civilization Perspective

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[Article by Vasilii Grigoryevich Kremen, candidate of
philosophical sciences]

[Text] "The free development of each is essential to the
free development of all"—this imperative of humanistic
thinking, which was only of metaphysical significance (as
a projection of the communist ideal into the future) to
the founders of Marxism, is acquiring concrete empiri-
cal, and even worldwide historical, significance in our
day. In this article we would like to discuss some aspects
of this process.

Of course, the dialectical relationship of the human
being and society, the collective and the individual, and
so forth is one of the traditional subjects in the social
sciences, and one on which researchers have expressed
diverging views. It is significant that until recently the
prevailing practice has been the encouragement of the
"new people" to believe that "collectivism" is the
essence of real socialism and "individualism" is the basis
of the bourgeois order. The author of this article was
party to this[1]. The new social realities which have
taken shape during the course of perestroika, however,
have urged us to take a discerning look at many seem-
ingly indisputable premises of socialist construction. The
foundation for this in the social sciences has already
been laid in the extremely constructive article by Yu.A.
Zamoshkin[2].

"One for all...", "the primacy of group interests...", "the
socialist type of personality...", and other "figures" of
ideologically charged speech, which are familiar to the
Soviet people from their childhood, live in a specific
kind of "philological reality" which was created by
assigning absolute value to the social-class approach to
sociohistorical analysis[3]. Now we are finally realizing
that it can serve as a genuinely scientific method only in
combination with other "perspectives." An analysis of
current processes in the East and the West provides
empirically valid evidence of this.

Perestroika forced us to reconsider these matters, but
can we confine this to a mere analysis of the "deforma-
tion" in this area? It seems to me that this line of
reasoning—which is essentially normativistic and there-
fore unavoidably dogmatic—is clearly inadequate today.
The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for
the 28th party congress contained the statement, which
has still not been fully appreciated, that the idea of
humane, democratic socialism is not just another social
experiment, to be imposed on the social process by force,
but the means by which the country will embark on the
road of organic and natural historical development.

With a view to this, we will start by describing the
distortions the idea of collectivism and individualism
underwent in our past practices.

First of all, the collective principles of the authoritarian
system were inconsistent with the full appreciation of
individual interests and led to the invariable subjugation
and even the stifling of these interests. The clearest
indication of this is probably Stalin's description of the
human being as a "cog" in the social machine. The ideal
of this mode of social organization is a "human factor"
devoid of individual features and wholly subordinate to
the interests of the group.

It is completely obvious that this approach not only
conflicted with Lenin's view of socialist collectivism, but
was also inconsistent with the goal of socialism—the
thorough and balanced development of the individual. It
was inevitable that standardization would keep the
human being from expressing his individuality, prevent
the complete disclosure of his abilities and inclinations,
and impede their development. "The Stalinist distor-
tions," M.S. Gorbachev wrote, "led to the loss of the
main premise of the Marxist and Leninist idea of
socialism: the view of the individual as the end rather
than the means"[4].

To a considerable extent, this was due to the unjustified
practice of contrasting the collective to the individual
and to a misunderstanding of their dialectical relation-
ship. In the bureaucratic administrative structure of
society, the hard-won truth that there can be no genuine
collective interest outside the individual interest and
that the highest purpose of collective action is the
creation of all the necessary conditions and prerequisites
for the genuine flourishing of individual interests, which
would, in turn, enrich the spectrum of collective interests
and foster organic social integrity and community, was
ignored.

Second, although collectivism retained its basic charac-
teristics until recently, it is largely formal and lacks
strong internal connections because it is based not on the
actual interests of individuals, but on factors of a dif-
ferent kind—pseudo-revolutionary enthusiasm at best
and coercion or even outright brutality at worst.

Third, the emphasis on collective interests, in which the
individual was underestimated and kept in a subordinate
position, invariably also included the cult of a specific
individual. Furthermore, this occurred not only on the
level of the country and party, but also on the levels of
the region, oblast, city, or rural community.

It sounds illogical to suppress individuality on the one
hand and to extol specific individuals on the other. It is
only contradictory on the surface, however. The ten-
dency to ignore the individual and individual interests
robbed collectivism of its natural integrating mechanism
and gave the cult a chance to fill this gap and promote
unification, thereby preserving the collective entity.

It must be said that this made the collective structure rigid and conservative, because it rested largely on official bureaucratic foundations which did not reflect the actual needs of the society, and it was therefore even less able to change in the process of natural social development. Furthermore, this kind of collectivism, in which the role of a single individual was exaggerated, lost its resistance to the irrational conduct of this individual, his unreasonable behavior and his generally capricious and even criminal actions. This was the cause of many problems—from the inefficient administration of specific collectives, due to the assignment of absolute value to the role of a single administrator, to the possibility of using leadership status for the commission of terrorist acts against the leader's own people.

These features of the past displays of the "collectivist" essence of socialism were one of the main reasons for the "barracks" brand of social relations that became prevalent in the Stalin years. Pseudo-democracy became their integrating feature. It hampered the constructive potential of the people who were responsible for the socialist revolution, impeded the disclosure of the potential of the new order, distorted its values and ideals, and seriously deformed the Soviet people's way of life by preventing the maximum development of their individual abilities and the complete realization of these abilities in social practice.

The logical result of this organization of social life can only be a social impasse, referred to as "stagnation" in our history. The deadlock cannot be broken without the establishment of genuine socialist collective principles during the process of perestroika and the restoration of the proper dialectical relationship of collective and individual interests.

I want to stress that the present definition of collectivism is largely a result of the new global realities which are acquiring more and more common human features. This, in turn, signifies a new stage of civilization.

Several features of the present phase of human development are having a significant impact on the interpretation of the collective and individual dialectic in modern society. In general, they indicate two interrelated tendencies. On the one hand, collectivism is becoming an organic feature of mankind on the global scale. On the other, new and unprecedented opportunities for the thorough display of individuality are being created. Both processes are closely interrelated and are reflected in the single and integral flow of human progress.

Let us take a closer look at the first of these objective tendencies: the increasingly collective nature of world civilization. It is primarily due to the fact that the continued existence of the human race has been made impossible outside the collectivist framework by global problems.

The global implications must be viewed from two standpoints: from the standpoint of the potential impact of

these problems, and from the standpoint of the possible solutions, which will necessitate global action.

When mankind acquired the ability to destroy itself, it entered a crisis signifying the impossibility of development within the earlier parameters of the antagonistic world social systems and the existence of isolated and inimical states. The divided human race is coming to the end of its history. A new and integral world is being born. The total group of countries is turning into a world community, and mankind is acquiring more and more of the features of a single global collective.

In contrast to the original situation in which collectivism allowed man to oppose nature, now it is giving him a chance to counteract his own destructive influence. Whereas the primitive level of technical equipment in the primitive society resulted in small-scale activity, autarchic behavior, and a lack of unity, cooperative labor is acquiring global dimensions in today's civilization, and this will lead eventually to the creation of a worldwide community of nations and a unique planetary collective.

The establishment of this situation will eliminate the threat of self-destruction, and mankind will enter a post-civilized era in which the free development of each individual will actually become a condition of the free development of all.

Mankind in its present state contains the new elements which could become the basis for the resolution of the crisis and could change the face of civilization. As for the threat of nuclear self-annihilation, this assigns colossal importance to the steps to minimize military confrontation, especially the elimination of a whole category of weapons. Mankind, personified above all by the USSR and United States, has not only given the impending danger abstract acknowledgement, but has also been capable of qualitatively new actions which seem absurd and irrational from the traditional standpoint because they signify the destruction of the results of labor, but are absolutely reasonable and completely rational from today's standpoint because they pave the way for the progress of mankind.

As for man's destructive effects on the environment, this also points up a few elements which can be developed and endorsed everywhere in order to stop these processes and to restore much of what has already been lost. Above all, these include the modern technological processes developed and incorporated in the most highly developed countries, including waste-free and energy-saving processes, as well as processes with other conserving properties.

Before these elements and others can acquire global scales and confirm the new state of civilization, however, concerted action must be undertaken by all mankind on the basis of collectivist principles.

The objective bases for this exist. In the economic sphere they have taken the form of the progressive internationalization of productive forces and the intensification of worldwide economic exchange, constituting the material content of international economic life. Integration processes are undergoing unprecedented development, and this is reflected in the stricter international regulation of economic processes, the gradual formation of international economic complexes, the expanded international transfers of goods, manpower, and financial resources, and the equalization of internal economic conditions in different states, particularly those belonging to international associations. Division of labor is bringing different countries and peoples of the world closer together, encouraging their interaction, and making them interrelated and interdependent. The most visible processes are occurring in Western Europe, where an essentially new type of international community, with its own currency, labor market, and capital and with the free movement of citizens within the EEC framework, will take shape by 1992.

Considerable experience in collective coordinating activity has also been accumulated in the political sphere. The existence of the United Nations and many other international organizations for several decades and their increasingly active and productive functioning established the kind of practical experience in planetary political cooperation that is already permitting successful interaction in the resolution of the most complex regional and worldwide problems. The political basis of united action by mankind is also being reinforced by the tendency toward stricter adherence to democratic principles in the activities of states. The events of late 1989 in the European socialist countries can be regarded as some of the results of this tendency.

In the spiritual sphere there has been a constant augmentation of the intellectual community of mankind, reflected in part in the ever stronger and broader flow of information between countries.

The rapidly developing community of mankind is also apparent on many other levels. They include the more active, broader, and unimpeded movement of people throughout the world, the broader exchange of the results of their activity, both material and spiritual, the creation of a common field of world information, the establishment of the "common skies" idea, and others.

The second tendency I mentioned consists in the unprecedented expansion of opportunities for the display of individuality. Mankind seems to be entering a qualitatively new phase in attitudes toward individuality. It is distinguished by the creation of objective prerequisites for the implementation of a postulate declared many times in the past—the supreme value of human life.

This is reflected, first of all, in the fact that the level of development of productive forces in the industrial countries and the achievements of agricultural production and medicine are laying the material foundation for the

extension of the biological lifespan of the absolute majority of people. Mankind is reaching the stage at which it can put an end to hunger and provide for the continued existence of each person born into this world. Solutions to these problems have been found, but they cannot be employed within the confines of traditional social relations. This will require the establishment of a single world community basing its activities on collectivist principles. The creation of the necessary conditions for the biological existence of each individual is a material prerequisite for its genuine establishment as society's highest priority.

Second, there is the possibility and even the need for each individual and his development to become the central concern of the society. The new form of production developed during the process of the present scientific-technical revolution, based on intellectually charged technology, demands the disclosure and development of the individual's abilities, creating a social need for the more balanced and thorough development of the individual. It is completely obvious that as mankind progresses, it will depend more and more on the degree to which each individual can realize his own potential.

Third, mankind's potential for self-destruction objectively increases the value of the life of each individual. The establishment of an atmosphere of concern for each specific individual everywhere in the world and the concentration of society's efforts to preserve the life and secure the thorough development of each individual will strengthen mankind's chances of survival. The tendency to ignore individuality and individual interests and disregard the very existence of these interests will pave the way for the mutual annihilation of individuals and nations.

Fourth, the increasing unity and heightened integrity of mankind will lead objectively to the humanization of interpersonal relations and assign higher priority in the system of world social relations to the development of each specific individual. The transformation of mankind into a unified worldwide collective will enhance the individual status of each person as one of its elementary components and will reduce or neutralize the importance of mediating structures, including states, by bringing the individual "closer" to all mankind.

These are objective tendencies, but the increasing value of each individual can only be manifested fully in an atmosphere of genuine collectivism, where the true dialectical unity of the collective and the individual will be affirmed as the two sides of the single life force.

How have global tendencies affected the changes that have taken place in our country during the process of perestroika?

Above all, the new political thinking which was formulated and proposed by M.S. Gorbachev during the period of perestroika is the fullest expression of the realities and prospects of today's world, including those mentioned above.

Reflecting the distinctive features of contemporary international development, especially the integrity of the world and the priority of human survival, it contributed to the move from the earlier primacy of class interests to the primacy of common human interests. It confirmed that the objective unity of the human race, which always had common interests, regardless of class and other differences, had acquired the level of integrity at which the realization of particular (class or national) interests would be impossible without consideration for general human interests. Otherwise, there would be the real danger of not only the destruction of the integrity of mankind, but also the termination of its very existence.

To an increasing extent, the new thinking is becoming the methodological basis of perestroika. On the one hand, this has allowed us to overcome Stalin's view of socialist construction, resulting from the assignment of absolute value to the class approach and from the eventual distortion of this approach and accompanied by nihilistic attitudes toward common human values, and on the other it has urged us to take all of the processes occurring in today's world fully into account. It is precisely on this basis that the theoretical model of contemporary socialism should be founded and its realization should begin.

Global tendencies, including those determining the essence and relationship of collective and individual principles, are reflected in the reforms in literally all spheres of social life in our country. We can take the tendency toward the development of collectivism in the economic sphere as an example. The present transformation of the total group of countries into a world community, based on collective principles, has the formation of a single world market as its economic basis. The participants in this market will be states as well as individual production collectives. The USSR cannot participate in this market without getting rid of the authoritarian methods of economic management, establishing its own domestic market, and granting participants in this market the right of free and direct participation in the world market. This is one of the motives and goals of the economic reform in our country. We have to establish a market economy "field" for the stimulation and regulation of national economic development and the organic inclusion of our country in the new world market.

Let us take a look at the political sphere. The processes in this sphere, including those influenced by the positive experience in foreign democratic practices, are contributing to the organic inclusion of our country in the political fabric of today's world. The augmentation of the people's legal knowledge will lead to the establishment of strong bases for socialist self-government, not only for the effective regulation of domestic political relations, but also for the maintenance of stable inter-governmental ties and the promotion of stronger interaction in the world. This purpose will be served by the optimal decentralization of public administration and the endowment of local Soviet government agencies with

the real powers and opportunities they will need for the successful performance of their governing functions. When these agencies become the subjects of administration instead of representing primarily its objects, horizontal ties can be pursued more actively within the country and with regional governing bodies in other countries.

Extraordinary processes are occurring in the sphere of ethnic relations. It might seem that the tendency toward a stronger human community should weaken these aspects of social life. This is not happening. In some cases we have witnessed the complete opposite. What can we say about this?

The dialectical nature of the changes occurring here consists in the fact that the stronger integration processes in the world are based to a considerable extent on national elements and have been accompanied by the more distinct crystallization of the ethnic aspect. It is possible that the creation of the world community and its regional subsystems, such as the European home, will be accompanied by intra-governmental changes resulting in the emergence of states representing just one or a few nationalities and entering directly into the world or regional community.

Recent ethnic processes in the country testify that union and autonomous republics and other national entities want stronger autonomy and feel that the only functions to be delegated to union authorities should be those which would be inexpedient or impossible to perform on the republic level.

The broader sphere of influence of national-state entities will have a favorable effect on their opportunities for direct participation in the new world community of nations and will aid in strengthening the positive influence of common human progress on the development of each nationality and ethnic group.

Forces in some union republics are known to be striving for the complete severance of ties with the union government. Even their formal secession from the union probably will not sever the numerous strands, some visible and some invisible, connecting these republics to the union government today. The possibility that these ties could be put on the intergovernmental level and could thereby be complicated substantially is a different matter.

Strict centralization and the authoritarian methods of its accomplishment, including inter-republic exchange, kept republics and regions from realizing their common economic interests and distorted the connection between the standard of living of the republic population and the effectiveness of its production activity. Perestroika, by establishing economic methods of national economic management and regional cost accounting, is expected to replace the authoritarian method with economic methods of expressing the republic's interest in the existence of the union, which will reflect its real strength quite effectively. This is certain to mean substantial

changes in the union administrative structures, necessitating their consideration of the economic interests of republics and regions and assigning many of them only mediating functions in place of their earlier governing status.

There is another interesting aspect of the dialectical relationship of general human and national interests. The acknowledgement of the priority of common human values objectively increases the importance of nationwide interests as indications of common human interests on the national level. The entire course of world social development has proved that the national communities with a future are those with a strong sense of internationalism, presupposing openness and interest in equitable cooperation with other nations. Otherwise, they are doomed to isolation and a place on the sidelines of world history.

Common human values are being incorporated actively in the perestroika process in the spiritual sphere of life as well. The most vivid example is the affirmation of the pluralism of opinions and creative freedom. This is making the spiritual life of society multidimensional, including competition by various currents reflecting the interests of various groups of people and highlighting the greatest achievements in each specific sphere of the spiritual process.

The elimination of dogmatic ideology is contributing to the establishment of common human values in the spiritual life of the Soviet society. Ritualistic ideological clichés were used too often in our country in the past, when attempts were made to employ them as a common denominator for all new developments. This deformed the spiritual culture, stopped its natural development, and had a destructive effect on genuine collective principles in this culture. We must realize, however, that the complete de-ideologization of this sphere of social life would be impossible, because it objectively contains some kind of ideological import, and this does not even depend on the wishes of the creator or artist.

Perestroika is turning into an increasingly complete reflection of the worldwide tendency toward a stronger individual identity by putting the individual at the center of social development and guaranteeing him the living and working conditions he deserves. Furthermore, this is not being done in the form of charity, but by means of active participation by each individual in his own secure maintenance. This is why one of the characteristic features of the present reform is the establishment of economic, social, and political conditions for the self-assertion and self-affirmation of the individual and for more autonomous and independent action by the individual.

It is significant that these reforms are not simply intended to create the necessary conditions for the display of individual abilities; they require each person to realize his own potential to the maximum.

There is another side to the matter. While we are encouraging maximum individuality, we must not allow it to turn into individualism. Otherwise, man's present alienation from economic and political structures will be supplemented by the mutual alienation of people, and this could cause all of our social structures to collapse.

One of the merits of the new view of socialism, in our opinion, is its ability to overcome the central flaw in the earlier model—society's inability to secure dynamic and stable self-development. This can be accomplished by mobilizing all individual and collective incentives through a variety of forms of ownership and competition by autonomous producers.

The main way of achieving a balance of collective and individual interests in human civilization as a whole and in the Soviet society consists in democratization. An analysis of social development in the world suggests that the democratization of the human community is a natural process common to all civilization, and a process not only accompanied by social progress, but also a process generating this progress and representing an essential condition for it.

The move from authoritarianism and false democracy to real democracy, however, cannot be compared to an abrupt move from black to white. Just as there are many shades and hues in the color spectrum, the process of democratization must include the whole essential spectrum of progressive steps and reforms. Otherwise, social upheavals and cataclysms will lead to failure, standstill, and regression. All processes have their limits. The criterion of social democracy is social participation by each specific individual.

By establishing a truly balanced combination of collective and individual interests, perestroika is making the development of our society a genuine product of mass effort, which is only made possible by the free activity of each individual, representing an essential condition for the free activity of the collective, and vice versa.

Socialism must be what only it can be—not a social project designed with more or less emphasis on realistic or utopian ideas and serving as a goal in itself, but a society distinguished by natural, continuous, and dynamic development, based on the set of standards, principles, and values which we call socialistic and which should guarantee that all social life is as humane as possible and guarantee the inclusion of each specific individual in it.

Perestroika, the embodiment of worldwide tendencies, is contributing to the more organic inclusion of our country in the common flow of civilization and encouraging the same trend in the development of countries belonging to the other socioeconomic system.

Perestroika has been directly responsible for the elimination of unwarranted confrontation in the world and the reinforcement of collectivist principles in relations between countries, whole populations, and individuals.

All of this is intensifying the process by which mankind, once torn apart by conflicts, is turning into an integral world community with a collectivist structure, in which human activity on the planetary scale will become genuinely sound and intelligent.

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Culture and Alienation

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[Article by Vladimir Nikolayevich Orlov, professor and head of the Department of the Theory and History of Culture at the Higher Trade-Union School of Culture, and by Oleg Ivanovich Karpukhin, candidate of philosophical sciences and deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet Cultural Foundation]

[Text] At the end of 1989 SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA organized a roundtable in Leningrad to discuss "Alienation in the Socialist Society." The economic, social, political, and psychological aspects of the problem were discussed. Special attention was directed to signs of alienation among youth.

It seems to us that the debate was creative and not trivial and that it was interesting and productive, even though it followed the traditional pattern—from "alienation in the labor sphere" to "alienation in the leisure sphere" and from the analysis of "mass" forms of alienation to their "individual" dimension.

We regard this discussion of the topic as an invitation to take part in the debate, particularly in view of the fact that the cultural aspect, one of the most important aspects of the problem, was overlooked by the participants. In this article we propose our own approach to the problem—not from the alienation of labor to alienation in the culture, but the reverse: from the "alienated" culture to "alienated" labor. In this way, we will strive, on the one hand, to fill the gap in the discussion of

alienation and, on the other, to propose a non-traditional approach to its investigation, presupposing an analysis based primarily on cultural facts.

Culture and perestroyka—there is probably no topic that is more relevant and less researched today. Scholars usually contemplate and write about the politico-economic aspects of perestroyka and say virtually nothing about its cultural, moral, and aesthetic aspects. This topic, however, is literally pervading the atmosphere. Culture is being addressed at rallies, in debates, and in lecture halls and dormitories. People ask what "perestroyka in the culture" might mean. Can this process take place in culture, and how should it begin? How will the political and economic reforms influence the perestroyka in culture? How, in turn, will culture influence the process of perestroyka as a whole?

Many questions have been asked. Inquiring minds in our country ask these questions, demanding answers, waiting for and often hoping for the "final verdict" on the matter and "recipes" for the proper and "correct" course of action. Many wonder whether we started the process correctly, whether we are pursuing the right goals, and whether we will achieve the right goals. Where should perestroyka "begin"—in the economy or the culture? Which takes precedence? The MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and NOVYY MIR controversy is indicative. It is unlikely that any simple answers can be found for these relevant questions, but it is possible to set the general guidelines for the resolution of these problems, and it is essential to define the methodology of their investigation. An objective social-scientific understanding of the "culture and perestroyka" relationship will first necessitate, in our opinion, an analysis of the problem of "culture and alienation" in the socialist society. The proper guidelines of perestroyka processes in the culture and the cultural aspects of perestroyka can only be defined from this standpoint.

Cultural alienation is one of our society's most "vicious" problems today. Traditionally, we spoke and wrote about alienation in reference to the capitalist culture for decades. Meanwhile, the process of alienation in the socialist culture was picking up speed and growing more intense. What forms did it take? First of all, the alienation of culture from labor: Culture began to exist as an entity in itself and for itself, and workers in physical production gradually acquired an attitude of indifference toward culture, as something alien and largely inaccessible to them. A special branch of spiritual production was established for them—cultural-enlightenment work, which was more concerned with agitation and propaganda in general than with culture. This work imitated cultural activity but was closer to "social pedagogy" and was intended to fill the leisure time of the laboring public with a group of quasi-cultural pursuits.

The workers were supposed to be content with the mass, commercial-entertainment "culture," and the intelligentsia was content with the highly professional, classical,

"elite" culture. In the second place, the process was reflected in the appearance and rapid development of the "alternative" culture, existing outside and apart from state and trade-union establishments. The development of makeshift recording studios, rock groups, and so forth is an example of this. In the third place, the development of the authoritarian bureaucratic system led to the considerable stagnation of culture, a slump, and the promotion of so-called socialist realism (or perhaps "surrealism"), intended to reproduce the mechanisms of totalitarian statism. In the public mind and in articles by journalists and some scholars, alienation is defined as the presence of something alien or hostile in the society. According to this line of reasoning, as soon as this "anomaly" has been eliminated, everything will immediately return to its normal, natural, and "proper" state. In our opinion, confrontational militarized terminology is not applicable in this sphere. In what sense are forms of cultural alienation in the socialist society "anomalous"?

The capitalist alienation of labor does give rise to a corresponding form of cultural alienation, but long before capitalism, as history tells us, there were other, successive social forms of alienation caused by specific economic and spiritual factors.

Cultural alienation is a natural historical process consisting in the disunity and rupture of the once single and integral syncretist culture of the primitive and barbarian era. "The syncretist cultures of the primitive and barbarian societies were unified. They were not divided into professional (or artistic) and unprofessional (or folk-natural), into 'high' and 'low,' or into learned and profane art.... The emergence of the class society (in pre-antiquity and antiquity) led to the first stratification (which became pronounced in time) of the previously integral folk culture into 'high' (professional, learned, and artistically individualized) culture and 'low' culture, or folklore. It was folklore that became the custodian of primitive syncretism and collectivism, a living memory of those times, 'rooted' in some kind of pre-cultural era"[1].

The stratification of culture was the result of the development and intensification of the social form of alienation, the appearance of the private form of ownership, and the growth of class antagonism.

Each specific stage in human history has its own form of socioeconomic and spiritual alienation. Socialism is also distinguished by its own form of cultural alienation.

We believe that alienation is just as natural in the socialist society as in the capitalist society and, incidentally, in the primitive communal order. This is not an anomaly, but a normal and natural process, characteristic of the development of each society and extending to the spiritual and cultural sphere as well as the economic sphere.

Under the conditions of genuine socialism, the alienation of labor still exists because the laboring masses are

alienated from the means of production here. They are neither the legal nor the actual owners. The final result of their labor is alienated from them when it is appropriated for the benefit of the different ministries and departments responsible for labor conditions and acting as the monopolist owners of virtually all natural resources and production equipment. Man is also alienated from nature, and the ties within the unified system of productive forces have been severed: the ties between the workers and the means of production on the one hand, and between man and nature on the other.

Alienation extends to production and consumption processes. Consumption virtually loses its independence and autonomy and becomes an appendage of production because the consumer has no choice and turns into a suppliant or hostage of production. Official morality, politics, and propaganda convince public opinion of the dependent functions of the consumer, who has to be content with what he can get from the shortage-ridden economy.

At the same time, workers are alienated from their labor collectives and from the people employed in other spheres of production, on whom their uninterrupted and balanced production activity depends. For this reason, they transfer "part" of their "dissatisfaction" and "hostility" to the transportation, communications, and supply workers on whom their labor and living conditions depend. In this way, some labor collectives are put in the position of the suppliant-consumers of others and this turns the entire production process into a "supra-economic" cycle, where everything is based not on commercial and technological relations, but on requests, entreaties, and pleas. In this way, personal and utilitarian relations, invested with the suitable "business" ethics, are substituted for economic relations.

A sensible idea was stressed repeatedly in the reports and speeches presented at the first and second congresses of people's deputies of the USSR. In essence, this was the idea that the alienation of the laboring public would have to be surmounted before the revolutionary reforms in our society could be intensified: the alienation of the peasant from the land and of the worker from the means of production. This will entail radical socioeconomic reform to turn the laboring public into the true masters and collective owners of industrial and agricultural enterprises.

The history of our country reveals the opposite pattern: The alienation of peasants from the land and workers from the means of production actually began in the 1920s and was particularly intensive in the 1930s. Of course, there were sociocultural, spiritual, and ideological grounds as well as socioeconomic and material-technical ones for this process. The underdeveloped productive forces we inherited and the working conditions approaching serfdom in agriculture and some branches of industry helped to perpetuate this alienation.

In essence, the revolution was supposed to eliminate the old forms of alienation of labor that were so burdensome to the majority of the population in tsarist Russia. The notorious and regrettable surplus-appropriation system of the first post-revolutionary years, however, was a new and equally burdensome form of alienation. It extended to agriculture and to industry, where it had a particularly strong impact in the 1930s. This, however, was not the main thing. Alienation not only continued in the socialist society, but was also developed, and primarily in connection with the spiritual and sociocultural grounds for it. The low spiritual level of most of the masses, combined with the blaring, regimented, and precisely targeted political campaigns, intended to fuel class hatred for everything "alien," "bourgeois," and "intellectual," led to a situation in which the workers did not even notice (and could not have noticed) when they became alienated from "their own" industrial and agricultural enterprises and "their own" "public" property and "popular" government or when all spheres of life in the society, including the spiritual sphere, were completely and irrevocably nationalized.

The alienation of labor does exist in the socialist society. It is a result of cultural impoverishment as well as the economic alienation inherited from capitalism. In our opinion, it was precisely the low level of culture that led to the situation in which the worker did not even notice his alienation and did not understand what had happened to him or how and when it had happened. He became a victim of the form of ideological pressure V.I. Lenin noticed toward the end of his life, when he warned the party and the people of its dangerous consequences. This was the ideology of "proletarian culture," which was intended to separate the broad popular masses from the intelligentsia—in our country and the rest of the world. The class struggle the ideologists of proletarian culture stirred up in our society was aimed against culture and against the proletariat itself, because it stupefied the proletarian mind with blind hatred for everything that was "not our own," "not proletarian" in origin, and planted the enemy image of the non-existent ideological saboteur in the proletarian mind.

A barrier, known as cultural-enlightenment establishments, was erected in the 1920s and 1930s and turned creative activity into "cultural-enlightenment work," which was supposed to raise the level of spiritual "services" for the population—i.e., fill leisure time with pseudo-cultural diversions defined as the results of "popular art." This was followed by a process of differentiation or, more precisely, "elitization": Theaters and concerts were still accessible to some, but for many years the club was the only "cultural center" for others, providing "cultural" services primarily to those residing permanently in communal dwellings—i.e., in an antisocial and anticultural environment.

The constantly growing and virtually unregulated and unrestricted migration by millions of people from rural areas and small communities to the big cities had a tragic effect on the economy, and especially on culture. It led

unavoidably to the loss of the old traditional culture, the disruption of the customary lifestyle and family structure, and the voluntaristic propagation of a new urban, "industrial" culture. People from rural areas, uprooted from their familiar social and cultural surroundings and centuries-old relationships, ties, and traditions, lost their old culture without gaining a new one. Their acclimation to the cities was a matter of formal and superficial adjustment, because they moved to the cities in search of jobs and bread, and not in search of culture. The urban environment, which was already educationally and culturally underdeveloped, was constantly augmented by numerous migrants from rural areas who quickly lost the traditional mentality and ideology of the rural way of life and just as quickly assimilated new ones—pseudo-urban ones.

As a result of cultural alienation, professional art was influenced on an unprecedented scale by primitive forms, giving rise to a variety of "legitimized" forms of art. Primitive art conquered the leisure sphere on a broad scale and a seemingly solid basis, including even the intelligentsia in its orbit.

Cultural alienation can be seen quite clearly in the fate of folklore. It ceased to be the natural state of peasant culture and became an artificial, professionally recreated genre. Why? Because the forcible industrialization of rural areas and their destructive collectivization resulted in the alienation of labor. The elimination of patriarchal forms of life and art in the rural community led to the elimination of folklore, despite all of the attempts to revive it: the attempts to keep "folk crafts" alive and revitalize folk dance troupes and folk choirs.

The alienation of modern culture due to the intensification of its stratification and its division into "high"—elite—and "low"—mass or "folklore"—was historically, socioeconomically, and psychologically programmed in advance.

The common mass culture, with a largely primitive basis, presents the views of people with a keen sense of their own social insignificance and "unacceptability," their cultural "inferiority," and their psychological and economic insecurity. As a rule, these are people who have been uprooted from their "soil," their "native community," and who have moved to big cities in search of financial security, for the sake of which they are willing to give up everything, including their past, to their present cultural surroundings, which they fear, and sometimes even hate, because they view them as an alien (in the social and psychological sense) "intellectual" culture, to which they cannot feel any "connection" and which constantly "repels" them. These socially and economically insecure people with weak psychological defenses—and, consequently, aggressive and intolerant people—usually become avid disciples of "kitsch," "mass culture," and "primitive art."

The facts indicate that the assimilation of culture by the individual has always been a fragmented and situational

process in our country, has been marked by ineptitude and incompetence in the past and the present, and eventually led to a shortage of spirituality and gave rise to a passive consumer attitude toward culture and life. Most people do not have the proper background to appreciate works of art, and this is why they are easily carried away by primitive "spiritual" values and "cultural" fads.

The low level of cultural requirements, the inclination of some adults and young people to seek out cultural "diversions"—or, more precisely, primitive culture—and the move away from genuine culture to the "consumer" culture are indications of cultural alienation.

This also leads to the "separation" of culture and education: For many decades culture was systematically banished from secondary and higher academic institutions and from virtually all pre-school establishments and elementary schools. Education devoid of culture ceases to be education, as the experience of human civilization reveals, and becomes something alien to the individual and society. It turns into a "trade," a medieval training system, in which the teacher is the "master of the trade" and the student is an "apprentice." One "rams in" the knowledge, and the other memorizes it mechanically. As a result, the individual and the society cease to experience a genuine spiritual need for education.

The expulsion of culture from the educational sphere and the elimination of art classes in secondary schools are nothing other than signs of the ideology of proletarian culture, which was officially (or verbally) disavowed in the 1930s, but actually still exists even today, taking command of art instruction in the educational sphere, turning club activities into pedagogical exercises, and inventing various "theories" of cultural-enlightenment work and leisure "pedagogy."

The development and realization of the individual's cultural potential are influenced directly by the educational process, its content and organization, and the level and quality of instruction in the humanities. What kind of "level" and "quality" of instruction in the humanities can we expect when instruction in the fundamentals of aesthetic knowledge (the course in "Aesthetic Education" in vocational and technical institutes and classes in literature and history) occupies no more than 6-7 percent of the academic process even in the schools and vocational and technical institutes in the city and oblast of Leningrad and under 5.5 percent in the Uzbek SSR"[2] As a result, only 5 percent of all students participate in various amateur art groups (in Pioneer centers, clubs, schools, and vocational and technical institutes). The formal-aesthetic nature of instruction—i.e., its effective absence—has an extremely negative effect on 91 percent of all teenagers and young adults: The majority of young people are not engaged in any type of aesthetic activity and have no interest in it. Today, for example, it is quite easy to chart the paradoxical attitudes of youth toward the fine arts. On the one hand, statistical records indicate

that visitors to art museums and exhibits are getting younger. Combined with the general increase in museum and exhibit attendance, this is viewed as a sign of cultural growth. On the other hand, surveys of young people suggest that the fine arts play an extremely small part in their aesthetic and artistic interests.

When a thousand upperclassmen living in big cities were surveyed, only 4 percent admitted to an interest in the fine arts. "The average student spends around 8 hours during his school years visiting art museums and exhibits and more than 10,000 hours watching television"[3].

The present fine arts curriculum drawn up by the Scientific Research Institute of Schools of the RSFSR Ministry of Education has not undergone any fundamental changes in more than 50 years. Experience has shown that most of the students covered by this curriculum have no interest in joining artistic groups. The fine arts are not taught at all in the upper classes of secondary schools, but upperclassmen in the developed capitalist countries spend 3 hours a week in music and art classes.

What is the explanation for the paradox mentioned above? There are apparent differences in the perception of works of art by young people and the older generation. "Around 60 percent of the young respondents could name their favorite artist, but only 40 percent of their parents could do this. Furthermore, the preferences of upperclassmen are of higher quality (but extremely low in themselves) than the preferences of their parents and teachers. This probably does not mean that the generation of the 1980s has a keener aesthetic sense. It is more likely that people lose their interest in the fine arts as they grow older.

"Among the objective reasons for this phenomenon, a particularly negative role is played by the breaking of certain traditions in the art culture. The trade fairs where decorative folk art objects were sold disappeared, personal orders for works of art gave way to departmental orders and then almost disappeared, and the temporary exhibits lost their permanent audience when they lost their relevance. An analysis of the suggestions of patrons of art museums in the Russian Federation indicated that 29 percent were disturbed by the stagnation of exhibits and the lack of new displays, 22 percent complained about the late issuance of prospectuses and catalogues, 13 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of lectures, and 13 percent were disturbed by the shortcomings of mobile exhibits"[4].

The most negative of the subjective causes are the shortage of amateur art groups in the urban leisure culture and the absence of training for the appreciation of cultural treasures, including works of fine art. This situation is rooted in the flawed mechanisms of the organization of spiritual life.

These flaws include the procedural weakness of art classes and the near inaccessibility of publications with color reproductions for non-specialists. Such rarely published albums as "The Tretyakov State Gallery,"

"The Pushkin State Museum of the Fine Arts," "The Russian State Museum," "The Fine Arts," and "The State Hermitage" are issued in editions of no more than 50,000-100,000 copies. Copies of books of the works of individual artists are even fewer in number.

What kind of impression can a book with black-and-white reproductions of poor quality have on a person, especially when the commentary frequently has little to do with real art criticism? How can tours of museums and exhibits inspire viewers when tour guides provide them only with the "bare facts" and do not bother to arouse their aesthetic inclinations, imagination, or sense of adventure?

Researchers have reported that 4 percent of the upper-classmen of secondary schools and students of vocational and technical institutes in Uzbekistan and 5.8 percent of the college students in Leningrad are united in a variety of spontaneous, informal associations. This is frequently the result of their desire to make music together. Without the proper artistic education, however, these groups cannot perform an aesthetic function, and to some extent they can be categorized as anti-cultural phenomena. Almost every school and vocational and technical institute in Uzbekistan has groups of young people who have learned to play folk instruments and perform at weddings and other gatherings for money, displaying a purely commercial-consumer attitude toward life instead of aesthetic sensibilities[2].

The alienation of culture from man is most clearly reflected in the fact that it has virtually ceased to influence the spiritual and moral development of the individual, and the individual has ceased to feel a need for culture and a need to appreciate it.

According to the data of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture's sectorial sociological service, one-tenth of the adult population of kray and oblast centers is completely or almost completely outside the sphere of activity and influence of art and cultural establishments and has to do without them.

Sociologists asked the following question: "Who can be called a cultured person, and what do you feel are his salient features?" Respondents were asked to choose the answer from a list of 16 characteristics, including "active participation in cultural affairs (the regular attendance of concerts, exhibits, plays, etc.)." It is interesting that this characteristic was not among the top three or even the top five salient features of the cultured person, but ranked next to last, in the 15th place on the list. Only 17 percent of the respondents felt that the regular attendance of concerts, exhibits, and plays was a prominent feature of the cultured person[4].

Above all, these data suggest that the overwhelming majority of respondents felt no need for culture. The problem is not merely the inferior quality of many concerts, plays, and exhibits or their moral and aesthetic

squalor. The low level of cultural and spiritual development of most of the population is also part of the problem.

Recent articles by scholars and writers have focused attention on the problem of the so-called "shortage" of spirituality in our life. They write about moral decline, the wave of uncultured behavior, and the corrupting influence of the "mass" culture on the population, especially youth. The discussions of this topic are generally conducted on an "emotional" level and usually bear little resemblance to impartial analysis. The shortage of spirituality, however, is directly related to, and caused by, the process of cultural alienation and deformation and by the fact that culture suffered for several years from arbitrary administration, the remainder principle of planning, protectionism, and other, far from coincidental symptoms of alienation. In this respect, the investigation of the problem of cultural alienation would seem to be an essential part of the determination of guidelines for the perestroika of the cultural process in the country.

What is the purpose of these comments? The name of the journal answers the question of whom they address quite clearly, but the answer to the question of why they were written consists of two interrelated aspects: first, to direct attention to the problem and prove that the resolution of all other problems, including economic and social ones, will depend on its resolution. Second, to recommend a modern and genuinely socialist method of solving the problem—turning culture over to the people, taking it out of the hands of the authoritarian system, and turning it over to the people's care in perpetuity. Only this can make it accessible and democratic and only this can lead to real—actual rather than verbal—cultural equality.

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Vox Populi—Voice of the "Elect"?

915D0001C Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to
press 29 Jun 90) pp 53-57

[Article by Eduard Sergeyevich Gams, people's deputy of the USSR, and by Vladimir Ivanovich Petrov, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at the Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; both are new contributors to the journal]

[Text] We must begin with a few words about the pre-history of our survey.¹ It was undertaken because of the events that took place at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After laws on land and property and problems in the democratization of politics and the government in the USSR aroused heated debates, the session decided not to schedule these topics for discussion by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The arguments which were cited in support of this decision were the following: "The people are not ready," "the people will not agree," and "the people will not understand." These "arguments" were used to obstruct deputies' proposals regarding a referendum on private property, the transfer of land to peasants as their property, and the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. They were also used to stifle attempts to direct the Supreme Soviet's attention to the need for the quickest possible revision of the union treaty. In this way, the fate of the people's fundamental rights, and that of what might be the most important laws governing our life, was decided "on behalf of the people."

We will be discussing the validity of the references to "public opinion," which actually turned out to be the personal opinion of a few deputies. Consequently, we will also be discussing the responsibility of the deputy who passes off his own personal vote as the vox populi. It appears that attempts by deputies to pass off their personal opinion as the opinion of their electors and the people as a whole are becoming the norm in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Doubts about the validity of these attempts were the reason for our survey. The authors conducted it because they wanted to learn the attitudes of voters (in Saratov Oblast) toward the country's main problems.

More than 1,500 people were surveyed, 62 percent of them men and 38 percent women. Around 40 percent of the respondents were from 21 to 40 years of age, and 44 percent were from 41 to 60. The educational level of respondents was fairly high: More than 36 percent said they had a higher education, 39 percent had a secondary specialized education, and almost one-fourth had a complete or partial secondary education.

The more active participation by men in the survey was probably the result of several factors, such as their traditional interest in economic and political issues. Besides this, they had more free time than the women.

These are the sociodemographic features of our respondents. Now we will take a look at the results of the survey.

Our analysis of the results allowed us to draw two main conclusions. The first was that the rapid politicizing of public thinking could lead to the dramatic destabilization of the political situation in the survey zone in the near future.

As far as political, economic, and other changes were concerned, the overwhelming majority of respondents were in favor of them. Almost 90 percent intended to vote in local soviet elections. It is a well-known fact that the most active segment of society usually takes part in surveys, and the real number of people wishing to cast a vote is therefore lower. Even this adjustment, however, is unlikely to change the overall situation substantially.

Therefore, there was an expressed desire to vote and to support people with the potential to lead us into a better future. On the other hand, the majority had only the slightest expectations of genuine and concrete changes in their life. Around 41 percent said that everything would still be the same after the elections, and one out of every five refused to answer the question, which certainly does not attest to optimistic views of the future. Only one-third of the respondents felt that the elections would lead to changes for the better. Three out of every four, however, hoped that their opinions would be taken into consideration in decisions on the society's most pressing problems.

What does this mean? First of all, there is a distinct awareness of the need for changes and a desire to participate in their accomplishment. Second, there is a lack of hope that these changes will be accomplished. Public thinking is in a precarious state: On the one hand, people want to believe in the possibility of change, but on the other, reality itself is convincing them that this possibility does not exist. The further exacerbation of this contradiction could mobilize forces beyond the control of official institutions.

There is another way this contradiction might be resolved and another possible course of action. Public thinking could "collapse," like the high-density celestial bodies known as "black holes." The result will be an inert mass, incapable of normal self-development and the exchange of information with the outside world. This kind of mass consciousness would need a constant source of energy for its existence and reproduction, and this energy is more likely to be generated outside the mass consciousness than within it. This course of events is attested to by the rapid disappearance of the belief in the possibility of a more or less tolerable existence and by the increase in apathy and indifference. Its important features are the absence of public criticism of the news reported by the mass media, especially the central press, and the inability, and even the reluctance, to delve into the essence of reports from the center or even to simply compare these reports to surrounding reality.

The analysis of these symptoms led to our second conclusion: The politicizing of public thinking in the region is not progressing in the direction of democracy and, what is more, cannot be directed into the channel of democratic standards today.

Here are the arguments supporting this conclusion. One is the indicator of people's attitudes toward the existence of different forms of ownership in our country. We can take the issue of land as private property as an example. Should the law guarantee property owners—we repeat, the actual owners, and not the managers—the right to hire outside labor? In our survey, 44 percent said that it should, but 46 percent disagreed. As we can see, the "forces" were approximately equal. The distribution of opinions regarding the ability of the owner of a plot of land to build an enterprise on the lot, for the processing of the products derived from the land, was completely different. Disagreement was expressed by 16 percent of the respondents, while around 74 percent were in favor, and the rest declined to answer.

If the hiring of labor and the construction of one's own enterprise are both indications of the existence of private property, why did construction win extensive support while hiring aroused so much opposition? Because the private hiring of labor is still condemned in the USSR even today, in the sixth year of perestroika, on all levels, beginning with legislation. Of course, small-scale private ownership (for example, the ownership of a small processing enterprise) was also condemned for a long time, but the cooperatives managed to break through the solid wall of mass opposition in this case. Now small businesses have been legitimized in our country.

Only the practice of private initiative can test the accuracy of legal prohibitions and authorizations in this sphere. Because it was stifled 60 years ago, before it had a chance to mature, people had no choice but to follow the directions of official ideologists. This resulted in the same kind of "destruction" of the mass consciousness that we observed in our survey.

As for the respondents' attitudes toward private enterprises and the legitimization of cooperative and private ownership in the USSR, positive opinions were expressed by 53 percent and 47 percent of the respondents respectively. As we can see, there is not much of a difference here either.

We went on to study respondents' views on the possibility of living on their present salary. To put it more precisely, we discerned their views on minimum and optimum subsistence. Around 60 percent of the respondents, for example, said that the "minimum" was 150-200 rubles, and around a third said it was 100 rubles. As for the optimum wage, 25 percent said it began at 200 rubles, 30 percent said it was at least 300 rubles, and around a third said it began at 500 rubles.

What does this mean? When they had to define the minimum subsistence level, most of the respondents said it was between 100 and 150 rubles, which corresponds to

today's legal minimum wage. The respondents' estimates of minimum subsistence did not exceed the boundaries of average monthly earnings in the country: over 260 rubles for workers, 200 for kolkhoz members, and 500-600 for cooperative members. In other words, the demand certainly does not exceed the supply.

The personal income evaluations "handed down from above" are so firmly ensconced in the public mind that there is no attempt to transcend these boundaries. People are simply incapable of freeing themselves of the pervasive idea that their demands should be limited, an idea which was imposed on them for decades. Even the cooperatives' attempts to break this vicious circle have not changed the situation much. On the contrary, they have earned the public's indignation by the very fact of their existence. Public opinion has not even tried to determine which of the cooperatives are good and which are bad! All of this is confirmed by the intention of two-thirds of our respondents to work not in a cooperative and not on their own land or in their own enterprise, but in a job with a guaranteed salary—however modest!—from the state. Of course, this is partly a result of the people's lack of faith in the irreversibility of changes, but dreams of a better life have to be preceded by a taste of this life. How can people indulge in dreams when they were not even allowed to doubt that we were living "in the most humane, most just state" until recently...?

Another argument in support of our conclusion is the attitude toward political pluralism in the country. In our survey, 42 percent of the respondents were in favor of a multi-party system, 9 percent were opposed, and 61 percent favored the repeal of the sixth article of the Constitution. Here is the most interesting fact, however: According to 44 percent of the respondents, the democratization of national politics does not depend on the number of parties.

Similar views were expressed in attitudes toward alternative state structures for the USSR. A union of sovereign republics within the boundaries of a single state was supported by 75 percent of the respondents, but a union of sovereign states was supported by only 17 percent. Three out of every four respondents wanted all of the union republics to belong to the USSR. Furthermore, they acted as though the opinions of the inhabitants of each of these republics were of no consequence. After all, if the respondents had had any doubts on this score, they could have declined to answer, but only 8 percent did this! We wonder where the inhabitants of Saratov Oblast got this desire to see other republics belonging to the USSR, irrespective of the wishes of the inhabitants of these republics. Where did the population of Saratov Oblast and other oblasts in the central Volga zone get this wish to stifle the political self-determination of the Volga Germans and interfere with the establishment of not even a German union republic, but merely an autonomous German republic? The answer is obvious. This wish is the result of the tenacity of the imperious ideology in the public mind, the result of the activities of

the state propaganda industry, which declared the "inevitability of the disappearance of ethnic differences between citizens of the USSR."

The respondents' views on the most important problems of their region were interesting. The highest-ranking item on the list was the state of the environment (60 percent), with housing and social security in second place (50 percent), followed by the democratization of public affairs and the protection of human rights (20 percent) and then by economic and cultural issues, the national-state structure of the country, etc. The issue of inter-ethnic relations ranked only seventh among these concerns. This opinion would seem to deprive it of the status of an extremely urgent problem, and this is not surprising: The inhabitants of this region are more likely to encounter this issue in the central press and television and radio programs than in their daily life.

Do our main conclusions confirm or deny the above-mentioned statements by some USSR Supreme Soviet deputies that "the people will not understand," "the people will not agree," and so forth?

The situation is not as simple as it might seem on the surface. On the one hand, there is clear mass support for the quickest possible democratic changes in the economic and political affairs of the country. The majority favored the legalization of private ownership in the country and favored the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. Meanwhile, there were also signs that public thinking is deformed, has little "power-generating potential," and lacks direction and force. People would like to believe in change, but they do not have the feeling that it will be irreversible. This is reflected in the following phrases: "the irresponsibility of leaders," "the despotism of the CPSU," "the elimination of cooperatives," "the lack of legal protection," "insecurity," "the impossibility of exercising legal rights," and "the exploitation of labor."

We can say quite definitely, however, that the statements made at meetings of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress "on behalf of" and "in the name of" the people frequently turn into irresponsible demagoguery and attempts to manipulate public opinion—in the traditions of the totalitarian ideology. These attempts have been nipped in the bud repeatedly by other people's deputies: We can recall the episodes at the second congress, when the generalizations about the "indignation of the people," who supposedly did not want to have anything to do with private ownership, revealed their groundlessness when they conflicted with the sociological research findings cited from the congress podium.

We hope the results of our study will serve the same good purpose.

Footnotes

1. A questionnaire drawn up by associates of the Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with USSR people's deputies representing the voters

of Saratov Oblast was printed in rayon newspapers in Saratov Oblast in December 1989. The questions dealt with our most acute current problems, both local problems and problems concerning the whole country. After analyzing the data, we decided to inform readers of the most interesting results of our study.

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When the Marriage Partner Is Bought

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[Article by Mukhamedgeldy Sardzhayevich Berdyayev, junior scientific associate at History Institute, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and a first-time contributor to our journal, and by Farkhad Nazipovich Ilyasov, candidate of philosophical sciences and scientific associate in Philosophy and Law Department of Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and one of our journal's permanent contributing authors]

[Text] A Turkmen proverb says that "A man without a goal is clay, and a man without love is an ass." But if the man's goal is a loveless marriage, what is he? The bride-price and love—are they compatible? "Incompatible," according to 46.8 percent of our respondents;¹ the opposite point of view was expressed by 8.5 percent; 28.3 percent said that it all depended on the circumstances. In short, although the arranged marriage has been "humanized" to some extent (with more consideration for the opinions of "the young couple"), the contradictory nature of this kind of transaction is still quite pronounced today.

Survey results indicated that the bride-price is paid in over 68 percent of the marriages in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan at the present time. Of course, the problem does not consist only in the spread of this custom and the amount of the bride-price (it is far from symbolic, averaging 8,476 rubles in the region). It is also important that this kind of marriage reflects complex social processes.

What are the origins and social implications of the bride-price? It is still too early for a complete answer. "The road the development of the marital bond took," C. Darwin remarked, "was a mysterious one" [1, p 631]. We must admit that this is still a valid judgment today, more than a century later. We will try to determine the main factors impeding the investigation of matters of interest to us in connection with our current topic.

Of all the great researchers of the last century—I. Bachofen, J. McLennan, and L. Morgan—F. Engels is known to have given preference to the latter, essentially accepting his entire theory of the evolution of marriage. This is why it began to be known in Soviet literature as Engels' theory (in spite of all of Engels' references to Morgan) and why it was consequently revered as the only correct

theory, and therefore the definitive one. Is this why the historical-theoretical aspects of marital and family relations have been approached so timidly in our country and still have not been given a satisfactory scientific interpretation? In particular, there is no clear understanding of the phenomenon of purchased mates. The most basic work is still the monograph by K. Kautskiy[2].

Therefore, the evolution of marriage was never researched because it was considered to be a restricted topic. In this connection, it is significant that Morgan's theory, supported by Engels, was unilinear—i.e., it proceeded from the postulate that marriage had one and only one line of development, in spite of all of the changes in its forms over many centuries. Kautskiy's publication of a theory substantiating a bilinear evolution was enough in itself to be viewed as criticism of Marxism. Because of this, Soviet researchers tried to be more restrained in their inventiveness.

There was also a ban on a field closely related to the sociology of marriage—sexual sociology. A.S. Makarenko made the unequivocal statement that "sexual topics simply do not come up in a completely healthy family and a completely healthy society"[3, p 246]. This sounded particularly convincing in 1937 (the year the work was published). For this reason, there could be no investigations of the phenomenon Kautskiy called the "sexual purpose of marriage" (using marriage as a way of satisfying sexual needs).

Incidentally, there was another reason the bride-price was overlooked by researchers. There was the assumption that this custom did not exist in the country. "We know," Makarenko asserted, "that women are actually bought and sold in some countries.... The October Socialist Revolution put an end to all of these outrageous remnants of the class society"[4, p 102]. Contrary to this wish, which was so impatiently portrayed as a reality, the revolution did not "put an end" to the bride-price, although the situation connected with it was indisputably transformed.

What are the driving forces stimulating the evolutionary development of marital ties? Useful insights can be derived, in our opinion, from the theoretical legacy of the same Kautskiy and A.M. Kollontay, which is almost never employed in contemporary family sociology. The approaches they suggest provide a slight different view of the matter. Defining one of the pairs of these conflicting forces, for example, Kautskiy wrote that "the communist instinct, demanding that women be common property, has to struggle against the individualistic instinct, which wants to monopolize the object of love"[2, p 47]. These are psychological determinants. The main social source of the process in question, according to Kautskiy, is the division of power between the sexes. For the sake of clarity, we have outlined Kautskiy's theory in the form of a diagram of the phases and sequence of the evolution of marital relations. It has been updated with a view to the possible development of some of its logical premises.

During the first phase of evolutionary progression, according to Kautskiy (see diagram), there was sexual equality, resulting in corresponding forms of marriage: free monogamy and free group marriages (including voluntary polygamy and polyandry and the club marriage). Actually, we are inclined to agree with Darwin, who believed that the first evolutionary phase was the "status marriage," in which the individual's position in the primitive community completely predetermined his marital status, similar to the situation in primate communities.

During the second phase, when one sex was dominant, compulsory monogamy and polygamy came into being. The evolution of marriage split into two lines, and so did the development of human civilization.


The third phase was distinguished by a situation in which the dominant position of one sex turned into supremacy as the social community developed. Female supremacy (one of the lines of evolution) engendered the matriarchy and led to compulsory polyandry and monogamy. The main forms (or elements) of betrothal became the abduction (or kidnapping) of a bridegroom or the purchase of one. The other evolutionary line was male supremacy. It gave birth to the patriarchy, where the main ways the partners were joined together were kidnapping (or abduction) and purchase. Compulsory polygyny and monogamy are characteristic of these social conditions.

During the fourth phase, in the democratic society, the equality of the sexes was restored and different forms of marriage existed simultaneously: free monogamy and free group marital unions.

This view of the evolution of marriage is completely logical as a whole, but it does have one significant flaw: There is no convincing explanation of the causes of the dominant position and subsequent supremacy of one sex. Following the reasoning of some other researchers, for example, Kautskiy believed that the matriarchy was established because ancestry could only be established (during a specific phase of social development) on the maternal side. In all probability, the cause and effect are transposed in this opinion.

Besides this, there are arguments which sound more valid. Let us look at Kollontay's work[5], where the initial premise is the thesis that the first division of labor in human society was based to a certain extent on the biologically determined, psychological and physiological differences between the sexes. Let us trace this author's line of reasoning. In the primitive tribe the women usually gathered edible fruit and plants while the men hunted. Depending on the habitat, one or the other ensured a stable existence. In line with this, the gender specializing in the more effective type of labor began to occupy a dominant position in the social community. Women were dominant in regions with an abundance of flora, and men were dominant in those with an abundance of fauna. Later, the gathering of fruit evolved into

Diagram of Evolution of Marriage Depending on Division of Power Between Sexes in Social Community (Updated)



Key:

- | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Club marriage | 9. Female supremacy | 17. Purchased bride |
| 2. Equality of sexes | 10. Patriarchy | 18. Purchased groom |
| 3. Group marriage | 11. Polygamy | 19. Marriage with dowry |
| 4. Free monogamy | 12. Matriarchy | 20. Equality of sexes |
| 5. One sex dominant | 13. Compulsory polygyny | 21. Club marriage |
| 6. Compulsory monogamy | 14. Compulsory polyandry | 22. Free monogamy |
| 7. Male supremacy | 15. Abduction | 23. Group marriage |
| 8. Supremacy of one sex | 16. Abducted groom | |

agriculture, and hunting evolved into livestock breeding. The assignment of priority to specific types of labor was the initial process of specialization in primitive tribes. Two types of economic systems took shape: the "farming-hunting" system and the "livestock breeding-gathering" system. The first system was a matriarchy and the second was a patriarchy.

According to this point of view, we can assume that as the tools of agricultural labor were improved and the effectiveness of hunting declined, tribes with the "farming-hunting" system became almost completely agricultural (with isolated elements of livestock breeding). The men began working the land, forcing the women to do "auxiliary" work. The change of labor roles turned the matriarchal community into a patriarchal one (which we would call the neo-patriarchy), and whereas the forms of marriage (abduction and the bride-price) remained the same in the traditional patriarchy, the purchase of mates turned into the bride's dowry during the transition from the matriarchy to the neo-patriarchy. The abduction of the future husband gradually became something found only in folklore.

Let us sum up the results of our theoretical digression. According to Kautskiy's point of view, the division of power between the sexes is the main determinant of the evolution of marriage. According to Kollontay, this then predetermined the role of each sex in the economic system.

Therefore, the economic supremacy of one sex leads to political, moral, and all other kinds of supremacy. Some of the rituals recorded by anthropologists² can be interpreted as remnants of the sexual supremacy of women. This means there is reason to assume that women were the active partners and initiators of sexual relations in the matriarchal cultures. The "courting" process would have been quite different from the process in the patriarchy, if not the complete opposite. Incidentally, studies of male and female sexuality also support this assumption.

Now we will return to the origins of the purchased mate. When the sexes were equal, there was naturally no payment involved. The betrothal ceremony took the form of the equal exchange of gifts. We can illustrate this with an anthropological description of a primitive Indian tribe. "If, for example, a young man sees a girl he likes, he presents her with a small wicker bowl or basket. If she accepts the gift, she is accepting his proposal. In this case, she gives him a painted headdress made with her own hands in exchange. Then they begin living together without any further ceremony" [2, p 26]. There are also tribes where the young girl can initiate the courtship.³

We might wonder why the couple could not simply decide to live together without the preliminary exchange of gifts. Evidently, this is a matter of man's predilection (especially in the distant past) for custom and ritual. After all, they are "tangible" regulators of behavior, and

they also give the events a certain air of solemnity and profound meaning. An agreement concluded in the form of a familiar ritual, with the observance of a certain code of etiquette, always seems (and frequently also is) stronger than an oral agreement, although even in this case people want to "seal it with a handshake."

When one of the sexes begins to occupy a superior position in the economic system and in the community as a whole, the marriage ceremony takes the form of an unequal exchange of gifts. The dominant sex, as the "richer" one, gives more—in accordance with its economic status. In essence, the partners engage in an equivalent exchange from the standpoint of their financial status, but in the absolute sense the gifts are unequal to the same degree that the positions of the partners are unequal. Besides this, the subordinate sex is coerced into marriage. This coercion is reinforced by a set of unique manipulating circumstances—ritualized and compulsory symbolic actions. In fact, this is how the marriage ritual ends—with a procedure uniting the futures of the partners.

Later, when one of the sexes is superior, the magical force of the marriage ritual is enhanced by the standards of common law, the ritual itself becomes increasingly conventional, and it is finally regulated by secular law. As we said before, however, "sexual" supremacy is the result of the development of productive forces, which also gives rise to commercial relations. When the economic market comes into being, the coercion of the subordinate sex takes the form of a purchase and sale transaction, because economic supremacy presupposes property relations. "In marriage to a purchased mate," Kautskiy stressed, "the whole point is the acquisition of property, and this is why the husband's rights to the possession of his wife frequently depend on the price he paid for her. Among the Gassani Arabs of Nubia, the number of days in the week a wife is obligated to be faithful to her husband depends on the number of livestock he paid for her" [2, p 15].

The superior sex acquires an opportunity to possess the inferior sex with the rights of a property owner. This is why the woman in a matriarchal society buys a husband (or husbands), and the man in a patriarchal society buys a wife (or wives), in accordance with their possibilities, desires, and also considerations of morality and prestige. This is how the paid marriage is arranged, but its content is not confined to the regulation of economic ties between the sexes.

The patriarchal society is a society in which all individual behavior is regulated and must conform to standards. Here patriarchal structures (the leader, the clan, the father) perform all of the actions making up the marriage procedure: a) making the decision that a marriage is necessary (or desirable); b) choosing the marriage partner; c) concluding the appropriate agreement; d) performing the ceremony itself, including symbolic and formal actions and arranging for the ritual feast.

Consequently, the arrangement of a paid marriage goes beyond the interests of the wedding couple. This process also regulates family and tribal relations, with their complex history and distinctive features. The bride-price is a result of two social phenomena—division of power between the sexes (economic and so forth) and the activities of patriarchal structures—and the paid marriage has evolved as these have changed.

The inclusion of women in social production in the 20th century was accompanied by the gradual transition (or return?) to the equality of the sexes. Kollontay remarked that "women have absolutely no rights among the Kirghiz, Bashkirs, and Kalmyks, these modern nomads, in societies where earlier, almost primitive economic forms have been preserved, but as soon as a Bashkir or Kirghiz family settles down in a city and the Kirghiz woman gets a job, the power of His Excellency the Husband dwindles before your very eyes" [5, p. 12]. This is a universal pattern: "If the economic opportunities...of married women improve, this also affects their status in the family, and this is attested to by the rapid disappearance of patriarchal authority in the families of some important groups of immigrants in the United States" [8, p. 172].

As for the regulation of the interaction of patriarchal structures, this functional feature of the bride-price is preserved as long as they continue to exist. The totalitarian order which was established in the USSR around the middle of the 1920s "meshed" well with the patriarchal structure which had existed in the Muslim region prior to the October Revolution. Totalitarianism merged organically with the patriarchy. This is why there was no need to change the general public's attitudes toward power structures. From the standpoint of the average man's perception of political institutions, no revolutionary changes had taken place. The patriarchs—khans, religious leaders, and rich landowners—were replaced by representatives of the totalitarian system: kolkhos chairmen and raykom and obkom secretaries. Administration became more detailed, and the hierarchy became more precise. The sacred symbols and dogmas were replaced, but this did not change things much. The new ideological formulas were just as far removed from reality as before.

The main thing was that the patriarchal order continued to exist and displayed little evolution. The bride-price, as one of its consequences, also continued to exist. It is true that ideological functionaries on all levels launched repeated campaigns against the bride-price and had to admit that "this remnant still exists in some places." Few people noticed how paradoxical this was. The totalitarian-patriarchal system itself had engendered the bride-price, and the system itself was now trying to put an end to it with admonitions and criminal prosecution. When a cat spins around in circles, trying to catch its own tail, it has a serious and even worried expression on its little face. This is how the republic patriarchies were trying to catch the result (the tail) of their own functioning. Abolishing the bride-price was tantamount to a fight

with themselves. This was impossible because the totalitarian power structure does not have the ability to eliminate itself.

The Turkmens say: "When there is a shortage of brides, expect the end of the world." In recent years there has been a "shortage" of brides in the marriage market of the region, and the bride-price has risen dramatically. The reason, however, is not the "shortage" of marriageable young women. At any rate, this is not the only reason, but, of course, as a product of endogamous ethnic and tribal barriers, it played a definite role in the rise of the bride-price. In some sense the saying turned out to be true: The "end of the world" (meaning the signs of crisis in the society) was drawing near.

Patriarchal authority as a personality trait and a system has much deeper and stronger roots in the region than it might seem to a reader living elsewhere. The concept of the "bribe" did not have time to reach full maturity here before the revolution. The payment of tribute and the presentation of gifts to the powers that be seemed natural. The totalitarian structure, which was implanted "from above," absorbed the "nectar of power"—bribes—rising spontaneously "from below."

The ratio of bribes to stolen (in the broadest sense of the word) goods has not been determined yet, but it is already clear that there is a connection (functional or statistical?) between the two. The "bribes-robbery" cycle is a self-perpetuating mechanism. An increase in stolen sums increases the amount of the bribe, and this, in turn, increases the amount stolen. The functioning of this mechanism is one of the reasons for the rising bride-price. It is convenient for dealers in the shadow economy because it is a matter of prestige.

The high level of conformity in the patriarchal community forces the "common people" to make an earnest effort to rise to the upper level. Families frequently concentrate all of their efforts on the accumulation of the necessary sum. In some cases they economize on everything else—from food and clothing to durable goods, and this gives rise to several social problems.

Some situations are extremely awkward. If a young girl commands a high bride-price and the parents of the groom do not have the necessary sum, they borrow the money (according to our survey, this occurs in six out of every ten cases; it takes around 6 years to repay the debt). After the wedding the young couple moves and then has to endure deprivations for a long time in order to pay off the creditors.

We are not against the bride-price as a custom. We must admit that many rituals add color and even inspiration to our lives. The solution is to remove the negative "social implications" of the bride-price, eliminate its categorically imperative nature, and make the amount symbolic. Administrative intervention in this sphere was attempted before the revolution and in the first years following it. "In 1923," Ya.S. Smirnova writes, "the congress of soviets of the Ingush district authorized a

reduced 'conventional bride-price' in the amount of 200 rubles and two sets of clothing for the bride." In 1925 it was reduced to 25 kopecks, but provisions were also made for the cost of the wedding and reception (25 rubles), presents for the bride (75 rubles), and another 25 rubles to pacify the parents in cases of elopement[9, p 124]. Obviously, these measures did not solve the problem.

Now this has been made possible by the move from the patriarchal arranged marriage to the democratic marriage, in which all of the elements are decided by the young couple.

There was an interesting custom in Babylon. Something that we might describe today as marriage auctions were common. Three respected men were chosen to conduct the auction in each district. They assembled all of the single girls of marriage age. The first girl to be "exhibited" was the most beautiful, and her hand in marriage was given to the bachelor making the highest bid. Then the less pretty girls were auctioned off, until there were no beauties left. The money earned from their sale was put aside as a dowry for the girls not blessed with beauty, and the least attractive was awarded the largest sum. The men who offered to marry these girls acquired wives with dowries[10, p 76]. This example shows how easily the purchase of a bride can turn into payment for a groom (in this case, in the form of a dowry).

The nature of betrothal customs always reflects the basic parameters of the social system, including ideas about social justice and welfare. When one of the partners is bought, neither is free. Giving them freedom entails giving them a new society. Consequently, the resolution of the bride-price problem is far from a regional objective.

Footnotes

1. The survey was conducted in the 1988/89 academic year by the young "Demos" group in the Philosophy and Law Department of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences. The information was gathered by interviewing students of the native nationality in universities in the capitals of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan (2,516 in all). A four-stage selection process was used to form the sample group.

2. Here is an example: "In the south of Kirivin Island and Vokuta Island the women who went out weeding in groups had the right to assault any man who did not live in their village. The women exercised this right...with enthusiasm and vigor. We cannot describe these assaults in detail. We can only say that when a woman noticed a man, she stripped naked, threw him to the ground, and committed indecent acts on his body"[6, pp 133, 136-137].

3. Morgan describes the following custom: "A young woman who feels attracted to a young man might send

him a secret message: Do you want to gather food for me? This is a marriage proposal"[7, p 338].

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Real and Imaginary Dilemmas, or the Mass and Elite Culture

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[Article by Aleksandr Bentsionovich Gofman, candidate of philosophical sciences, lead scientific associate at Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and contributor of two articles to our journal, including "Values in the Structure of Fashion" (1980, No 4)]

[Text] The adjective "mass" is quite common in the vocabulary of the social sciences today. We speak of mass production and consumption, mass movements, mass organizations, mass media, and the mass consciousness. Mass appeal has become an integral feature

of many social processes and can be discerned in the most diverse spheres of socioeconomic and cultural life.

Whereas the existence of these phenomena is apparent, however, some of the unavoidable historical consequences are frequently viewed as a deviation from the "normal" course of events. This is exactly what has happened in evaluations of certain cultural processes: The bugbear of the "mass culture" first came into being in the West and then moved to our part of the world.

As soon as the discussion turns to the mass culture, even the most impartial researchers sometimes lose their objectivity. In some cases, even cultural figures who are certain of their own commitment to democratic values feel obligated to condemn it. They employ a variety of subtle tricks, particularly terminological devices. The "mass culture" is definitively contrasted to the "culture of the masses," the folk culture, the original culture, and so forth. This is usually preceded by a procedure reducing the former to a trite and inferior product, manufactured by clever craftsmen and swindlers for consumption by the emotionally immature masses.

It is exceptionally important to discern the real motives behind this line of reasoning. Two critical positions are dominant today—cultural elitism and traditionalism (the latter is often passed off as respect for national traditions). There is the clear or hidden implication that there was a golden age of culture in the past, when "real" artists created exceptionally "genuine" cultural masterpieces, and "true" connoisseurs had a "genuine" appreciation of them.

The non-differentiated critical attitude toward the mass culture and its "dismissal" by many Western researchers—and then by several domestic theorists and practitioners—essentially conceal snobbish criticism of the masses. Obviously, we cannot object to the rejection of the inferior products of the culture "market," but "inferiority" and "mass appeal" are not synonymous.

When an inferior work of art wins mass recognition and "comes into vogue" in our day, it is its widespread dissemination that makes inferior taste seem widespread as well, but how many second-rate products do not win universal recognition even for a short time and are never in "vogue"? How many of these works, even when they are circulated widely, find only a handful of fans or die of natural causes soon after their birth? We have every reason to assume that there are many more of these works, but it is precisely because of their mass rejection that they escape notice.

Their authors are tempted to criticize the mass culture and current trends, and not all of them can resist the temptation. On the one hand, this gives them a convenient excuse to criticize those of their colleagues who do not impress them for some reason but have won mass recognition. They can accuse these colleagues of being "slaves to fashion," of striving for "cheap popularity," and of pandering to the infantile tastes of the masses, they can predict that their success will be short-lived,

they can speak of the distance separating these works from the "high" culture, "authentic art," and so forth. At the same time, while taking a stance against the mass culture, these "artists" are inclined to assign some kind of virtue to their own unpopularity and attribute their lack of recognition to their contempt for current fads and their lack of success with the public to its inferior tastes. Consequently, their declared goal is not the improvement of their own works, but the re-education of the ignorant masses who have been corrupted by the "mass culture." It is convenient for them to conceal and compensate for the poor quality of their own works by condemning mass tastes and fashions and by making constant references to classic, traditional, national, and eternal values (as if the mass nature of the mass culture per se is radically inconsistent with these values and is capable of undermining their greatness). These authors are inclined to call themselves the defenders and custodians of these values. There is even a whole stratum of cultural figures whose main functions consist in, on the one hand, exuberant praise (and not research!) of the classics and, on the other, the inclusion of certain works among the classics and excommunication of others from this category. Both functions are essentially intended to compensate for their own artistic infirmities.

In my opinion, it is time to move from the regular composition of hymns and odes to the classics (popular genres in domestic art criticism) to serious sociological and cultural-historical studies of this phenomenon, its causes, and its methods of functioning in the culture. It is quite possible (if you will pardon the play on words) that if the classics themselves had always followed classical guidelines, we would have no classics at all today.

It was precisely from the standpoint of "high," "classic," and "anti-mass" culture that some colleagues slighted the works of B. Okudzhava and V. Vysotskiy, "Time Machines" and "Aquarium," "unofficial" paintings, and other works after they had already won widespread recognition. Furthermore, the mass media either ignored the works of these artists or also slighted them: They were resolutely separated from the "high and genuine" values of life and were declared part of the base mass culture. In spite of, and sometimes because of, this silence or vehement criticism, a tape recording, a concert, or an exhibition in an inappropriate facility without any kind of advertising served as an effective means of communication with the mass listener and viewer, who found serious answers to the most important existential questions in these works and are still finding them today.

Obviously, mass recognition for a specific period of time is certainly not always an indication of high merit, and the criticism of weak works of art which have become successful is extremely necessary. The establishment of high criteria of public taste is important and always relevant, but it is accomplished primarily by the cultural works themselves, and not by condemnation in the name of "high" culture. We know that many crimes were committed against humanity and culture in the 20th century in the name of the "people." Outstanding works

were destroyed or banned on the pretext that the masses "would not understand" them and "did not need" them. The conscious or unconscious wish to please the masses or those acting on their behalf usually has a ruinous effect on art. In general, the artist is not obligated to address the broad masses or to be understood immediately and by everyone. It is even quite natural for an artist to address his works to only a small group of people close to him. In time, even these works can gain mass appeal and win universal recognition.

The present situation is peculiar, in my opinion, because some of the people who reject the mass culture are "artists" whose cultural level is lower than the average level of the masses for whom they intend their works of art. Furthermore, they are many in number, which is precisely the reason for the mass nature of cultural processes. This kind of "criticism from below," which is often based on ordinary jealousy, is not that rare, but the main thing is that it is not that harmless either. With their loud criticism of the mass culture, these authors bring it down to their own level and diminish the cultural potential of the society.

In the final analysis, the cultural elite does not depend on the number of consumers addressed. The important thing is not mass appeal per se, but the kind of works that gain mass appeal. The "creators" have a great responsibility to the society, but before they can carry out their mission, the society must provide them with the necessary conditions for the free competition of minds and talents—i.e., for the natural formation of a cultural elite. It is this elite, which is formed on the basis of merit, and not by means of bureaucratically distributed jobs, titles, and awards, that is capable of establishing the authentic values of culture and life in the society.

Let us consider the example of a clearly inferior work of art which is not disseminated in the mass media and which is "consumed" by a small group. Would we call it part of the mass culture? Obviously, we would not. On the other hand, the masterpieces of world culture can simultaneously or successively belong to both categories: mass and elite. The works of Bach certainly did not come into being as part of the mass culture, but now that they are on phonograph records and tape and are used as the musical accompaniment in figure skating competitions, they are certainly part of the mass culture. Meanwhile, and this is particularly important, they have not ceased to belong to their brilliant composer and cannot compromise him in any way whatsoever. The same is true of the frequently mentioned "profaned" Mona Lisa on the soap wrapper and of other such cases.

One of the common themes of the criticism of mass culture concerns the standardization invariably accompanying its "products." This criticism is always a conscious or unconscious result of the idealization of traditional culture, which supposedly never suffered from standardization, or of the tendency to think of all past cultural works only as unique classic models (overlooking the fact that the "middle" and "lower" levels simply

sank into oblivion). This puts the critic in the same position as a person who would compare, for example, modern row housing, built by the mass industrial method, to a 15th century Florentine palazzo and then proceed to list all of the obvious aesthetic flaws of the former in comparison to the latter, implying that there were no shacks in Florence in those days.

The circulation of copies does not necessarily mean the "vulgarization" of unique and superior works (although losses are possible and unavoidable here). According to art historians, an acquaintance with copies of art works frequently leads to a deeper understanding of the unique essence of the originals.

Standardization, which is closely connected with mass consumption, is a universal social process, and the important thing is not to "expose" standardization per se. There is no question that we should cultivate an appreciation for the unique and inimitable and support it in every way possible, especially in art (because without this, it simply would not exist), but we must also remember that it can (and sometimes should) become the standard, although not necessarily a standard for all time and all places.

The creation of original and diverse cultural standards is extremely important in the functioning of culture, however paradoxical this might seem at first. In time, the standard can become (and has become) unique. Finally, there is a need to raise the level of existing standards of mass consumption.

Some lowering of the quality of outstanding cultural achievements is certainly possible and even inevitable in the process of mass dissemination, but the historical process is dialectical by its very nature, all gains are accompanied by losses, and it is impossible to exchange something for nothing. The important thing is to minimize the negative consequences of the generally positive processes of the mass dissemination of cultural achievements.

The distinctions drawn between "mass" and "folk," between "mass" and "classical," and others are highly artificial and have no logical or historical basis. It is more valid and more realistic to compare the mass culture with the elite, traditional, and specialized cultures. Even here, however, it is important to remember that these distinctions are conditional and variable. In modern societies, the elite, traditional, and mass spheres are overlapping and interpenetrating elements of culture and often cannot exist without one another. It is also important to consider the complexity of such seemingly comprehensible terms as "elite" and "traditional." The concept of the cultural elite is extremely vague: First of all, it does not coincide with the concept of the social elite; second, it does not coincide with the concept of the "creators" of culture. For this reason, even serious researchers have had to introduce value judgments into their interpretations of the "elite—mass" dichotomy. The categorization of anything as part of the mass

culture is often simultaneously a covert allusion to the existence of an elite culture (designated as "high," "authentic," and so forth). When critics, art critics or literary critics, include a work in the category of "high" ("non-mass") culture, they are naturally guided by their own, quite diverse tastes and values. As a result, the elite culture (just as, incidentally, the folk culture) could include a dull and colorless (and therefore unread by anyone) novel as well as a masterpiece.

As far as the traditional culture is concerned, here we are dealing with another pseudo-verity. Not only does the mass culture frequently rely on the traditions of folklore and on professional traditions, particularly the classics, but tradition itself does not influence the subsequent development of cultural forms directly or automatically. The cultural heritage is multifaceted and constitutes an object of constant choice for each generation. In this sense, we are always choosing not only our future, but also our past. The traditional culture, which is no more homogeneous than the elite and mass cultures, not only influences the last two, but is also constantly reproduced, investigated, and interpreted in them. Without this, tradition cannot exist.

The comparison of the mass culture with various specialized cultures seems more valid. The latter are the cultures whose forms are not widely disseminated but operate permanently in more or less isolated social groups and categories (sociodemographic, socioprofessional, amateur, etc.) with a special set of values, standards, and rituals, are reproduced only within these groups for some reason or another, and do not transcend their boundaries. Even here, however, various types of reciprocal influences exist. On the one hand, patterns of mass culture are differentiated in accordance with the traditions of the social group or other traditions and, on the other, the cultural models of specific social groups gain mass appeal and become accessible to everyone.

While theorists insist on exposing the mass culture and only occasionally, and quite reluctantly, acknowledging the right of such "vulgar" genres as variety theater, the circus, or the operetta to exist, experience tells us that the most diverse forms of creative activity and their results will eventually become part of the sphere of mass culture. Some are partially or occasionally "included" in it, while others are part of it from the very beginning. The latter include industrial design, the planning of physical surroundings in accordance with human requirements and specific social ideals. In contrast, for instance, to easel painting, which can only be "included" in the mass culture by the circulation of copies of initially unique works, design belongs to this sphere immediately. Designs are meant for the mass consumer. The use—or consumption—of the products of this activity is also of a mass nature. Many designs are based on mass production and could not exist without it. Others, such as the urban neighborhood, might be unique but are also meant for the mass consumer. Obviously, the consuming "mass" must be differentiated in this case.

It is completely obvious that design ideas, or the purpose of projects, are the products of individual "creators" or small groups of professionals who think alike. The project, however, is not a commodity yet. This is how design differs from other forms of plastic art or, for instance, from literature. The easel painter creates a unique work, and the circulation of copies of it is only an supplement to his work. For the designer, the mass production of the item is an integral part of the creation of his own work. If the designer's idea remains unique, it dies. It must be reproduced and must become a standard, although not necessarily an eternal standard everywhere. Furthermore, the interval between the scale model or experimental model and the mass-produced and mass-consumed item must be minimal.

Whereas uniqueness and inimitability are always necessary attributes of paintings, in design this is more likely to be a drawback, although it is not necessarily a flaw in the design. (It could have to do with the capabilities of technology, etc.) A unique design is often tantamount to an unrealized project. The uniqueness of the work is not the same thing as the uniqueness of the creative idea it embodies. As a rule, paintings are also unique because there is only one copy, or a few in some cases. At the same time, the painting could be weak and unoriginal. A mass-produced design, on the other hand, could be outstanding and original because of the ideas it embodies. (Copies are not the same as imitations: Copies of masterpieces are quite different from derivative and unoriginal works.) Consequently, originality is just as important a creative element in design, in spite of its mass and standardized production, as in the forms of artistic creativity producing "unique" works.

I do not intend to defend the artistic, moral, and other qualities of works lacking in merit or to defend bad taste. It does seem to me, however, that the mass culture—and cultural trends, for that matter—are much more complex phenomena, with much deeper roots in sociohistorical reality, than they seem to their numerous critics in our country and in the West.

If we can move from the subjective evaluations of these phenomena to their objective cultural-historical and sociological analysis, and if we can stop portraying part (the intentionally or unintentionally negative part) as the whole, we will see that the mass culture is not a separate and static entity with a specific set of features, but a particular state, determined by the current phase of historical development. The main distinction of the mass culture is not its "inferior" content, but—however trivial this might sound—its mass appeal. This means that different and even conflicting forms, including classic, folklore, elite, and others, can be its models at different times and with differing degrees of probability.

It is this last fact that encourages us to ensure that works of genuine value, both those created in the past and those being created before our very eyes, are not confined to the almost inaccessible and rarely frequented upper levels of culture or to the lower levels, but that they live

a full life together everywhere. Then perhaps the "top" will not sound so impossibly high in the discussions of the theorists of culture, and the "bottom" will not look as obscenely low as it often looks today.

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Communist Views on Perestroika in the Party

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[Article by Aleksandr Viktorovich Lipskiy, scientific associate at Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and one of our journal's consultants and permanent contributing authors (this article was written at the end of 1989)]

[Text] Five years of perestroika, years which have been more tempestuous than productive, have gone by. Citizens standing in front of empty store counters are arguing about the speed and results of social renewal. Optimists assert that we are restructuring, taking the best of all possible roads. Pessimists are afraid that this is all there is. Sociologists are surreptitiously using up our scarce paper to print questionnaires to study something that is not social reality, but only a projection of it, based on the ratio of optimistic to pessimistic views in the society.

Arguments about perestroika are a waste of time: Judgments have to be based on criteria which do not depend on the feelings of the arguing parties. Any method is good if it is objective. In the final analysis, the situation can also be judged by the number of the "dismissed," no longer relevant anecdotes about the period of stagnation, complete sets of which are kept in official agencies and in private collections. The folklore has lost its edge and its meaning: All the pluses are on the side of perestroika.

According to the calculations of well-known "experts," no more than 10-15 percent of the cases referred to in these anecdotes have been "closed" in the last 5 years. This means that we still have to cover approximately nine-tenths of the distance between points "A" and "B." If we state this in the form of an arithmetic problem, we can ask how quickly the pedestrian must walk if we know that the reforms stipulated in the new edition of the CPSU Program are scheduled to be essentially completed by 2000. From the standpoint of arithmetic, the answer is clear: He must walk two and a half or three times as quickly as before. We derive the same result from a comparison of the rate of labor productivity growth in the last 5 years and the projected rate. If it is to be augmented by 2.3-2.5 times by 2000[!],—i.e., to reach the present U.S. level—it would have to rise more than 6 percent each year for 15 years beginning in 1986. The losses of the last 5 years can only be covered by speeding up the present rate two and a half or three times.

Who (or what) is keeping us from setting sail at the proper speed? Is it an incompetent crew, rotten rigging, the notorious "force majeure," or the absence of agreement on the direction of travel, both on the bridge and on the deck? World experience in handling a ship in a stormy sea suggests that the only hindering factor is the last of these. We know that Stalinism was unable to exterminate all of the competent people, the rigging can be replaced, and the "force majeure," as a term more applicable in bookkeeping than in the natural sciences, is not that frightening when there is unanimity in the struggle against difficulties. The example of such countries as the FRG or Japan, where the people were united after the war by a passion for "bourgeois" democracy and economic prosperity, a passion alien to us for class reasons, speaks for itself.

It appears that the key to the success of perestroika is the achievement of a consensus on the main problems in the society's socioeconomic and political affairs, but we have a different interpretation of this than they do. Over there, "on the other side of the ridge," compromise, based on the real balance of power, is a synonym for unity, but in our country consensus is usually accompanied by the barracks brand of conformity—"Eyes center!" (the center, as we know, is the location of the party, the core of the Soviet sociopolitical system).

The artifact of official party ideology, the messianic idea about the CPSU's leading and directing role in social life, rests on a few sacrosanct propaganda postulates, and perhaps the most important is the imperative of unity, which is given a primitive interpretation as adherence to the single course chosen by the leadership and the unanimity of the CPSU rank and file with regard to this. The monopoly on the truth, appropriated by virtue of dogmas often far removed from living Marxism, demands two things for its self-justification—first, the absence of doubts and conflicts within the monopolist party and, second, the support and enthusiastic unification of the people whose "highest interests" it represents.

Dialectic conflicts with harmony, however, and the two demands cannot be fulfilled simultaneously in a single party system. If the political party turns into something like an order of sword-bearers and achieves monolithic thinking among its followers, unity with the people has to be forgotten, because the variety of interests of all social groups cannot ever fit into the Procrustean bed of the class approach and the general line. If the party decides to actually unite all social forces in the country without resorting to a witch hunt, however, the renunciation of unanimity is inevitable, and the pluralism of opinions and intra-party debate will develop naturally. In other words, the new "thinking" is beginning to make some headway in our domestic affairs as well as in the world arena.

As a structure of political power, the multi-party system "became part of history" in the first post-revolutionary years, and this was followed by the elimination of the intra-party factional struggle, which had some purpose at

least in the sense that it encouraged the conflict of opinions and the debates which are known to reveal the truth. In complete accordance with the theories of physiologist Pavlov, the threat of being accused of opposition activity, reinforced by mass repression, aroused a fear of personal opinion in whole generations, and this eventually evolved into horror at the very thought of expressing dissent. Just recently the press reported the first abstention from a vote by a Supreme Soviet deputy with great emotion and anticipation, as if overcoming the herd instinct in oneself were tantamount to a public auto-da-fe.

The total suppression of dissenting views in the party, which continued even after Stalin, objectively undermined the party's contacts with the masses. To rectify the situation, official "agitation and propaganda" began the intense, and essentially forcible, inculcation of the idea of the indissoluble union of Communists and non-members in the public mind in the early 1970s. The more this statement was repeated, the more skepticism it aroused. This is why the slogan "The people and the party are the same" is already openly doubted, to put it mildly. Meanwhile, the party is being blamed for the collapse of the economy, its alienation from the people, the opportunism of the party staff, etc. Our opponents are cleverly taking advantage of the fact that the ruling party was essentially unable to provide the majority of citizens with the living conditions they deserved—conditions corresponding to the present level of civilization, and not the 1913 level.

If the CPSU claims to play the leading role, they spitefully say, let all of the Communists go and live in one oblast, from which all of the non-members have been evacuated, and let the party members build a glorious future in a couple of five-year plans, and we will see what they come up with. These schismatic arguments would not deserve repetition if they did not imply a genuine wish to portray the party as an institution alien to the society and isolated from it—a wish which, in the final analysis, can only weaken our unity during the course of perestroika.

These attitudes reached their height in the election campaigns of the last 2 years, in which the candidates supported by the party staff were running against candidates who had not won this support. In Moscow, for example, the struggle was launched under this characteristic slogan: "Ivan Ivanovich is the party candidate, but Ivan Nikiforovich is the people's candidate." In principle, the CPSU membership of the candidates and the voters was of no consequence. For most people the election was a chance to vote against the candidates behind whom, as the public saw it, the leaders of rayon, city, and oblast party organizations were looming. As a result, not one of the raykom secretaries in the capital was elected to serve as a deputy of the first Congress of Soviets on 26 March 1989, the chairman of the Moscow gorispolkom did not win either, and most of those who ran uncontested did not win the necessary number of

votes because the absence of rivals was also interpreted as the result of party staff intrigues against undesirable candidates.

Drawing a distinction between the party and the party staff in their minds, the people preferred to support mainly the CPSU members who had no known ties to the staff, and the party's prestige did not suffer. Almost 9 out of every 10 of the newly elected deputies were Communists.

The election results provided clear evidence that party unity simply did not exist, apart from the united staff, because the CPSU rank and file are not lunatics or infiltrating parachutists, but people just like us, part of our diverse multimillion-strong population. I will mention just a single incident, which is extremely interesting and is worth a whole sociological research project. Child psychologist M. Idlinskaya told me that when she asked a 4-year-old boy what kind of games children play in kindergarten, he said they played "Politburo." The children arrive carrying briefcases, and after deciding who should play which roles, hold a meeting in the playhouse and pass decrees. At one meeting they "expelled" their "Yeltsin" from the Politburo. The boy explained the procedure to the inquisitive lady: The accused was simply pushed out of the window....

No, whatever anyone might say, the people and the party are the same! They are the same flesh and blood. They are the same in the sense that the CPSU today is a scale model of the society at large, a copy of its conflicts and problems. We now see that the party ranks include radicals as well as conservatives. The processes taking place in the party are identical to those taking place in the society: The lower levels are taking more initiative, glasnost is becoming more widespread, bureaucrats are objecting to changes, and professional activists are jabbering on and on about perestroika. Therefore, we can assume that the party rank and file are not united by any kind of single ideology differing in any way from the ideology of the non-party masses, because their living conditions and average level of consciousness (not to be confused with conscientiousness) are approximately the same. Nevertheless, although unanimity no longer exists in the party, we still have only a vague idea of the actual state of affairs and do not the precise range of Communist views on domestic politics and intra-organizational matters.

We were given a unique opportunity to satisfy our curiosity to some extent at the very beginning of 1989 when the leadership of one of Moscow's central rayons asked us to learn what Communists thought about the work of the raykom and primary party organizations just before the rayon report and election conference. A preliminary study of the total group—the CPSU members in good standing in Moscow's Sverdlovskiy Rayon—suggested that it could be viewed as a model of the party organization of the "whole capital." A four-stage selection strategy, designed to preserve the parameters of this

model in the sample group, secured the group's acceptable correspondence to the total group and sufficiently representative data. The main method of collecting information was an anonymous questionnaire, which was filled out by almost 3,000 party members from 42 party organizations in the rayon. The sample group included Communists working in industry, construction, transportation, science, education, trade, medicine, the administrative network, public utilities, culture, the press and the mass media, as well as retired individuals and students.

The documents we received from the CPSU raykom indicated that the following areas of work were assigned priority during the report period:

"1. The restructuring of the activities of party committees and bureaus of the CPSU raykom as organs of political leadership;

"2. The promotion of the democratization of affairs in primary party organizations by means of political, personnel, and organizational work, the creation of an atmosphere of free discussion and debate, criticism, and self-criticism, the enhancement of the initiative, personal responsibility, and vanguard role of Communists, and the reinforcement of concerted action based on collective decisions;

"3. The promotion of economic methods of administration through party organizations by establishing the principles of cost accounting and self-funding in economic practices and developing socialist production self-management;

"4. The stepped-up resolution of urgent socioeconomic problems."

These areas became the structural basis of our study, focusing on four separate groups of questions. For understandable reasons, it would be impossible to discuss all of the survey results in this article, and we will therefore mention just a few concerning the first two areas of work. The determination of the degree of Communist unanimity—the main purpose of this article—will be taken up again later.

"When comrades cannot agree, things never go right..."—
I.A. Krylov

Let us begin with the now ritualistic question: "How quickly is perestroika progressing in your work collective?" Most of the Communists (52.9 percent) believe that perestroika is progressing too slowly, and another 16 percent said that it has not even begun in earnest. Table 1 (part "A") illustrates that workers and engineering and technical personnel expressed the most negative opinions. For example, members of the sample group representing different levels of management were three times as likely to choose the response "Quick."

Table 1. A.

Estimates of Speed of Perestroika in Collectives, December 1988-January 1989, %

Categories	Quick	Average	Slow	Perestroika has essentially not begun	No definite opinion, or No opinion
Workers	1.4	21.2	53.1	18.8	5.6
Engineering and technical personnel	1.4	17.6	52.1	22.4	6.4
Managers	3.8	28.7	55.4	9.0	3.1
Average	2.2	23.8	52.9	16.0	5.0
		76.7			

When we analyzed the distribution of these responses in connection with length of CPSU membership, we found that members become less critical as the years go by. The highest number of dissatisfied responses were given by candidates for membership and members who had belonged to the party for less than 15 years. The assumption that this was a natural result of the higher

percentage of managers among respondents who had belonged to the CPSU for more than 15 years was not corroborated, because most of the managers who responded to the questionnaire had belonged to the party for only 6-15 years. Apparently, other factors, generational ones, are at work here.

Table 1. B.

"How Is Perestroika Progressing at Your Enterprise?" (%)

Surveys	Quite vigorously	No significant results yet	Perestroika essentially has not begun	No definite opinion
"Perestroika-1987"	5.1	57.6	34.8	2.6
"Perestroika-1988"	4.1	60.0	33.6	2.3
"Perestroika-1989"	3.8	58.0	38.2	—

The subjective attitudes of Communists toward the current changes were quite similar to the opinions of perestroika revealed in other studies, such as the all-union monitoring surveys called "Perestroika—1987, 1988, 1989," with more than 10,000 respondents in each group, irrespective of party membership (see Table 1, part "B"). The slight shift in the distribution of Communist opinions in 1988 from the response "Not begun" in the direction of "Begun, but no significant results yet" is an accurate reflection of the state of affairs in the country, and especially in the economic sphere. In 1989 the opposite occurred, when it became clear that the new radical economic reform was still quite distant[2, p 11].

Returning to our study, we must say that estimates of the speed of perestroika differed substantially in individual organizations—up to 20 percent in either direction. Most of the Communists at enterprises of physical production and in organizations from the "remainder financing" sphere—i.e., schools, medical establishments,

etc.—had a low opinion of the progress of perestroika. Communists in the rayon internal affairs administration were also extremely critical, and the people most satisfied with the speed of reforms were those working in the "administration and distribution" sphere: in ministries and in the trade network.

Communists had the same opinions of the overall progress of perestroika in the rayon as a whole. More than half of the respondents (60.1 percent) declined to answer, choosing the response "No definite opinion." Of those who did express an opinion, only 0.7 percent of the respondents said it was progressing quickly, 16.3 percent said it was not very fast or very slow, 62.4 percent said it was progressing slowly, and 20.6 percent chose the response "Perestroika has not begun."

Has the work of party organizations improved as a result of the decisions made at the 19th party conference? Let us take a look at Table 2, illustrating the distribution of responses to this question.

Table 2.

Opinions of Changes in Party Committee Performance After 19th Party Conference, %

Categories	Considerable improvement	Negligible improvement	No improvement	No definite opinion
Only workers	10.3	46.0	32.0	11.7
Only engineering and technical personnel	5.6	45.7	36.0	12.6
Only managers	18.0	58.6	16.9	6.5
Average	10.4	50.1	28.7	10.8

As we can see, the opinions of "overseers" (as F. Iskander aptly termed them) differed from the opinions of the rank and file executors of managers' instructions this time as well. Depending on length of party membership, young Communists (under 6 years in the party) and, what is most interesting, veterans (over 25 years in the party) expressed the most critical opinions. In response to a question about raykom performance (worded in the same way), only 4.9 percent of all respondents said it had improved, 20.6 said there had been negligible improvement, and 17.6 percent said there had been no improvement. More than half (56.8 percent) said they had difficulty evaluating the degree of change in the work of the CPSU raykom.

Let us take a look at the evaluations of the performance of party committees in relation to different criteria. Around 51.1 percent of the respondents mentioned improvement in the consideration of Communists' opinions and suggestions (34.9 percent said the situation had not changed, 0.9 percent said it had changed for the worse, and 13 percent had no opinion whatsoever). And

what about glasnost? Are there still areas of party committee work which are not open to discussion? One out of every four Communists (one-fifth of the workers and one-third of the managers) said that glasnost had taken over completely and that there were no forbidden zones at all. Two out of every five workers and managers, however, made the guarded comment that these zones still exist, but they are few in number.

When the work of the CPSU raykom was evaluated from this standpoint, 52.2 percent of the respondents prudently said they had no definite opinion. Among the imprudent, the distribution of responses was the following: 67.5 percent said there were many forbidden topics, 26.5 percent said there were a few, and 6 percent said glasnost was unlimited.

The responses to the next indispensable question, about the existence of conditions for the development of criticism and self-criticism at enterprises and in organizations, completed the evaluation of the perestroika of party organization performance (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Opinions of Conditions for Development of Criticism and Self-Criticism, %

Responses	Average evaluation	Workers	Engineering and technical personnel	Managers
Favorable conditions have been established	32.1	25.2	22.7	41.1
Criticism is discouraged and disregarded	46.7	53.8	53.7	38.9
Criticism is followed by outright harassment	13.9	14.8	16.2	11.5
No definite opinion	7.3	6.2	7.4	8.5

*"There are few real fighters, and there are no leaders..."—
V. Vysotskiy*

Only one out of every five respondents said that his party organization was a united entity and was capable of attaining great long-range objectives (20.6 percent), while 60.8 percent said that their party organizations were not distinguished by much solidarity. 8.8 percent said their party organizations were disunited, with each

person out for himself. 2.5 percent said the party organization was split into opponents and defenders of perestroika, and 7.2 percent declined to answer. Once again, engineering and technical personnel and workers were most critical, and managers were least critical.

Most Communists feel no proprietary sense and do not believe they can influence the state of affairs in the collective (see Table 4).

Table 4.

Responses to Question: "Do You Feel That You Are the Master of Your Collective and Can Influence the State of Affairs in It?" (%)

Categories	No proprietary sense	Almost no proprietary sense	No opinion	Somewhat strong proprietary sense	Definite proprietary sense
Average	21.2	30.2	12.5	22.6	13.5
Only workers	29.0	28.7	17.4	12.3	12.6
Only managers	12.6	21.0	9.8	30.1	26.6

Do party members have a clear idea of their own role in perestroika, and did our respondents acknowledge their personal responsibility? Around 53.8 percent answered yes, 30.6 percent had no clear idea, and 15.5 percent had difficulty answering the question. The opinions of workers and engineering and technical personnel differed dramatically from those of managers. Whereas

only around 45 percent of the former acknowledged their role in perestroika, the figure for the latter is already around 70 percent (!).

Communists also had low opinions of real opportunities to influence the progress of perestroika in the party and to improve the work of their party organizations (see Table 5).

Table 5.

Assessment of Real Opportunities To Influence Course of Perestroika and Improve Work of Party Organization, %

Categories	Many opportunities	Few opportunities	No opportunities
Average	22.3	62.8	14.9
Only workers	16.8	66.0	17.2
Only engineering and technical personnel	15.9	64.7	19.4
Only managers	34.4	58.1	7.5

All categories of respondents were almost unanimous in the evaluation of their opportunities to influence perestroika in the rayon and the work of the CPSU raykom: 6.6 percent said there was more opportunity, 26.5 percent said there was less, and 66.9 percent said there was no opportunity.

An analysis revealed a close connection between the opinions cited above and the assessments of the role of

primary party organizations in perestroika at enterprises and in organizations. The more party members were aware of their own personal role in perestroika, the more authority their party organization had among the laboring masses. In general, only one out of every four Communists said that his party organization played a leading role in perestroika (see Table 6).

Table 6.

Evaluation of Actual Role of Primary Party Organization in Perestroika at Enterprises and in Organizations, %

Categories	Leading role	No special role	No authority
Average	25.2	60.4	14.4
Only workers	25.1	54.0	19.9
Only engineering and technical personnel	18.3	62.4	19.3
Only managers	31.6	60.4	8.0

Evaluations of the party rayon committee were even lower. Some 7.8 percent of the respondents said the raykom had considerable authority, 23.5 percent said it had little authority, 23.2 percent said that virtually no one respected the CPSU raykom, and 45.5 percent had no definite opinion.

The leading role presupposes the existence of a leader in the collective, capable of heading the perestroika process, but most of the respondents saw no such person in their group (see Table 7).

Table 7.

Opinions Regarding Presence of Genuine Leader in Collective, %

Categories	Yes	No	I do not know
Average	31.0	41.6	27.2
Only workers	20.9	42.6	36.5
Only engineering and technical personnel	25.0	48.2	26.8
Only managers	40.7	33.3	25.9

Whom did Communists see as the leader? It was usually the economic manager of the enterprise (67.4 percent), and only 14.1 percent named members of the party committee as leaders. The workers were less likely to see economic managers as leaders—only 47.6 percent of the workers said this. The managers were more likely—83.2 percent, and the figure for engineering and technical personnel was 70.5 percent. The most surprising result, however, was that virtually no economic managers saw party committee members as leaders (only 7.3 percent), and the situation was the same among engineering and technical personnel—9.1 percent. Workers and employees were more likely to name party committee members as leaders (20.4 percent and 21.2 percent respectively). Why? There are probably two reasons: First, the tenacious technocratic attitudes of economic and production managers; second, the new party organization members who have joined the staff of party committees in place of people who established their routine during the years of stagnation—i.e., the selfsame economic managers. In general, it is clear that party committees are not ready to direct the course of perestroika at enterprises in the rayon yet.

Finally, let us look at the Communists' personal evaluations of the performance of primary party organizations (see Table 8).

Table 8.

Responses to Question: "Were Communists Satisfied with the Performance of Your Party Committee (Or Bureau) During the Report and Election Campaign, and What Is Your Personal Evaluation of Its Performance?" (%)

Categories	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	No definite opinion
Average	74.0	16.0	10.0
Workers	68.4	19.6	12.0
Engineering and technical personnel	68.0	21.0	11.0
Managers	79.4	11.7	8.9

These are the average evaluations for each category. They were much lower at some enterprises. In seven primary party organizations the performance of the previous party committee was given a satisfactory evaluation by 50-59 percent of the Communists. In 12 others, however, from 80 to 100 percent of the Communists were satisfied with the performance of party committees. It is significant that throughout industry, transportation, science, and construction, the party committees of only the enterprises and organizations which had made the move to economic accountability were given a high evaluation.

In our opinion, one of the most interesting questions was the one which revealed the measures the respondents were willing to support for the reinforcement and rectification of party ranks. Almost one out of every two (45.7 percent) chose "the resolute expulsion of opportunists, self-seeking individuals, and morally defective people from the party ranks." Around one out of every eight (12.9 percent) proposed the radical reduction of party membership, and one out of every ten (10.8 percent) suggested a longer probation period for candidates for CPSU membership. Three out of every ten favored the renunciation of the representative principle (quotas) of party membership.

This suggests that Communists themselves feel that clearing the deadwood out of the CPSU is the most important current objective. It is interesting that only half of the party members mentioned this indisputably natural requirement for the real Communist. It might be possible that some people really believe there is not a single scoundrel in the party, but I think there are almost no Communists who are isolated enough from society to be taken for Old Believers from the taiga. In any case, they did not constitute a significant percentage of our respondents. This means that around half of the Communists did not choose this response because, even if they are not "self-seeking," it is at least quite possible that they joined the CPSU for opportunistic reasons or acted on other, far from ideological motives.

Comparisons of the distribution of responses to several sociodemographic characteristics did not reveal any significant differences (deviations from the average values of linear distributions) based on gender, education, age, or length of CPSU membership. Differences were only discovered during the analysis of the connection between responses and the social status of the respondent. Only one out of every five workers (around 20 percent) supported the renunciation of the representative principle of new membership. This was a much lower figure than in the other categories (employees, engineering and technical personnel, managerial personnel, retired individuals, students, and others). Almost half of the artistic and scientific personnel, for example, wanted the quotas to be cancelled. This difference warrants analysis: It appears that workers and the intelligentsia have diametrically opposed views on the quotas. Why?

First of all, this could be a reaction to the humiliating restrictions on CPSU membership for the intelligentsia and the continued discrimination against non-party members in promotions to managerial positions. Second, this is a comparative indicator of aspirations to join the party (irrespective of inner, individual motives), natural at the end of the fifth year of perestroika. It is no secret that workers themselves are in no hurry to apply for membership today, just as 10 years ago, and that "the right kind of work," as they say in party committees, has to be conducted among them. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, never had to be asked before: There was always a waiting list.

Whereas opportunistic considerations—why hide the fact?—were once the main reason many people joined the party, this is a much weaker motive today. In an atmosphere of increasing criticism of the party, high demands on its members, and intense struggle over perestroika, "life in Russia" has become much less happy and carefree for wheeler-dealers with party membership cards. Now people of that type are in no hurry to join the party because they are waiting to see which side wins.

We can conclude from this that when we kept the quotas in force, we were, in a certain sense, sawing off the branch on which we were sitting—i.e., we were keeping some active fighters for perestroika out of the party and, furthermore, in view of the progressive intelligentsia's inherent qualities, these were people who were objectively more active than most of the laboring public. Suspicion of the intelligentsia—of all things!—is permanently engraved in the genetic code of the bureaucratic state, or, as it is commonly called today, the authoritarian system. Examples of this can be seen not only in the way the intelligentsia was viewed and treated by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, but also throughout the history of the Russian State. It appears that many of today's administrators would immediately agree with Count Kurlov, the chief of police who compared the intelligentsia to rust, because it destroyed everything and created nothing. Was this the origin of the pejorative

term "corroded intelligentsia," which came into being during the years of repression?

The workers voted for the retention of class privileges in admittance to the CPSU and for limited access to the party for anyone "not from the lathe or the plow." What does this tell us? First of all, suspicions of intellectuals are characteristic of the working class as well as the powers that be. They began to be cultivated in earnest in the USSR at the end of the 1920s, beginning with the persecution of "bourgeois specialists" and farces like the Industrial Party trial. Second, the laboring public, especially the working class, is suffering from a severe crisis of faith in all managers, "executives," the administrative staff, and employees in general. According to Suslov, however, we were living in a completely democratic state and an almost classless society, which had supposedly been achieved when all strata and social groups had agreed with the ideological position of the working class!

After hearing the responses to just about one-tenth of the questionnaire, the reader is justified in wondering exactly what all of this means. The situation is paradoxical because the party still regards public opinion as a single entity. This creates the impression that the average statistical member of the CPSU, judging by these responses, does not know exactly what he wants: "Maybe democracy, or maybe sturgeon with horseradish." As soon as we realize that each opinion represents a separate individual with his own personal grievances, we can clearly see that a crisis is brewing in the party.

At the beginning of the article we agreed to view the CPSU as a scale model of the society, and this means that the same processes are occurring in the social community. In other words, a crisis is brewing, and this is more or less apparent to any discerning citizen with a red card in his pocket.

"But what does all of this mean? It means we should live..."

Is there a solution to the present state of affairs within the party? Strictly speaking, if we do not count the appeals to "live in harmony," there are probably only two possible scenarios. First, everything could be left as it is. The ban on dissenting views in the CPSU ranks will completely and finally discredit the thesis that "the people and the party are the same" in the near future. The party will cease to represent the population in miniature, and most of the population will move from passive disapproval of the party to active anticommunism, which will result either in the intensification of totalitarianism (to the point of a dictatorship more extreme than Stalin's) or outbursts of mob indignation as in Romania (to the point of the physical removal of the Communist Party from the political stage). The desire for unanimity within the party, reinforced by repressive regulations, will force some CPSU members to choose between keeping their membership cards and remaining silent or giving up their cards and venting their dissatisfaction.

The second alternative is the complete elimination of bans on the free expression of opinions and the democratization of intra-party affairs. This will lead unavoidably to the revision of the Stalinist canons of conformity and party discipline, and this, in turn, will put an end to the tenacious idea of the party's leading role. Subsequent events can also move in two directions: either a multi-party system "de jure," with the retention of the "ruling party" principle, or the same system "de facto," with power transferred to the soviets, officially apolitical bodies of social self-government, but made up of deputies from politicized social organizations expressing the interests of various strata and groups (and even calling themselves parties).

Of course, events in the CPSU could also adhere to both patterns: for example, slight democratization, followed by the exchange of party membership cards (activity for the sake of activity), and then a new tightening of the screws for dessert.

In any situation, they say, the number of possible outcomes is equivalent to $n+1$ (reserve). This sounds particularly appropriate to me today. The reserve plan—or, more precisely, the emergency plan—suggests that..

"Without waiting for praise, we will clean our white feathers"—B. Okudzhava

Left and right wings, factions, and blocs in the CPSU are fictitious in a situation distinguished by a single-party monopoly. Pretending that the pluralism of opinions and different ideological platforms are possible in this kind of party is incorrect at the very least. The idea determines the structure of the organization, its goals, and the means of their attainment. The RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks) (1912-1918)] was conceived and established as a means of achieving political supremacy. The moral justification for the claims to power was the arousal of progressive thinking in the backward masses and the exercise of authority (for a certain amount of time) in the interests of the majority, even if the majority was still unaware of these interests. Using "progressive" ideas to penetrate the essentially hostile territory of human minds unprepared to seek the realization of the communist ideal, the party took power into its own hands and then continued to do this every day and everywhere for the next 70 years. But from whom can power be taken in the absence of other authorities? Only from one's own people. This is abnormal. The CPSU can and must be divided into several parts, because only rapid "vegetative" self-propagation can help to normalize the processes of the struggle for power, without waiting until weeds like "Pamyat" start sprouting.

First of all, the CPSU should actually, and not just verbally, assume full responsibility for the fact that our country is lagging behind the developed civilized states in terms of economic and social criteria. There is no other alternative, because a single-party system means that a single party is responsible. Second, it is important

for all of us to realize that the CPSU can exist, can act as the people's vanguard, and can accomplish the effective political leadership of the society only in the presence of real opponents. It is no coincidence that the English word "party" is derived from the word "part," which naturally presupposes the existence of at least one other part of the whole. Whatever other people may have accomplished, the English were the pioneers in this area.

The existence of two or three (or more?) parties with Marxist or general democratic aims in the country will not be inconsistent at all with our common goal of building a just and flourishing society. It is not goals that should compete, but the means of their attainment. A new Marxist, workers', democratic, socialist, or whatever other party will not hurt the cause of socialism, because we are not even sure whether we have already built it or not, and if we have, we are not sure it is the right socialism.

The consequences of the arbitrary division of the CPSU could be debated, but this is essentially unimportant. It is much more important to decide what the Soviet people and the Soviet social order will gain from this. First of all, a multi-party system will unavoidably put each part of the political structure under the complete control of the society, which will force all of the people exercising power to act in accordance with the laws and interests of this society, and not against them, as they did in the past and as they are still doing today. Second, this will establish the necessary conditions to stop the process of universal de-professionalization and finally begin the enhancement of the comparative (in relation to other nations) effectiveness of our order, promised (or bequeathed) to us by V.I. Lenin. Competition for power will objectively promote the "removal of the cheap assortment" from the party staff. Without this, functionaries will simply "drift" gradually over to the soviets or any other new power structures and will once again do the only thing they are good for—controlling the distribution of resources—i.e., "holding on and not letting go."

The third and final advantage is that the filling of the political vacuum will diminish the threat of the undesirable politicizing of the informal organizations which are now trying their best to infiltrate the vacant niches in the power pyramid. They will tend to their own affairs, and the Central Committee will no longer have to issue helpful hints on ways of counteracting the informal groups "making political demands." The future will show whether any of this will happen. We can only wait hopefully for the 28th CPSU Congress.

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Professional Growth of Young Specialists

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[Article by G.N. Sokolova and V.G. Drakokhrust]

[Text] Negative tendencies in the professional employment of specialists in the modern corporations (scientific-production associations) of Belorussia began to grow stronger in the 1980s. This was a period of transition from their traditional structure (scientific and engineering centers, design and technological bureaus, an experimental production unit, and a plant) to the "flexible" structure (separate scientific-technical complexes working on specific problems). It led to the development of several of the specific characteristics of scientific and engineering labor.

First of all, a system is being established for the continuous improvement of skills and augmentation of knowledge, guaranteeing the increased professional training of personnel. The traditional forms that are compulsory for each specialist have been supplemented with active personal involvement in groups and seminars dealing with specific problems. The need to constantly supplement knowledge stems from the emphasis on fundamentally new technical designs for the use of scientific ideas in production. Second, the concentration of experts with different areas of specialization and styles of thinking in the corporations is accompanied by professional mobility, defined as the broadening of outlook and the acquisition of the skills of interdisciplinary research and a comprehensive approach to the resolution of scientific and technical problems. Third, there is a new functional mobility, representing a broader range of professional activity. It occurs when the scientist or engineer participates in all stages of the cycle—from the scientific idea to its materialization—and promotes the expansion of professional knowledge and skills, the elevation of professional standards, and the assignment of priority to high-quality results. The workplace of the specialist grows broader, taking in the experimental production unit, design bureau, and plant along with the laboratory. Besides this, the length of the "research-production" process is shortened, and this intensifies all of the work involved in it.

The new type of professional activity conflicted with the earlier stereotypes of the extensive use of young specialists. Unexpected problems arose. On the one hand, the mastery of new levels of scientific and engineering labor is contributing to more flexible scientific and technical thinking, but, on the other, the possibilities for the realization of creative potential are still limited.

Creative Potential of the Specialist

When the creative potential of the specialist is described in literature, the following components are generally singled out for discussion:

- 1) Cognitive—the ability to assimilate new knowledge and professional experience independently;
- 2) Valuable—the willingness to participate personally in the accomplishment of socially important scientific and production tasks on the basis of personal values;
- 3) Communicative—the ability and skills of communication and the development of professional and personal contacts with colleagues;
- 4) Practical-transformational—the professional knowledge reflecting the specialist's ability to participate effectively in professional activity.

All of the components of the specialist's creative potential are closely interrelated. Judging by the results of comparative republic studies the authors conducted in 1983 and 1989,¹ however, the unequal development of individual components precludes a balanced relationship.

Specialists acquire their cognitive potential in higher academic institutions, but education can only be deemed successful when it provides specialists with knowledge and with the methodology of its acquisition. The VUZ training of specialists is flawed because of the absence of this methodology, and this is why the graduate has to spend a long time accumulating practical experience instead of working on production problems. The materials of the survey indicate that only 17 percent of the specialists regarded themselves as professionals immediately after graduation, 37 percent felt that they were professionals after 1-3 years, and another 46 percent did not feel this way until 4 or 5 years after graduation. It usually takes 3 years for a young person to adapt to production, and this is not a matter of growing accustomed to new production conditions or a new sociopsychological situation, but of continued professional training to the point at which it meets the requirements of scientific and technical progress.

Adaptation and professionalization are two separate processes, but they do depend on one another. The mastery of a specialty is impossible without the accumulation of experience in professional communication along with work skills. Becoming part of a new group entails fewer difficulties and takes about half as much time as the mastery of production skills. Up to 80 percent of all young associates "get used to" the collective in the first 6 months of work, and only 46.5 percent overcome production problems during this period. The difference could be due to the fact that the enterprise is usually working in fundamentally new fields of science which are still not part of the specialist's professional training in the higher academic institution.

When young specialists begin their professional activity in a scientific-production association, they participate in each stage of the "research-production" cycle and, consequently, in scientific work as well. Which type of activity do they prefer? The results of our survey indicated that 24 percent of the respondents had chosen

auxiliary jobs not requiring any scientific knowledge, 20 percent were performing complex production functions for which the VUZ did not give them adequate preparation, and 6 percent were managing a collective although they lacked the vocational and special knowledge needed for this. This means that the VUZ is responsible for half of the cases in which the content of labor does not correspond to the educational background. The other half of our respondents said there were shortcomings in the organization of their production activity.

The motivational nucleus of the specialist's professional self-assertion includes such values as work on engrossing projects, the improvement of skills, the existence of congenial colleagues and co-workers, work supervised by a highly qualified administrator (with an emphasis on professional communication) in an atmosphere of precisely organized labor and, finally, high wages.

The motivational nucleus determines the young specialist's degree of activity in production. If the conditions of the professional employment of specialists do not meet their interests and expectations, however, the opposite effect is apparent in the very first years: The specialist takes a passive professional stance.

A comparative analysis of the 1983 and 1989 results revealed the dynamics of the motivational nucleus and the degree to which the real opportunities provided by the work corresponded to the interests of young scientists and engineers. The relative importance of two factors—the opportunity to work on interesting projects and to improve skills—depends on the degree to which the individual is involved in the creative process of developing and incorporating scientific and technical innovations and fundamentally new scientific design and development projects. The young specialist's choice of specific professional interests is accompanied by an awareness of the productivity of communication with competent colleagues. Whereas in 1983 the young specialists valued colleagues who were simply good people with whom it was pleasant to maintain a good relationship, 6 years later the situation had changed dramatically. Highly professional and competent colleagues ranked highest. Businesslike cooperation with congenial professionals is preferable to friendships with co-workers.

It is true that the gap between the ideal and reality was much broader in 1989 than in 1983. The possibilities of working in an atmosphere of precisely organized labor, in comfortable conditions, and under the supervision of a competent administrator remained the same, but the projected value of these possibilities rose considerably. The continued extensive use of young specialists during the initial stage of their career, however, is still diminishing their creative potential. The "beginner's project" for the new researcher is usually not a complex (and therefore creative) project requiring him to use all of his intellectual and spiritual strength, but a partially completed fragment of an older colleague's project. The organization of labor on this level has a negative effect

on the immature professional character of the young researcher and gives rise to professional apathy and indifference.

The young researcher must be entrusted immediately with a project with a high level of risk if he is to become a researcher with a strong character. Organizations are not inclined, however, to take this risk. Given the present structure of management, the head of the subdivision is responsible for the final results. Whatever the distribution of functions, the personal responsibility of other associates is always negligible. This is why there has been an increasingly acute shortage of research qualifications and skills, and even of strength of character and the ability to make ingenious decisions and to lead the collective. If the tendency toward the extensive use of specialists continues, the problem of professional adaptation will be accompanied by a shortage of scientific leaders in general.

The traditional system for the professional employment of young specialists de-emphasizes creativity and excludes some of them (11 percent) from the integral functions of creative inquiry and decisionmaking. Around one-third of the respondents described their work in their specialty as conscientious performance requiring no independent initiative.

The passivity of young scientists is engendered by egalitarian tendencies in the payment of wages, inadequate material and moral incentives, and delays in professional advancement: 70 percent of the specialists had not risen above the level of third-class engineers in the first 10 years after graduation from the VUZ. The professional advancement connected with salary increases is complicated by the overall stability of personnel and is not always appealing because it presupposes more active involvement in administrative activity. Professional independence, on the other hand, does not earn the necessary compensation and social recognition.

In line with the informal system of division of labor in scientific-production collectives, each researcher masters one or several functions: scientific leadership, the generation of ideas, erudition, and criticism. Almost half of the young scientists mentioned a preference for criticism (not always constructive, incidentally). The second most popular function was erudition—37.1 percent. Fewer scientists wanted to generate ideas and lead the scientific team: 34 percent and 13.9 percent respectively. The change in the priorities of young scientists as a result of constant tutelage by older colleagues and the absence of the need to make independent decisions is certainly disturbing. The qualities of scientific leadership are in shortest supply at this time. Some 86-89 percent of the specialists surveyed associated the achievement of valuable creative results with the need for the constant elevation of professional standards. This must be regarded as a positive tendency. The improvement of the skills of associates between 1983 and 1989 is reflected in the higher number of young candidates of sciences, graduate students, and doctoral candidates (an increase

of 50-100 percent), in the higher skill categories of one-third of the young engineers, and in professional advancement. During that period the real opportunities to work without any substantial overloads doubled (according to the specialists' estimates), and opportunities to improve skills tripled. Young scientists have two or three times as many opportunities to work on their own ideas and on interesting projects. Opportunities to realize transformational potential, however, are still below average, and this certainly cannot increase job satisfaction. Whereas 42 percent of the specialists were dissatisfied or indifferent on this score in 1983, the figure was 31 percent in 1989.

A comparative analysis of the 1983 and 1989 surveys suggests that the effectiveness of the professional establishment of specialists depends on the degree to which negative tendencies can be surmounted in the use of their creative potential and on the reduction of their level of social and professional passivity. This could be achieved by developing the cognitive, evaluative, communicative, and transformational components as interrelated elements of creative potential.

Footnotes

1. There was almost no change in distribution by gender during the survey period: In 1983, 48 percent of the respondents were men and 52 percent were women, and the respective figures in 1989 were 49 percent and 51 percent; the average age of the young specialists rose slightly, from 26 in 1983 to 28 in 1989; in 1983, 83 percent of the respondents were engineers and 17 percent were scientific associates, and the respective figures for 1989 were 80 percent and 20 percent.

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00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 29 Jun 90)

Half a Century of Silence (All-Union Population Census of 1937) (Yu.A. Polyakov, V.B. Zhiromskaya, and I.I. Kiselev) pp 30-52

Which Road Led to Ham (S.N. Savelyev) pp 66-78

Technological Aspects of Social Engineering (V.V. Shcherbina) pp 79-86

Social Forecast and Social Innovation (I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada) pp 87-93

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Alternative Service: Domestic and Foreign Experience (V.S. Novikov and M.A. Timofeyev) pp 111-118

Names (P.A. Florenskiy) pp 134-141

Letters to Editor pp 142-148

New Sociological Research Center pp 149-150

"Eros" as a Social Phenomenon... (L.V. Polyakov) . pp 151-156

Sociologist's Bookshelf pp 57, 78, 133, 150

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